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ABSTRACT
This thesis is a study of international relations theory and the case of the Lebanese 
state’s relations with Syria between 1975 and 2002. It aims to answer the following 
questions: (1) Why has Lebanon generally “bandwagoned” with Syria, a country which 
has managed to intervene in and subdue it at the expense of Lebanese sovereignty? (2) 
How have Lebanese state officials, along with other political actors, tried to 
manipulate Syria for their own interests, whether to defend Lebanese sovereignty to 
maintain and increase theii" status, or to contain and appease their rivals and 
opponents? (3) Parallel to the discussions generated by these two questions, which 
kinds of theory are relevant to or best explain Lebanese relations with Syria? 
Specifically this study demonstrates that the behavior of a penetrated weak state, 
Lebanon, toward a regional middle power, Syria, cannot usefully be explained by 
simple realism’s state-to-state power balancing model. Rather, it is necessary to 
differentiate the multitude of state (office-holders) and sub-state actors. In addition, 
their behavior can only be explained by a combination of factors identified in a variety 
of theories: reaction to an external threat (simple realism) which explain a very few 
cases; “omni-alignments” against interrelated threats (complex realism) which result 
from the weaknesses of the Lebanese state and which explain much more; still 
powerful transstate ties (constructivism) which themselves needed to be understood in  
terms of the contradiction between sovereignty and identity and which have some 
impact; and complex interdependence and shared interests (pluralism) which 
generally exist between Lebanese and Syrian elites.
vu
I . INTRODUCTION : ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
This study focuses on current Lebanese-Syrian relations, especially with regard to 
the Lebanese state's dealings with Syria, and, specifically on Lebanese political 
actors’ attempts to both use and appease Syria in order to maintain their interests 
and a measure of autonomy. The aim of this introductory chapter is to lay out the 
broad perspective reflected in the thesis by briefly surveying the literature on 
Lebanese-Syrian relations, and by situating this doctoral research conceptually 
within the fields of international relations theory.
1. BRIEF SURVEY OF PREVIOUS WORKS
There is an abundance of works dealing with Lebanese and Syrian affeirs, with the 
number of studies on Lebanese-Syrian relations dramatically increasing after the 
outbreak of the Lebanese civil war in 1975, which saw the beginning of Syria’s 
continuing deep involvement in Lebanon. Most of the literature focuses on Syria’s 
motivations and behaviour. Numerous interpretations of Syrian policy are put 
forward by a variety of academics and journalists, with analyses falling mainly into 
one of two categories, according to whether they see Syrian policy toward Lebanon as 
being based on external or internal ffictors.
Works representing the former trend are Ayi-Ran(1991), Chalala(1985), 
Dawisha(1980 and 1984), Deeb(1989), Faksh(1992), Harris(1985), Hinnebusch(1986 
and 1998), and Seale(1988). Their interpretations are essentially that, while the 
conflict in Lebanon gave Syria both opportunities and causes for intervening in 
Lebanon, which allowed it to help its aUies in difficult situations and to pacify the 
country as an arbiter, the turmoil also raised the possibility that it would give Israel 
an excuse to intervene militarily in Lebanon. Since Lebanon, especially the Biqaa 
area, is known as the “soft underbelly” of Syria, Syrian policy was determined by the
threat to its national security presented by the dvil war, and by the possibility tbat 
the resulting partition would open the door to an Israeli presence in Lebanon, As a 
result, the Syrian intervention aimed mainly to save Lebanon from partition and to 
stop the conflict, although Damascus sometimes fenned the fittin g  to its advantage. 
The Israeli threat continues to be a key fector even now that the conflict has ended. 
Works subscribing to the “internal” interpretation include Abukhalil(1994), 
Lawson(1996), Ma’oz(1988), and Hpes(1990). Among these, a sectarian explanation 
maintains that Asad’s Alawi-dominated regime feared that Muslim, especially Sunni, 
power and success in Lebanon would affect Sunni behaviour in Syria and ultimately 
lead to a Sunni rebellion against the Ba’th regime. According to this view, Syrian 
policy toward Lebanon was shaped by the internal security situation of the regime. 
An economic explanation, such as that offered by Lawson, argues rather tbat poor 
economic conditions, such as capital shortages, led the Asad regime to seek to exploit 
Lebanese economic assets as a means of maintaining the loyalty of Syrian clients of 
Lebanese businesses.
There are a number of weaknesses in the latter explanation. First of aU, since Asad 
seized power in 1970, the domestic condition has been stable, except for a few 
occasions such as the Hama revolt in 1982 and the period of his iUness between 1983 
and 1984. By subordinating the sub-state groups in Syria, Asad freed bis policy from 
domestic pressures and was thus able to focus on a foreign poHqy based on national 
interest, the main thrust of which was to protect Syria from the Israeli threat. This 
was so even to the extent that Syria aligned with the Maronites in 1976, so as to 
avoid the possibility of a decisive Muslim-PIX) victory inviting Israeli penetration 
into Lebanon. A second weakness is that, although it is true tbat there has been a 
degree of Lebanese-Syrian economic interdependence, with Syrian elites profiting 
from it mainly tbrou^ smuggting, economic interest does not seem to offer a major 
explanation for Asad’s behaviour. During the civil war, “the intervention antagonised
his Soviet patron and even when—m the eighties—the Syrian economy was actually 
in crisis, he continued policies in Lebanon which jeopardised aid from Saudi Arabia 
and the Arab Gulf states (drives against the PLO and Maronites) and then from Iran 
(conflict with HizboUah).”^  During the post-civil war period, Syria has continued to 
support HjzboUah’s military activities in the South, although it has occasionally 
constricted the group lest Israel intervene militarily If Syria were to force the group 
to cease military activity against Israel, it could gain economically in terms both of 
American and European investment and aid. In the long run, Syrian behaviour and 
motivations seem mainly to be formed by its security concerns with regard to Israel. 
Since Syria has tended to frivour the status-quo and tried to stabilise Lebanon, the 
Lebanese government has generally taken a positive view of Syria, which could 
explain the Lebanese bandwagomng vis-à-vis Syria.
In a number of works which focus on Lebanese political and economic dynamics 
during the dvil war, representatives of which are Abul-Husn(1998), Deeb(1980), 
Dessouki(1988), Koury(1976), Hanf(1993), Petran(1987), Rabinovich(1985), and 
Sirreiyeh(1989), there are certainly references to Syrian Actors. Since Syria in 
particular was one of the states which were deeply involved in the Lebanese conflict 
by using transstate ties with Lebanese sub-state groups, the inteiplay between 
domestic and external Actors was decisive in shaping the conflict; and both sete of 
Actors were so mterconnected as to be scarcely distinguisbable, as has been 
maintained m many studies, such as Day(1986), Gordon(1983), and Haddad(1985).
There have only been a few studies, such as Hitti(1989), Salame(1988), and Salem 
(1994), which focus on the Lebanese state and its foreign policy. This is because, 
unlike the countries “where foreign policy remains insuAted from the influence of 
domestic politics and well guarded by the regime in power, the demarcation line
 ^Hinnebusch (1998) p. 142.
between foreign and domestic politics is blurred in Lebanon.”^  It is indeed very 
difficult to trace the foreign policy of the divided and penetrated Lebanese state. 
“What is foreign policy and what is domestic policy in a country thoroughly 
dominated by foreign forces?’® Salame asks whether it is possible that the polarised 
and dominated Lebanese state even has a foreign policy at ad. To answer these 
questions, Salem’s following statement seems suggestive. “Mdth most of the country 
under domination by outside powers and tbe state having virtually no area of 
uncontested jurisdiction, all policy, even that which would otherwise be considered 
domestic, must be negotiated and cleared througb outside channels. In a sense, all 
policy is foreign policy.”^  AU of these explanations pAce great emphasA on the 
dominance over Lebanon of external power, espedaUy that of Syria, and Lebanon’s 
abUity^  to influence or react to Sjrian hegemony has been neglected This study aims 
to ffll this gap in the Uterature.
Have Lebanon and its elites been simple puppets of Syria? This study argues not. It 
took S)ria years to assert hegemony over the fracturous Lebanese Actions and it 
could only do so by striking alliances m th Lebanese elites and movemente which, in 
principle, required it to make concessions to their mterests and concede them a 
modicum of autonomy. The post dvil war period may be one of Syrian hegemony but 
rule from Damascus is very much mdirect through Lebanese clients who have their 
own interests.
Since the same difficulties in distingiiishing between domestic and foreign policy 
can be seen in the case of post-war Japan under the “indirect rule” of US occupation, 
it is worth considering the extent to which the Lebanese experience during the post­
war period is analogous to the experience of Japan, referring to the discussion of
"mtti(1989)p.3.
® Salem (1994) p.69.
4 Salem (1994) p.69.
Japanese “diplomaty’ under the GHQ/SCAP® occupation after the Second World 
War (from 1945 to 1951). lokibe maintains that there was no Japanese “diplomacy” 
in a formal sense, but there was a de fecto diplomacy between the Japanese 
government and the GHQ/SGAP mthin Tbkyo. In other words, although Japanese 
sovereignty  ^ was restricted and the relationship was not based on equality, the 
Japanese government continued a daily and close form of diplomacy with the 
GHQ/SCAP in order to secure tbe incorporation of its opinions in GHQ/SGAP 
policies and also in order to be able to implement these policies.®
It therefore seems meaningful to talk about the Lebanese state and its “diplomacy” 
under the foreign power, Syria. This study aims, by focusing on how the Lebanese 
state has coped with Syrian power since the outbreak of Lebanese d^di war, to 
answer tbe following questions:
(1) Why has Lebanon generally “bandwÊ^oned” with Syria, a country which has 
mangled to intervene in and subdue it at the expense of Lebanese sovereignty?
(2) How have Lebanese state officials, along with other political actors, tried to 
manipulate Sjria for their own interests, whether to defend Lebanese sovereignty to 
maintain and increase their status, or to contain and appease their rivals and 
opponents?
(3) Parallel to the discussions generated by these two questions, which kinds of 
theory are relevant to or best explain Lebanese relations with Syria?
The following section offers a conceptualisation of Lebanese and Syrian poHqy and 
behaviour, and of relations between the two countries.
2. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THEORIES RELEVANT TO THIS STUDY
® GHQ/SGAP means General Headquarters of the Supreme Gommander for the 
Allied Powers.
® For the details of this discussion, see lokibe (1997 and 1999).
The classic paradigm of interstate politics, that of “simple realism”, focuses on 
states’ interactions. Interstate politics is conceptually distinguished from, although 
linked indirectly to, domestic politics. States are the agencies through which sub­
state actors deal with each other. In other words, iransxiational interactions, the 
movement of material or non-material items across state boundaries when at least 
one actor is not an agent of a state or an interstate oi^anisation, are neglected. This 
classic paradigm A illustrated in Figure I .
State     State
Interstate politics «.....
j j Domestic politics ———•
Sub-State Sub-state
Figure I
The additional hnes drawn in Figure H indicate transnational interactions. 
Transnational reAtions are those networks, assocAtions or interactions which cut 
across national societies, creating linkages between indhdduaA, groups,
organisations, and communities within and between different states. A 
dAiinguAhing feature of transnational reAtions A that they by-pass states, because 
they operate within the social domain and beyond direct state control (Figure H) J
State Statej \ Interstate Politics
I I Domestic Politics — —
^  { Transnational Interactions —  ----
Sub-State Sub-State
Figure H
ThA study vdU argue that Lebanese reAtions with Syria are best conceptualised by
 ^These two modeA were constructed based on Nye and Keohane (1972) and Mcgrue 
(1992).
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the latter model. In this regard, it A important to recognise that Lebanon has not 
been a unitary actor and that powerful sub-state actors in Lebanon have in most 
cases kept trans-state ties with Syria. In effect, the state-centric and state-to-state 
power balancing approach, which A tbe backbone of what might be called “simple 
realism”, seems not to be generally applicable to Lebanese-Syrian case. Rather, a 
modified or “complek’ version of reafism which includes domestic threats, and some 
theoretical rivaA of reaHsm such as constructivAm (identity) and pluralAm (shared 
interests between elites) seem to be more relevant to thA case. The combination of 
these three theories, complex realAm, constructivism, and pluralAm, allows a better 
understanding of the complex dimenmons of Lebanese-Syrian reAtions.
Simple realAm assumes that, as a government represents tbe whole of society, its 
chief foreign policy concern A security threats, and that as threats are external, the 
state elite behaves as a rational actor trying to manage the international scene. This 
assumption seems applicable to Syria where Asad consolidated bA power and tried 
to maximise tbe autonomy and security of the state in regional arenas by exploiting 
the great powers. But, A it applicable to Lebanon threatened by both Israel and 
Syria? Were simple realism to adequately model Lebanese behaviour, we would 
expect Lebanon to find support against these threats in great powers, particularly 
the USA or its traditional Western ally France. It could appease Israel and the USA 
as a counter-baAnce to Syria, or it could appease Syria as a counter-balance to Israel. 
In fact, except in a few cases where Lebanon has allied with Israel and the USA 
against Syria, it has generally appeased and ‘handwagoned” with Syria. Simple 
realAm does not explain thA policy, particularly why it tends to appease rather than 
balance against Syria, the most sustained threat to its sovereignty.
Let us turn to complex realAm to see if it provides a better key to explaining 
Lebanese behaviour. Complex realAm assumes that unstable governments in the 
Third World states are threatened not only externally but also by groups within their
own societies, and that these external and internal threats are interrelated. 
Lebanese sub-state groups are traditionally powerful and able to form ties with 
outside powers which threaten Lebanese autonomy or security thereby constituting 
a threat to the Lebanese state. In this theory Lebanese elites could bandwagon with 
Syria, as a lesser threat, in order to deal with a perceived greater internal threat; 
alternatively it could align itself with domestic groups, clients of Israel or the West, 
to balance against Syria. In general, the latter case has been rare, but complex 
realism cannot fully tell us why this type of policy has not predominated, especially 
given Syria’s on-going vioAtions of Lebanese sovereignty sinœ the outbreak of dvU. 
war. Other explanations such as identity issues and shared interests are ne^ected 
by reahsm, and we must therefore resort to other theoretical approaches which do 
take account of them.
“Constructivists insist that interstate reAtions are contingent on the way identity is 
constructed; in the Middle East, sub- and suprastate identities compete with state 
identity, inspire transstate movements, and constrain purely state-centric 
behaviour.”® If the identity of Lebanese sub-state groups can be said to be one that is 
transstate Arab, the Lebanese state cannot readily align against Syria without 
vioAting deep-rooted norms. I^ however, these groups see their identity as being 
primarily sovereign Lebanese, the state A in a position where it can align itself 
against Syria. Until recently, Muslim Lebanese and some ChrAtian Lebanese, a 
majority of tbe popuAtion, seem to have pAced more emphasA on Arab identity 
than on Lebanese identity. However, it A impossible not to notice that identity A 
changing. Considering the current Lebanese debate over the Syrian presence, in 
which both Christians and Muslims participate, the unequal Syrian-Lebanese 
reAtionship seems to have encouraged the widespread propagation of a Lebanese-
Hmnebusch (2002a) p.2.
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first sense of identity. Is this situation fikely to result in a change in the behaviour of 
Lebanese state officials toward Syria?
To answer this question we wül find that the theoretical approach of pluralism A 
relevant. “For plurafists, Middle East states are not unitary and impermeable, as 
(simple) realAm assumes, but fragmented and penetrated and hence less capable of 
pursuing reafist ‘reason of state’.”^  PluralAm also alerts the analyst to the potential 
of transstate economic ties to generate shared interests and “complex 
interdependence” which can account for interstate cooperation, reduce conflict, and 
supersede threats as the main determinant of reAtions. In the case of Lebanon, the 
dynamics of power among key politicians has generated an interdependence 
between Lebanese and Syrian elites.
In the following sections, each of these theories and its relevance to the Lebanese- 
Syrian case will be discussed m detail. Finally based on thA discussion, a brief 
e3q)lanation wül be put forward of the main phases in the evolution of the dynamics 
of Lebanese state and sub-state complexes, and Syrian behaviour.
3. SIMPLE REALISM: THE STATE AS A RATIONAL ACTOR AMIDST 
SYSTEMIC THREATS
In “classic” or “simple” reaHst accounts, the behaviour of smaU powers, such as 
Syria and Lebanon, A intimately shaped by the chronic intervention of great powers 
in the region. HAtoricaUy the broad motivation for the great powers to have 
penetrated into the Middle East has been its strategic transit location between the 
East and the West, its vast oü reserves, and the protection of Israel. On the one han(^ 
they have tried to prevent any Middle Eastern state or group of states from 
achieving regional hegemony and from forming a Middle East system opposed to
Hinnebusch (2002a) p.2.
their presence. On the other hand, Middle Eastern states and also sub-state groups 
within them have tried to exploit the resources and leverage of the global powers to 
their advantage.^ ® Since the Middle East has been continuously penetrated by the 
great powers for about two hundreds years, Brown has categorised the Middle East 
as a “penetrated system”.
“Global penetration does not mean that the region lacks all autonomy in the 
conduct of foreign policy.”^  Since it A generally impossible for even the great powers 
to fidly control regional issues, regional autonomy may manifest itself in the issues 
to which they do not pay much attention or have a vital interest. ThA was especially 
so durir^ the Cold War period, when superpower rivalry forced the great powers to 
support the interests of client states on regional issues, especially where “the clients 
vital interests were more at stake than those of the global patron.”^® In effect, the 
Cold War made it possible for local states to maintain their autonomy. As will be seen, 
bi-polarity presented Syria opportunities to intervene in Lebanon, and Lebanon 
chances to resAt.
The behaviour of local states was also influenced by the regional environment, as 
will be shown here. La the Middle East, as simple realAm claims, the built-in feature 
of a state system, anarchy has generated a profound insecurity and a continuous 
power strug^e. In feet, the Arab-Israeh and the Gulf arenas, among the most 
enduring and intense conflict centres in the world, are of course located in the Middle 
East. According to simple realism, threats lead states to create a counter-balance to 
them, or (more rarely but more Hkely in the case of weak states) to bandwagon with 
or appease powerful threatening states. Situations of thA kind have led to states
Ehteshami and Hinnebusch (1997) p.9. 
Brown (1984) pp.3-5.
^ Hinnebusch (2002a) pp.4-5. 
Hinnebusch (2002a) p.5.
14 Hinnebusch (2002a) p.l.
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creating alliances or building up their military power. There is one regional middle 
power^  ^which could be said to behave as simple realism predicts: Syria.
Once Syria became a central force in the Arab-Israeli arena, how did this regional 
middle power behave? After Hafez Asad consolidated his authoritarian rule^ ®, the 
Syrian regime has, by subordinating and restricting sub-state group activities, 
generally enjoyed the internal stability, which made it possible for a state to conduct 
its foreign policy reAtively free from domestic constraints. This enabled Syria, as 
realism holds, to behave as a rational actor, effectively coping with external threats 
from Israel by accommodating its foreign policy to the changing regional 
circumstance. Thus, although Syria aligned with the USSR to increase its military 
capabilities in a bipolar world, Asad sought, in the face of US backing of Israel, to put 
pressure on Israel to withdraw from the occupied territories by exploiting US fears of 
instability in the Middle East. While the Reagan administration treated Syria as a 
Soviet surrogate, Asad tried to retain a degree of independence by refrising to sign a 
friendship treaty with the USSR, though he reluctantly ended up doing so.^ ^
These domestic and external conditions affected Syrian behaviour in the regional 
sphere, especially with regard to Lebanon. Israel has been Syria’s main enemy and 
security preoccupation, because it was constituted at the expense of historic Syria, in
The concept of regional middle powers suggests states which pAy key roles in their 
regional arena, but which should be treated as middle powers on the ^obal scene. It 
A said that they have following characterAtics. Firstly, whiA their regional 
behavioral pattern A similar to that of great powers, their goaA and spheres of 
influence are more limited than those of great powers, and they mainly focus on 
regional affairs. Secondly, regional middle powers, in general, have leaders who are 
enjoying extra-regional influence and a^iration. Thirdly while these powers are 
dependent on great powers, especially for economic and technological assAtance, 
they hope to maximise autonomy by diversifying their economic links and by 
balancing the regional impact of great powers. Fourthly regional middle powers 
need to possess enough resources which are has A of their power. [Ehteshami and 
Hinnebusch (1997) pp.7-9.]
For the concept of authoritarian rule and the Syrian case, see Hinnebusch (1990),
M
1967 seized Syria’s natural defence against it, the Golan Heights, and has enjoyed 
permanent military and economic security as well as the potential to outflank Syria 
through Jordan and Lebanon. Calculating both military and economic capabilities 
rationally the Asad regime pursued ambitious but realistic goals vis-à-vis Israel: 
recovering the occupied lands (above aU the Golan Heights) and achieving 
Palestinian rights, notably in the West Bank and Gaza, as part of a comprehensive 
peace under UN Resolution 242. In this context, Israel has also been Syria’s main 
competitor for influence in Greater Syria (Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and the Palestine 
area) which Asad considered his natural sphere of influence and over which Syria 
defined itself as a “parent state” with special rights and responsibilities. Following 
Jordan’s repression of the Palestinian fedayeen in “BAck September” of 1970 Jordan 
became a stable country and the Syrian-Israeli conflict was dApAced from its 
borders to Lebanon, with Lebanese permeability and turmoil creating the fikehhood 
of direct Syrian-Israeh mflitary confrontation in Lebanon. Syria sought the power to 
balance against the threat fi*om Israel.^ ® ThA effort inevitably affected Syrian poHcy 
toward Lebanon, where Syria developed a “deterrence reAtionship”^® with Israel and 
alliances with various Lebanese sub-state groups to increase its security.
What, in contrast to a regional middle power like Syria, A the behavioural pattern 
of a weak state such as Lebanon? As Handel pointed out, weak states “form the 
largest class of states and have the most diverse membership”, which make it 
“difficult to assign them any common denominator other than their reAtive 
weakness.”^  In thA regard, H e/s su^estion that the concept of “weakness” A 
comparable to that of “strength” seems to be relevant.^  ^“Whereas one of the most
Hinnebusch (2002b) pp.147-153.
Hinnebusch (2002b) pp.143-144.
^ For the detaiA of thA concept, see Evron (1987). 
^ Handel (1981) p.30.
"'Hey (1995) p.203.
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important characteristics of the great powers is their military strength and capacity 
for self-defence, the weak states are continually preoccupied with the question of 
survival. They have difficulty in defending themselves against the great and middle 
powers, against a coalition of weak states, or even against a sin^e weak state.”"" 
Such defence may take the form of balancing against threats but more often involves 
bandwagoning with them. In general, weak states must appease and at most take 
defensive positions against the great and super powers. Occasionally however, a 
weak state may defy a great or super power with a certain degree of success."®
As for Lebanon, it occasionally exaggerated the “communist threat’ and portrayed 
itself as a barrier to defend the “capitalist world” in the Middle East in order to win 
Western support against threats from its stronger Soviet-surrogate Arab neighbours, 
such as Syria. Using this rhetoric, Amin Jumayiel allied with Israel and the USA 
against Syria during the first half of 1980s, a rare case of “balancing” against a 
threat.
However, this picture of USA-USSR confrontation in the Middle East should not be 
exaggerated: both states mans^d, sometimes exercising restraint, to ensure that 
their rivalry there would not escalate, making it harder for small states to acquire 
their protection."^  Thus, in 1976, Lebanese territory was tacitly divided into Israeli 
and Syrian spheres of influence, since their patrons, the USA and the USSR, did not 
want the conflict in Lebanon to invite a direct confrontation between them, ha other 
words, Lebanon had become a victim in the name of prevention of future supei^wer 
military conflict. Under such conditions, Lebanon’s only option as a weak state was 
usually to bandwagon with—appease—its more powerful neighbours, Israel and 
Syria.
""Handel (1981) p.36.
"® Handel (1981) p.39.
""HaUiday (1997) p.9.
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The end of the Cold War in the global arena, especially the collapse of the USSR 
and the emergence of American military hegemony has had profound regional 
effects; but it has not yet much affected Lebanon’s options. For many regional states 
m the Middle East, the bipolarity which made it possible for the USSR to put a check 
on US power there and which also made it possible for regional states and sub-state 
groups to use superpower rivalry to their advantage provided favourable 
circumstances for the maintenance of regional autonomy. Under the current USA- 
dominated global military hegemony economic conflicts among the capitalist core 
states may give regional states the opportunity to exploit their differences, but this 
phenomenon appears differently from region to region. It seems that for the Middle 
East the world A now effectively unipolar, since the USA has repAced the former 
USSR power after defeating the Iraqi attempt to reshape the regional system 
against it and no other power contests its hegemony in the region."®
ThA situation has reduced the autonomy of many regional states in the Middle 
East and forced them into a greater dependency on the USA though some have 
tried to counter the American hegemony by reinforcing their ties with potentially 
countervailing powers. For Syria, constraints have increased. On the one hand, 
Syria, aiming to dilute US hegemony has been cultivating ties with China, North 
Korea, and RussA m the military field, and with Europe, Japan, and South Korea in 
the economic field,"® While doing thA Syria has to take carefully into consideration 
US interests in the Middle East, lest the Syrian presence in Lebanon be questioned 
by the American government. On the other hand, though Lebanon lost its strategic 
value as a defender of capitafist world in the region, the Hariri government has tried 
to maintain dose reAtions with the USA to contain Syrian power, and has also been 
cultivating ties with Europe, especially France (Lebanon’s traditional patron), as
"® Etheshami and Hinnebusch (1997) p. 11. /Hinnebusch (2002a) p.6. 
"® Ehteshami and Hinnebusch (1997) p. 11.
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well as Japan and South Korea. Though these relations are mainly limited to the 
realm of economics, Lebanon antidpates that these forces could play a more active 
role in the political field, thereby putting pressure on Syria.
Overall, simple realism seems to be e^splanatory of Syrian foreign policy behaviour 
but of only a few Lebanese episodes such as the manoeuvres of Jumayiel and Hariri, 
which seem to partially fit this theory.
4  COMPLEX REALISM : INTERRELATED EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL 
THREATS
In simple realism, there are, traditionally, two explanations for a state’s alignment 
decisions. The twin notions of balance of power and balance of threat, along with 
their bandwagordng versions, emphasise the constraints and opportunities that exist 
external to a state. In contrast, sodety-centred approaches such as pluralism view 
alignment decisions as being primarily driven by internal political incentives and 
risks. The work of David represents a bridge between that of theorists who focus on 
external fectors and the work of those who emphasise internal fectors, David expects 
that when the primary threat is internal (coup, revolution, and/or insurgency), the 
political leader of a state may seek an international alignment that promises to 
protect the regime from this internal threat, even if this state is also viewed as an 
external threat, but when this external threat is deemed secondary to the internal 
one. His work is based on the assumption that in many countries the political 
process lacks legitimacy for a majority of the population, and thus internal threats to 
the state elite may be more u i^ n t than external thrëats.^ ^
TbiA Complex realism, which sees primary internal threats as an explanatory factor, 
has irifluenced the omnialignment theory advocated by Harknett and Vatidenberg.
^ David (1991) pp.233-256. /Harknett and Vandenberg (1997) pp. 117-118.
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However, in their analysis, reactions to interrelated threats — the presence of 
mutually reinforcing external and internal security challenges—are theoretically 
different from responses to a primarily external or a primarily internal threat. 
Reactions to interrelated threats require a state elite to take the hehavioural pattern 
of "omnialignments —international alignments that use a combined strategy to deal 
with internal and external challenges that feed off one another.”^
Interrelated threats generally occur when conditions that foster internal 
instability^ are present along with an external power that represents an immediate 
security challenge. This creates a condition in which both international and domestic 
factors led to the creation and the potential suppression of threats.^ In this situation, 
alignments require state leaders to cope with multiple threats from different 
directions. These threats are often concerned with the situation where external rival 
states support internal opposition movements or insurrection.^  ^ In the Lebanese- 
Syrian case, interrelated threats mean that state officials in Lebanon have to 
respond simultaneously to both state level and sub-state level influence from Syria.
There are two basic responses to both external and internal threats: 'halandr^ is 
alignment driven by the desire to find security in resisting or defeating one’s most 
pressing threats; bandwagoning is alignment driven by the desire to find security in 
appeasing one’s most pressing threats.”^  As a result, it is convenient to use the 
following schematic diagram for omnialignment in the presence of interrelated
^ Harknett and Vandenberg (1997) p. 119.
^ Three conditions contribute to the presence of internal threats: (1) diversion of 
identity; people identify with transnational and/or suprastate identity other than 
with their own state. (2) lack of r^im e’s legitimacy; a regime’s power base is narrow 
and thus the legitimacy is questioned at the national level (3) a state apparatus 
actually controls the predominant source of power and wealth in society. [Harknett 
and Vandenberg (1997) pp.121-122.]
^ Harknett and Vandenbei^ (1997) p. 122.
Harknett and ^ ^denberg (1997) p. 123.
^ Harknett and Vandenberg (1997) p. 124.
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threats.^
Strategy Ibward Internal Threats 
Balance Bandwagon
Strategy Balance I E
TDward External Threats Bandwagon IE IV
The strategies of state officials in Lebanon toward Syria wiU, except in few 
instances, generally fall into category IE, with Lebanese political elites using Syrian 
help to threaten or repress internal opposition, or category IV, with Lebanese 
officials winnir^ support from Lebanese sub-state groups with transstate ties to 
Syria by supporting Syria against Israel.
The reason why Lebanese state officials normaEy align with Syria seems to be 
largely due to Syrian status-quo behaviour. Since the Lebanese state has had, 
traditionally and in common with many Third World states, little power to regulate 
social relations, there has been rampant manoeuvrabifity of strong sub-state actors 
which have kept transnational ties with other states, especiaEy Syria. It therefore 
seems impossible for Lebanese state officials to Ignore the effects of interstate 
penetration: manipulation of the Lebanese domestic poHtical system by Syria, In 
general, penetration is more effective in open societies like Lebanon, and the success 
of penetration is also dependent on the intention of the penetrating state. If a state 
seeks to establish or strengthen an alliance with a taigeted state by manipulating 
pubEc and elite attitudes, this behaviour is unlikely to be viewed as a grave threat to 
state independence. However, if a state seeks alignment by subverting the regiaieoi 
the other state, the targeted regime wiE probably take a hostile attitude toward the 
state conducting the campaign.^  Since the Syrian case is generaEy of the farmer 
category Lebanese state officials have generaEy found it worthwhEe to cooperate
^ Harknett and Vandenberg (1997) p. 127. 
^ Walt (1987) pp.47-48.
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with and appease the Syrian régime so as to be able to deal with strong sub-state 
groups.
These interrelated threats are especially sensitive to Maronite officials who 
emphasise Lebanese sovereignty. However, since they generally reccgnise Syrian 
status-quo behaviour toward Lebanon, they, reluctantly or not, tend to choose to 
bandwagon, except for the staunchest anti-Syrian figures. La the sections which 
follow there is a discussion of the possibility that identity and shared interests ffictors 
could also explain the Lebanese bandwagoning toward Syria.
5. CONSTRUCTIVISM : SOVEREIGNTY VS TRANSSTATE IDENTITY 
The Middle East state system is characterised by an uneasy relation between 
identity and state sovereignty. Indeed, the process of consolidating its own “nation- 
state” in the region was a demanding task for each state elite. Borders were not 
established through a process of domestic consolidation and external war, and the 
power of state over society, divided generally along ethnic, religious, tribal, and/or 
linguistic fines, has consequently been limited. States have frequently been 
challenged from both inside and outside. Western colonial states, in feet, drew 
boundaries without paying attention to the hopes and history of local people in the 
Middle East. As the boundaries of Lebanon and Syria were indeed drawn on the 
basis of imperial calculations, the resulting division of the two countries with 
arbitrary Lebanese-Syrian border and the tension between state and national 
identities have led to a situation in which loyalty to the individual states has been 
contested by both sub-state (sectarian) and supra-state (Arabism, Islam) identities. 
Irredentist feelings have been historically preserved. Li other words. Middle Eastern 
politics, particularly politics of the Levant, has been characterised by separatist 
movements, border disputes, and supra-state ideology advocating the dissolution of
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existing states and the establishment of a larger entity in the region.^ ®
These trends were strongly connected with and also influenced by pan-Arabism 
which was at its peak in 1950s and 1960s under Egyptian President Gamal Abdul 
Nasser, ha the years before 1967, when Egypt was a centre of pan-Arab influence, his 
appeal for widespread Arab “unity of ranks”, backed by his enormous popularity in 
the Middle East, mobilised a number of Arab states and people under his banner. 
However, Egypts overwhelming defeat in 1967, the death of Nasser in 1970, and the 
dramatic changes of Egyptian foreign and domestic policies (infitah) severely 
damaged the prestige and appeal of this movement, and reduced its ability to shape 
and lead opinion in other Arab states. The relative weakening of Egyptian power 
had important repercussions for individual states and thus for the overall pattern of 
relationships between states within the system.^
Since the decline in Egyptian activity and influence throughout the region 
decreased the major source of regional systemic pressure, other Arab governments 
gained more latitude to decide their own policy. In addition, Egyptian inability to 
dominate events on the basis of pan-Arabism provided opportunities for other major 
Arab states to play a greater role in the affairs of the system and to develop their 
own local spheres of influences. In the Arabian Peninsula, Saudi Arabia surfaced as 
the predominant power by using financial aid and religious (Islamic) ties. In the 
Levant, Syria was successful in establishing a modified sphere of influence with 
arms supplies finm the Soviet Union and financial support firom the oil-producing 
Gulf states, especially Saudi Arabia.^ ^
Barnett cites three indicators in support of the claim that Arab states came to 
respect each other’s sovereignty and norms for diplomatic activity. There were the
^ Gause (1997) pp.201-203. /Hinnebusch (2002a) p. 7. 
^ Noble (1984) pp.56-59.
"'Noble (1984) pp.57-59.
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decrease of attempts to unite Arab states, the shift at Arab summit meetings away 
from debates over political unification, and the little success of Arab leaders in 
identifying themselves as champions of pan-Arabism.""
The consolidation of state sovereignty in the Arab world required an increase of 
state control over the societies in the region, and Syria under Hafez Asad reflected 
this process. However, the consolidation of state sovereignty did not completely free 
Arab states fi'om the pressure of pan-Arabism identity. Since state identity did not 
fully replace pan-Arab identity in most Arab states, the legitimacy of a regime is still 
dependent on its being seen to act for Arab interests, albeit nominally in most cases."^  
In the case of Syrian intervention in Lebanon, pan-Arab sentiments and Syrian ties 
with both Lebanese state and sub-state groups, not aU necessarily based on pan- 
Arabism, gave Syria a motivation to intervene, justified its intervention, and further 
helped legitimate its actions to other states in the Arab world.^ ° On the other hand, 
“Syria has been most careful to maintain the forms of Lebanese sovereignty while 
consolidating its protectorate over (Lebanon).”^  ^hi sum, although most Arab states, 
including Syria, stEl take into consideration the symbols of pan-Arabism, their 
policies are performed in the ways that are consistent with the states’ sovereignty 
and which assume that the building of spheres of influence is a legitimate pursuit.
In contrast, it was Lebanon which was the noteworthy exception to the process of 
consolidating state sovereignty in the Arab r^o n . While state control over society 
was consolidated in other Arab states, the Lebanese state was not only shattered but 
the society was still subjected to penetration by outside powers finm which sub-state 
Lebanese groups sought support and assistance.^ In Lebanon, there are two
For the details, see Barnett (1995) pp.506-507. 
Hinnebusch (2002a) pp.9-10.
^ Gause (1997) p.208.
Gause (1992) p.466.
^ Gause (1992) p.461.
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significant socio-political phenomena that have reflected as well as reinforced loyalty 
to the sectarian œmmnnity rather than to the state. One is the feet that most 
political parties in Lebanon have not been nationally based. Few political parties 
have been integrative and representative of the country as a whole, and they have 
represented and derived their support firom their own communities. In addition, 
parliamentary seats as well as ministerial and bureaucratic posts have been 
allocated along sectarian lines. Another is that since the central government has 
been generally weak, private interests have tended to dominate over public interests, 
with sectarian identities having the ability to meet the material, security and status 
needs of their members. In effect, sectarian affiliations seem to continue to be the 
most important basis for Lebanese identities, and, consequently of sub-state groups 
in Lebanon being formed by sectarian affiliations; but equally important, these sects 
also hold to supra or transstate loyalties or identities which compromise their loyalty 
to the Lebanese state. Lebanon has traditionally had four m^or sectarian 
communities: Maronites, Sunnis, Shiites, and Druzes, and Muslim and a few 
Christian groups have maintained Arab sentiment, whether strongly or not, and 
thus also ties with their Syrian counterparts. When the Lebanese government 
ignored this feeling and attempted to establish a counter-balance to Syria, as in the 
case of Jumayiels conclusion of the May 17 Agreement with Israel in 1983, 
government legitimacy was called into question with disastrous results.
In relation to this, Walt writes, “when weak or unstable regimes rely on ideological 
arguments to bolster their legitimacy this reliance affects their alliance choices. In 
particular, weak regimes may try to enhance their popularity by seeking 
membership in a large and popular movement (such as identifying with pan- 
Arabism). By aligning with a larger group, a weqk regime may hope to convince its
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dtizens that it is pursuing worthy and widely accepted aims.”'*" Since the sub-state 
groups have generally had the power to influence Lebanese state officials, they have 
needed to take into account of pan-Arab tendencies held by the major communities. 
In other words, the actors at state level have found it difficult to ignore their pan- 
Arab identity and as a result Lebanese sovereignty has been weakened.
However, the long history of unequal relations between Lebanon and Syria seem to 
be weakening pan-Arab identity and strengthening a sense of Lebanon-first identity 
among the Lebanese people, including Muslims. One example is that influential 
Muslims have joined in the recent discussions over the Syrian presence, and some 
have indeed demanded that Syria show greater respect for Lebanese sovereignty, 
while admitting that there are special bonds between Lebanon and Syria. However, 
the Lebanese state stfll bandw^ons with Syria, except m a few cases. It is at this 
point that it is useful to consider the explanatory power of pluralism.
6. PLURALISM : COMPLEX INTERDEPENDENCE AND SHARED INTERESTS
Pluralism can shed fight on a variety of non-state forces relevant to international 
relations: actors that can be called suprastate (international organisation), 
transstate (transnational corporations), and nonstate (professional associations and 
social movements). Pluralism also focuses on the complex interdependence created 
by their participation in international relations. According to Keohane and Nye, 
complex interdependence has three main characteristics: the participation of actors 
other than states; an agenda of interstate relations consisting of multiple issues that 
are not arranged in a dear or consistent hierarchy; and ineffectiveness of the use of 
military force as regards certain issues, notably economic relations. In addition, they 
distinguish between the two dimensions of sensitivitydsià. vulnerabiliiyaB keys to an
Walt (1987) p.39.
22
understanding of power in complex interdependence. Interdependence makes 
countries sensitive to what happens in the other country and vulnerable to high 
risks and costs if they attempt to severe their connection with the country in 
question.'*'*
In the case of Lebanese-Syrian relations, the Lebanese state has not been unitary 
and Lebanese sub-state groups have had dose connections with Syria. In effect, 
there have been some cooperative dimensions between the two countries, and not 
only multiple transnational and interstate economic ties, as interdependence theory 
maintains, but also shared political interests.
One example of economic interdependency can be found in relations between 
Beirut’s finandal community and the Syrians. Under a “Pax-Syriana” in the fall of 
1976, the Lebanese banking sector was able to resume its activities, and Syrian 
enterprises were given an opportunity to once again use Lebanese investment 
capital.'*® After the Asad regime openly encouraged the private sector to play a 
greater role in Syria by introducing the Investment Law 10 in 1991, Lebanese banks, 
with other Lebanese entrepreneurs, have been able to operate in Syria benefiting 
fi*om their geographical proximity. Syrian officials and politidans also have had 
economic interests in Lebanon, and it seems that these economic ties have increased 
the interest in cooperation with Syria among Lebanese state offidals.
Their shared political interests mean that some Lebanese politicians on the one 
hand have exploited Syrian power to their advantage, for example maintaining their 
status and containing the power of their rivals, while Syria on the other hand has 
used these leaders to justify its presence in Lebanon. If one appfies the concepts of 
sensitivity and vulnerability to the political field, to the extent that Lebanese state 
officials rely heavily on Syria as their power base their sensitivity\s high In contrast,
^ Keohane and Nye (1977) pp. 11-29. 
Lawson (1996) p.95.
23
if they also rely on other states and thereby diversify their power base, their 
vulnerability will decrease. However, since these political and economic interests 
seem to become vested interests, Lebanese state officials do not seem to give them up, 
and arguably continue their bandwagoning with regard to Syria. Indeed, these I
relations have become institutionalised in a form of indirect rule (discussed on pgs.27 
—34). Though there was recently a mounting trend among Lebanese to reconsider 
Lebanese-Syrian relations, a trend which m i^ t in future result in Lebanese officials 
being less attached to these interests, it ended in their vested interests still 
predominating.
In summary state officials in Lebanon, though they have had differing perceptions 
of the Syrians, either positive or negative have had reason to choose to bandwagon 
with Syria.
7. LEBANESE STATE AND SUB-STATE COMPLEXES AND SYRIAN 
BEHAVIOUR
(1) Introduction
The interactions between Syrian and Lebanese actors explained by realism, 
complex realism, constructivism, and pluralism took place within two quite different 
structural contexts. From 1975—1989, it could be described as semi-anarchy and 
from 1989—, a model of indirect rule is more appropriate.
(2) Lebanon under Semi-Anarchy : From 1975 to 1989
During this period, since the function of most state structures came dose to collapse,
a system of “semi-anarchy” emerged. Since the mistrust between or within fighting 
groups generated ever smaller groups, and the conflict raged not only between 
sectarian groups but also within sectarian groups, the country became ever more 
fragmented. The multicommunal and open society in Lebanon provided a ready-
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made arena for external powers to penetrate and to exploit the rival minority 
community fears in order to play a role inside the multicommunal state.
Indeed, the escalation of the Lebanese dvil war had sprung not just from domestic 
factors but also from the triangular relationship between the three main non- 
Lebanese actors: Syria, Israel, and the PLD. According to Azar and Haddad, these 
actors undertook “strategic interventionism”. The strategic interventionists, in 
seeking long-term influence, sought to control Lebanese institutions. Moreover, to 
ensure control over sub-state groups, they fenned not only inter-group conflict but 
also intra-group rivalries. In addition to this strategic interventionism, the USA, 
France, Libya, and Iran undertook “tactical interventionism”, which means that (by 
contrast to strategic interventionists) they did not command enduring influence in 
Lebanese domestic affeirs.^
Zartman subdivided internal conflicts with a substantial international dimension 
into the following types: internal rebellions which necessarily reflect regional 
conflicts because of transstate ties between populations; internal conflicts in which 
the fragile state identity breaks down and the sub-state groups rely on their 
“brothers” in neighbouring countries for support and assistance; internal conflicts in 
which the search for external resources of power has turned into proxy wars between 
external powers; and a residual group of internal conflicts in which one or both sub­
state groups have enjoyed sanctuary and/or support from outside. Zartman classified 
the Lebanese case as the second type,'*' but it also had features of the other types. 
Nevertheless, the divided Lebanese identity played an important role in the 
outbreak of conflict, and Lebanese sub-state actors exploited the Syrians to their 
advantage.
Given the complex interplay between domestic and external fectors in a
Azar and Haddad (1986) pp.1347-1348. 
■*' Zartman (1995) p.4.
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fragmented society “semi-anarchy” could be defined as a model having the following 
characteristics. While government lacks a monopoly of the means of violenœ or 
legitimacy and while sub-state groups are armed and struggling for power, in most 
cases backed by external actors (these two features are generally shared with a 
condition of “full anarchy”), government continues to formally exist and sustains 
efforts to restore order, unlike in “full anarchy”. In fact, it was surprising that the 
Lebanese government continued to formally exist. It nevertheless did, and its office 
holders remained actors, and to some extent continued to attempt to restore order 
and to defend Lebanon’s sovereignty. This is why the dvil war period can be called a 
system of only “semi-anarchy”, not “full anarchy”.
This study is concerned with the dynamics of relations between the remaining 
Lebanese government, the Lebanese sub-state actors, and Syria. In feet, the 
government in this “semi-anarchy” system took a number of measures to restore a 
“normal” state system, while exploiting or being exploited by foreign powers, 
espedally Israel and Syria. These measures induded several reconciliation efforts 
and the formation of governments. Theoretically, there are three types of cabinet 
which could have contributed to a restoration of order: a salvation cabinet in which 
every important sub-state community leader partidpated, especially zuama (plural 
of za’im)'*"; a technocrat cabinet focusing mainly on economic reconstruction; and a 
military cabinet formed mainly by military officers. While the latter two might have 
promoted the state interests against fragmenting forces, the increased zuama power, 
which resulted from the dependence of people on zuama to protect their lives and 
interests espedally in dvil war times, sometimes forced the government to choose 
the first option. The other government actions were associated with attempts at
^ The three main criteria identified by Hettinger in delimiting the category of za’im 
are as follows: “local limitation of the group; tendency toward heredity of 
function;(and) exchange of economic support given to the clients against political
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reunification of the Lebanese army and several economic reconstruction efforts.
Although the state made some attempts to recover order by these political, military 
and economic strategies, sub-state and external actors had significant power, and 
when a state policy went against zuama and/or Syrian interests, the effort generally 
ended in failure. In addition, it was generally not until foreign intervention that talks 
for reconciliation were arranged. This was applicable to most cases of reconciliation 
efforts and, finally, the Ta’if Agreement in 1989, arranged mainly by Syria and Saudi 
Arabia.
(3) Lebanon after the Civil War and under Reconstructed Indirect Rule : 
Since 1989
Since 1989, as a result of the end of the Lebanese dvil war, a normal political 
system has gradually been restored. Before presenting a fi*amework for 
understanding the current political situation in Lebanon, it seems essential to 
consider a model for the “termination of dvil wari’, the question of why and how the 
dvd war ended, because this affected the post-Ta’if political situation in Lebanon.
There are a number of factors which can lead to the end of a dvd war. Firstly, 
politidans and military planners generally assume that the shape of the post-war 
settlement in a dvd war is a function of the military situation on the battlefield. 
From this viewpoint, a war ends when one or both sides have the wdl to accept the 
situation on the battlefield as a basis for peace. This stage might be reached when 
one side removes its adversary's wdl or ability to continue fighting, when one side 
gains its objectives, or when both sides calculate that the future costs of continuing 
the war, politicady, mditardy and/or economicady, exceed the potential benefits."® As 
a result, there are two theoretical possibdities firom the viewpoint of a balance of
loyalty coming from the clients.” [Hottinger (1966) p. 104.]
^ King (1997) p.35.
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power calculation by the protagonists. On the one hand, a dvil war may end with 
one side’s overwhelming military victory over the other, with the winner fordng the 
loser to accept a peace agreement.®* On the other hand, a dvd war may end in a 
stalemate, with no single group having a hope of victory, because power is equally 
balanced. In this case the parties lose interest in continuing the dvd war.
A second set of fectors, external influences, can also have profound effects on the 
course of the war and on the mediation process. Generally foreign countries, 
particularly states bordering war zones, are not only influenced by the development 
of the internal war, but they also try to influence its conduct. For bordering countries, 
a protracted war incurs economic costs and the security threat of refugees flooding 
across the frontiers. On the positive side, they can profit from the seding of weapons 
and from smuggling. Broadly spealdng, as lor^ as a dvd war continues, they are 
easdy able to find reasons for intervention, such as the restoration of peace and the 
prevention of disaster. Therefore, in considering how a cease-fire has come into being 
and what its effects are, one needs to take into consideration the interests and 
behaviour of an external state.
In 1989, conflict in Lebanon was rampant, not only between sectarian groups but 
also within such groups, and no single leader had any hope of dominating the whole 
of the country. Extemady the Arab states had tolerated the continuation of the 
conflict, apparently calculating that the cost of toleration was lower than the cost of 
mediating to stop it. However, this situation was not to last. An increased Iraqi 
involvement in Lebanon in the form of the supply of arms to General Michael Awn, 
who claimed to be prime minister in place of Salim Hoss, as wed as the continued 
support of the Lebanese Forces by Bagdad fodowing the end of han-Iraq War, 
raised the dangerous possibility of a direct confrontation between Iraq and Syria in
King (1997) p.l2.
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Lebanon. Most importantly, with the aborted 1988 presidential election bringing 
about the end of the pretence of a unified government, the division of Lebanon 
became a matter of urgency.®* Had this occurred the situation would have been 
dangerous for both Syria and other Arab states, because the collapse of the Lebanese 
state would not only have created a cause for Israeli intervention in Lebanon but 
would also have had a spill-over impact on the whole Arab state system.
It was under these circumstances that Syria and Saudi Arabia mediated to bring 
about the Ta’if Agreement (The Document of National Accord), a settlement in which 
neither side was able to declare victory. The agreement only modified the “rules of 
the games” of the Lebanese First Republic, without altering its basic character, that 
of a confessional system. This was because zuama had generally increased their 
power during the dvil war and Syria had an interest in continuing to mediate and 
manipulate the ^stem’s built-in rivalries.
This means that post-war Lebanon may in form, be a “consodational democracy”, 
but it is necessary to add some qualifications if the current Lebanese political system 
is to be judged fi*om the point of the standard of “democracy'’ advocated by Dahl. He 
suggested that two axis are needed to assess démocratisation: liberalisation (public 
contestation) and indusiveness (partidpation).®  ^In terms of indusiveness, universal 
suffiage is formally guaranteed to all Lebanese, but there are some limitations with 
regard to liberalisation.
This “semi-democracy” situation is dosely connected with Syrian hegemony in 
Lebanon. According to the Treaty of Brotherhood, Cooperation, and (Coordination in 
May 1991, the Lebanese government must “consult’ with Syria in the field of politics, 
economics, security, sdence, and culture.®" This writer’s viewpoint is that this means
®* Norton (1991) p.460.
Dahl (1971) p.7.
®" Deegan (1993) pp. 116-117.
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that the ciurent Lebanese state and sub-state complexes and Syrian behaviour are 
susceptible to analysis according to an “indirect rule” model. Though there have 
historically been many cases of indirect rule, it seems worthwhile referring to Japan 
under the indirect rule of the GHQ/SCAP after the Second World War. This is a good 
example of indirect rule and is useful for this discussion of Lebanon, for the following 
reasons. Firstly, both countries are strategically located. Japan was important for the 
USA strategy toward the Soviet Union and China (communist movement), and 
Lebanon is crucial for Syrian strategy toward Israel. Thus, both doroinant states had 
to contain threats from and/or through subordinate states towards them. In other 
words, Lebanon can be said to be a buffer in a “Cold War'’ situation between Israel 
and Syria, as Japan was at that time. Secondly, the societies of both countries were 
and are permeable and open. As in Lebanon, Japanese society was divided over 
USA-USSR rivalries and was strongly influenced by the communist movement. 
Thirdly, both cases assumed “semi-democracy'’ after war and under occupation.
This model operates according to the following framework. Firstly the dominant 
power tends to intervene in the political process, indudit^ parliamentary elections, 
to serve its interests. In Japan, the reestablishment of the Japan Communist Party 
(JCP) was made possible by the direct GHQ/SCAP intervention, since the 
GHQ/SCAP initially pushed for a thorou^ démocratisation in Japan. After this 
occurred, the first post-war general elections were held in April 1946. Moreover, the 
GHQ/SCAP intended these elections to serve as a plebiscite on the issue of 
constitutional revision in general and on the GHQ/SCAP draft of the revision in 
particular, and so scheduled the elections to serve that purpose. Furthermore, the 
electoral processes are also influenced by the change of the dominant state’s policy. In 
Japan, the candidates finm the JCP were virtually wiped out by the “Red Purge”,
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winning no æats in 1952.®^  In the Lebanese 1992, 1996, and 2000 elections, the 
Syrians, on the one hand, frequently changed the electoral laws and showed interest 
in the formation of electoral lists to feivour pro-Syrian candidates. The Lebanese 
candidates, on the other hand, tried to exploit Syrian power to their advantage, for 
such purposes as containing a rival’s power.
The second aspect of this model is that the dominant power manages to carry out 
its policy by means of the state apparatus of the subordinate power. In Japan, the 
GHQ/SCAP made use of Japanese statesmen and the Japanese bureaucracy to 
implement its policy. In Lebanon, Syrian influence rests mainly on its ability to 
manipulate three leading political figures (or “Troika”) to its advantage: the 
president, the prime minister, and the speaker of parliament.®® Against this, officials 
of the subordinate state tend to maintain a balance between the intentions of the 
dominant power and those of its own people in order to protect their status. They 
also try to have their views taken into consideration in the dominant poweris policies, 
and also to increase their interests and status by exploiting the dominant power.
Thirdly the model assumes that it is generally impossible for a subordinate state to 
conduct its own security interest and diplomacy when this is against the dominant 
state’s wUl, which effectively means a restriction of the subordinate state’s 
sovereignty. In Japan, although the government tried to establish relations with 
communist countries, these activities were strictly constrained by the GHQ/SCAP, 
especially after the eruption of the Cold War. In Lebanon, the government has had to 
coordinate its policy toward Hizbollah and the Middle East Peace process with the 
Syrians, althou^ Hariri tried several times to carry out his own policy and to 
maintain sovereignty in these afeirs, mainly by means of his connections with the 
USA, France, and the Guff states.
®^ Fukui (1988) pp.164-165. 
®® Hudson (1999) p.31.
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The model’s fourth premise is that an economy-oriented leadership is required to 
rebuild the state foUowing a state of war. Also, under indirect rule, it is essential that 
the leadership has dose connections with the dominant power in order for its 
economic policies to be effected smoothly. In Japan, cabinets were formed under pro- 
Westem Prime Minister Kijuro Shidehara and Shigeru %shida. Since 1992 in 
Lebanon there have been, except for two years under Hoss, technocrat cabinets 
oriented toward economic reconstruction under Rafiq Hariri, who has generally been 
mindful of Syrian interests. An additional feature of a government of this type is that 
it tends, in the interests of efficient development, to centralise power and to 
emphasise specific economic departments. In Lebanon, Hariri has promoted 
economic development by emphasising construction, and this has been associated 
with considerable nepotism.
A fifth characteristic, according to the model, is that social freedoms are generally 
curtailed by dominant interests under the pretext of maintaining order. In Japan, 
the initial GHQ/SCAP policy aimed to facUitate a thorough démocratisation by being 
clearly pro-labour, and a memorandum in October 1945 explicitly directed the 
Japanese government to encourage the organisation of labour unions. Nevertheless, 
it was the GHQ/SCAP that forced the public service general strike planned in 
February 1947 to be called off the main reason for this being that the GHQ/SCAP 
feared that the strike would spfil over into criticism of its presence.®" In Lebanon, 
preceding parliamentary elections, the government made public order its top priority, 
at the e^ q)ense of civil liberties for similar reasons.®'
Since the press and electronic mass media play a considerable role in creating 
public opinion, which is inevitably sometimes critical, the dominant power cannot 
but be sensitive to the activities of media and attempts to impose censorship. In
®" Fukui (1988) pp.174-176. 
®'Harik(1998)p.l45.
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Japan, the mass media were under tight control by the SCAP/GHQ throughout the 
period of indirect rule. At the beginning of this period, a system of control was 
established for both press and radio through the enforcement of rigid rules known as 
the “press and radio code”. The strict adherence to these codes was ensured by 
informal guidance and direction from the CIE of the GHQ/SCAP, and by the CCD’s 
pre-publication censorship of the CIS.®" “Dissernination of information about the 
censorship system itself also was strictly controlled.”®^ In Lebanon, the Hariri 
government, presumably backed by Syria, curtailed freedom and pluralism, and 
decided to reduce the number of authorised television stations in 1996, the policies of 
which were dominated by leading pro-regime figure’s interests.
The model’s sixth and final assumption is that, as time passes, discussion by 
ordinary people in the subordinate state of the presence of the dominant state tends 
to mount. In Japan, demands for the GHQ/SCAP to end the occupation began to 
increase in 1948, with this desire finally being realised in 1951. In Lebanon, afier 
Israel evacuated from the so-called “security zone” in May 2000, many groups to 
discuss the Syrian presence have been formed, resulting in the formation of a 
number of different groups. This has had some influence on the attitude of state 
officials toward Syria, and also led to the partial withdrawal of Syrian troops. In the 
Japanese case, the indirect rule succeeded in foiling an establishment that has 
permanently been pro-American. In the Syrian case, the indirect rule will be 
successful, since it both established the institutionalised interdependence between 
Lebanese and Syrian political elites and also Syria stripped Lebanese opposition 
groups of thefr power by withdrawing, although not completely.
If one looks at the overall process of what has happened in Lebanon one has to
®" CIE means Civil Information and Education Section, CCD means Civil Censorship 
Department, and CIS means Civil Intelligence Section.
® Fukui (1988) p.167.
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conclude that, while Lebanon after the dvil war aimed at “democracy” as stipulated 
in the Ta’if Agreement, this goal has not been reached. As has been pointed out in the 
discussion above, this outcome is dosely related to Syrian indirect rule. In other 
words, applying Dahl’s model, the Lebanese situation can be dassifted as a “mixed 
regime”, which comprises two sub-types. A mixed regime allows for more public 
competition or more partidpation than a hegemonic regime, but is not a fully 
polyarchic system (“full polyarchy”) where both full competition and partidpation are 
guaranteed, hence could be defined as a “near polyarchy”. A “near polyarchy” is 
either indusive in terms of the scope of sodety although there are more restrictions
on public competition than a “ftdl polyarchy”, or somewhat less indusive in groups
Iinduded while coming dose^  to providing the greater latitude for public competition of 
a “full polyarchy”.®* The Lebanese situation is arguably a “near polyarchy”, with all 
groups induded, but restrictions on competition.
8. PLAN OF THIS STUDY
lb answer the three questions raised above (see p.5), chapter II briefly explains 
the relevant Syrian and Lebanese historic background. Chapters HI and IV, after 
mentioning the external and internal situations surrounding Lebanese state 
behaviour toward Syria, separately examine the dynamics of Lebanese state and 
sub-state groups complexes, as well as the role and behaviour of Syria in Lebanon 
during the dvil war and post-war period. The hypothesis of this study is based on 
multi-level models; mainly simple and complex realism, constructivism, and 
pluralism. Specifically it is based on the assumption that the Lebanese state’s 
dealings with Syrian power must be understood in terms of (1) reaction to an 
external threat, a simple realist model which could explain a very few episodes; (2)
Dahl (1975) p.l22 and pp.127-129.
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interrelated external and internal threats which result from the weaknesses of the 
Lebanese state and which explain much more; (3) still powerful transstate ties, 
which themselves need to be understood in terms of the contradiction between 
sovereignty and identity and which have some impact; and (4) complex 
interdependencies and shared interests between Lebanese and Syrian elites. Finally, 
chapter V draws some conclusions about the nature of Lebanese relations with 
Syria and the validity of these models.
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n . HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
This chapter will survey the historical background necessary in order to 
understand Lebanese-Syrian relations since 1975. The survey will take the 
form first of a brief look at the formations of the two states of Lebanon and 
Syria and at their relations until 1970. This will be followed by an 
examination of the situation for both countries in the first half of the 1970’s, 
when the paralysis of the Lebanese state function and the transformation of 
Syria under Asad into a regional middle power together made it possible for 
Syria to play a more active role in Lebanese affairs.
1. THE FORMATION OF THE STATES OF LEBANON AND SYRIA, 
AND RELATIONS BETWEEN THEM (1920-1970)
(l) Introduction
The sovereign state system in the Middle East, as is the case in many parts 
of the Third World, was imposed by Western imperiahst states. Without 
taking sufficient account of local history, they tended to draw state 
boundaries, which, to an even greater extent in the Middle East than in 
Africa and Asia, resulted in mismatches between state and national 
identities. With only Iran and Egypt having historically been political 
entities, the states in the Eastern Arab region, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, and 
Syria, were established as states on the basis of their convenience for 
Western imperialist power.* The section that follows wdl detail how this was 
manifested in the cases of Lebanon and Syria.
In the last days of the Ottoman Empire, “Syria”, or “Greater Syria” became 
the center of pan-Arabism. Arab nationalists conceived of Greater Syria as
* Gause (1997) p.202.
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roughly encompassing the territorial expanse of present-day Syria, Lebanon, 
Jordan, and Israel. However, after the end of the First World War, the 
victorious allies, Britain and France, were not prepared to honor their 
wartime promises to the Arabs of independence and a united Arab state, and 
agreed, in the 1916 Sykes-Picot Agreement, to divide Greater Syria between 
them. In exchange for an acceptance of a French mandate in Syria and 
Lebanon, Britain asserted control of the territories of Iraq, Palestine, and 
Transjordan.
The postwar settlement caused resentment among the Sunnis in Syria, 
most of whom were cut off from their co-religionists in Lebanon, Iraq, 
Transjordan, and Palestine. The French “mandate” government controlling 
the rump, present-day Syria, further fragmented the country into provinces 
based on sectarian concentrations; Jabel Druze, Damascus, Aleppo, and 
Latakiya. The French also created Greater Lebanon, which was to be ruled 
as a separate mandate consisting of the previously autonomous Maronite- 
domoinated province of Mount Lebanon and some other Muslim areas 
having transstate ties with Syria; Beirut, coastal areas from Tripoh to Sidon, 
and the Beqqa Valley. The Maronites had been pushing for a French 
mandate over Greater Lebanon, and had dispatched a mission to the Paris 
Peace Conference representing the Maronite Patriarch Ehas Huwayyik.^ Not 
surprisingly, therefore, the Syrian Arab nationalists and the MusHms in the 
provinces attached to Mount Lebanon did not accept the reality of Greater 
Lebanon, and saw the separation of Lebanon from Syria as an arbitrary 
imposition on them by Western colonial powers." The French pohcy of “divide 
and rule” did nothing to mitigate this attitude, tending instead to increase 
communal differences and to further encourage separatist tendencies. The 
following sections discuss in detail the history of the two states and their
Goria (1985) pp. 18-19.
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relations with one another until 1970, which saw the election of Suliman 
Franjieh to the Lebanese presidency and Hafez Asad’s final victory in the 
power struggle which had been taking place in Syria.
(2) Lebanon
France’s creation of Greater Lebanon in 1920 resulted in pohtical 
institutions being formed on the basis of confessionalism, an organization of 
the government according to rehgious divisions. This principle was reflected 
in the newly created Representative Council which later served as a 
Constituent Assembly; and the debates of the Assembly’s committee for 
drafting of the constitution were strongly influenced by France. The 
Lebanese constitution was finally proclaimed in 1926, against the protests of 
the leaders of the Sunni community, who were calling for unification with 
Syria. Their main objections were that the constitution stipulated that the 
boundaries of Greater Lebanon were permanent and that the French had the 
right to supervise Lebanese foreign relations and to close down the Lebanese 
parhament without consulting Lebanese deputies.'* The creation of Greater 
Lebanon did not diminish this pan-Arabist feehng among the Sunnis, and 
during the 1920s and 1930s there were thus two basic trends in Lebanon: a 
Maronite-dominated Lebanism and a Sunni-dominated Arabism. This 
bipolarization necessitated a political arrangement to estabfish the common 
parameters of the newly independent Lebanese state declared by the treaty 
with France in 1936.
Maronite-Sunni agreement on the basic character and pohcies of Lebanon— 
on shaping and sharing the positions of power and on dividing the power 
resources of the state—was finally reached by leaders of the Maronite and
" Avi-Ran (1991) pp.4-5.
38
Sunni communities, Bishara Khuri and Riyad Solh. at their meeting in 
September 1943. Later known as the National Pact, it was a “gentlemen’s 
agreement”, but has nevertheless constituted the backbone of Lebanese 
politics and foreign policy. The main features of the pact were as follows. 
Firstly, positions of power and influence between the various Lebanese 
communities were to be allocated in proportion to the 1932 national census. 
As a result, the presidency was to be reserved for the Maronites, the 
premiership for the Sunnis, and the speaker of parhament for the Shi’ites, 
with the power of the president being stronger than that of the other two. In 
addition, the parhament would be formed on the basis of a consociational 
formula with a ratio of six Christians to five Mushms. Secondly, Lebanon 
was to belong to the Arab world and would cooperate with other Arab states; 
it would have the right to defend its sovereignty, its independence, and its 
unique character of traditional ties with the West, especiaUy France, unless 
such ties would make Lebanon a gateway for Western penetration into the 
Middle East.® In sum, it stipulated that the Christians refrain from asking 
help for France, and that the Muslims, in turn, promise not to cah for 
unification with Syria.
One of the important achievements of the newly formed Solh government in 
consohdating Lebanese sovereignty was the abrogation of the mandatory 
restrictions which France had placed on the 1926 constitution. In November 
1943, French High Commissioner, Jean Helleu, retaliated against this action 
by arresting Khuri, Solh, Abdul Hamid Karami and three important 
members of cabinet: Camille Chamoun, Sahm Takla, and Adel Usayran. 
After the six men were imprisoned, Helleu nullified the decision by the Solh 
government, suspended the constitution, dissolved the parliament, and 
stated that the pro-French Emile Edde should be president. Against these
 ^W einberger (1976) p .55.
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French actions, the Lebanese reacted swiftly and with powerful unanimity. 
Even the members of Pierre Jumayiel’s Maronite-dominated Phalange Party, 
founded in 1936 with the determination to preserve and strengthen the 
Lebanese pohtical entity against pan-Arab and/or pan-8yrian orientations, 
joined forces with its MusHm counterpart, the Najaddeh, which had been 
founded by a journalist called Muhieddine Nsouli as a youth group in 1936. 
Nationwide strikes were organized and large-scale riots occurred. France, 
strongly pressured by Britain, changed its policy and the release of Khouri, 
Solh, and their colleagues marked the end of the French rule in Lebanon and 
the emergence of Lebanon’s full independence which was finally realized in 
1946/
Although the 1943 crisis generated cross-sectarian solidarity among the 
Lebanese, the Lebanon-first identity did not continue to prevail: the 
National Pact had preserved to some extent a tradition of pluralism, but it 
had produced a weak state. In Lebanon, communally-based sub-state groups, 
among them MusHms having pan-Arab identities, were still powerful. Since 
the zuama power was dependent on ensuring the security and interests of 
local people, they generally prevented the emergence of a strong central 
government. These factors further eroded both loyalty toward the state and 
identification with it. The Lebanese state was destined to be challenged from 
both within (by sub-state identities) and firom outside (by supra-state 
identities, as with pan-Arabism).^
After its independence, the color of Lebanon’s politics was dominated by 
rivalry between the Constitutional Bloc led by Khuri and the National Bloc 
led by Edde. Khuri’s enormous popularity, which was on the basis of the fact 
that he led Lebanon to independence, meant that the Constitutional Bloc
" Zisser (2000) pp.57-59.
® Goria (1985) pp.25-26. /Hudson (1985a) p. 142 and p. 175.
 ^Zisser (2000) p.66.
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was initially overwhelmingly powerful. However, his amendment of the 
Lebanese constitution in 1947, which made it possible for him to secure for 
himself a second presidential term, antagonized former colleagues. This was 
especially true of Chamoun, who had hoped to succeed Khuri as president. 
Chamoun later aHgned with Edde and was finally elected to the presidency 
in 1962/
During the 1950s, when Nasser’s leadership of the pan-Arab movement was 
exerting a strong influence on Lebanese MusHms, there was growing 
opposition to Chamoun’s pro-Western foreign poHcies, such as his support for 
the Eisenhower Doctrine. MusHm dissatisfaction with Chamoun’s domestic 
poHtics, changes to electoral laws in favor the Maronites in 1957, and the 
formation of the United Arab RepubHc (UAR) with the merging of Egypt and 
Syria, which had different meanings for Christians and MusHms and 
consequently spHt Lebanese society along sectarian Hnes, fiuaUy led to the 
outbreak of a short-Hved civil war in 1958.®
The 1958 crisis was resolved with the election to the Lebanese presidency of 
General Fuad Shihab, whose reputation for having remained “neutral” 
during the civil war stemmed firom his not ordering the army to intervene on 
behalf of the government. He attempted to overcome one of the weaknesses 
of the consociational democracy in Lebanon: its inabiHty to cope with the 
demands of radicals for social justice. In his view this would be a key to the 
prevention of future turmoil in Lebanon. He expanded the government’s 
bureaucratic powers as a means to dilute power possessed by al-zuama who 
were mainly interested in the distribution of power under the consociational 
formula and were generaUy opposed to extending the functions of the state, 
since to do so threatened to deprive them of such poHtical resources. 
Although he introduced a number of reform and development projects that
H arris (1996) pp. 138-140.
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aimed to narrow the gap between sects and/or regions, his term expired in 
1964 before his policy could bear fruit. Since his successor, Charles Helou, 
lacked his strong mind and popularity, Shihabism began to lose its power to 
make use of the Lebanese army and the Deuxieme Bureau, special security 
forces, to overcome the opposition of traditional leaders to centraHzing 
policies. In effect, the 1968 parliamentary elections signaled the resurgence 
of traditional pohtical trends in Lebanon, and the Tripartite Alliance (hilt)
composed of three Maronite factions of — Camille Chamoun’s National
Liberal Party, Pierre Jumayiel’s Phalange Party, and Raymond Edde’s
National Bloc — defeated the Shihabist Bloc (nahj) which were led by
Maronite Shihabists in the army, Rashid Karami and a loose coalition of 
groups supporting social reforms. The restoration process was finalized in 
1970 when Shihabist Efias Sarkis was defeated by Suleiman Franjieh 
supported by the hilf.^ ®
Another weaknesses of Lebanese consociational democracy which affected 
the legitimacy of the Lebanese parliament was its vulnerability to 
demographic trends. The National Pact that placed Maronites and Sunnis in 
top governmental posts rehed for its legitimacy on the 1932 census. However, 
Lebanese acceptance of those arrangements had been dramatically 
decreased, because of rises both in Christian overseas emigration and in the 
Muslim birth rate, especially in the case of Shi’ites, whose community 
seemed to become the largest single sect, though it remained politically and 
socially deprived. ^  ^
® Hudson (1976) p. 116. /Kalawoun (2000) pp.23-64.
Hudson (1985b) pp.282-283. /Zamir (1980) pp.49-50.
Official public statistics do not exist, but according to one private source in 
1975, it was said that 60 percent of the population in Lebanon was occupied 
by Muslims and 40 percent by Christians. The details are that the Shi’tes 
constituted 27 percent, the Sunnis 26 percent, and the Maronites 23 percent.
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Since the Lebanese political system did not address radicals’ demands for 
social justice of these demographic trends, an increase in ideological 
movements outside the government and parliament, focusing mainly on 
developing inequalities in Lebanon, continued after the 1950s. Kamal 
Jumblatt, the Druze chieftain and founder of the Progressive Socialist Party 
(PSP), which was established in 1949 and whose ideology represented a 
mixture of French sociahsm, Gandhian pacifism, and Druze factionahsm, 
demanded strongly that the Lebanese government adopt policies of social 
justice and welfare. After the retreat of the Shihabist reform trend at the end 
of the 1960s, the issue of development and social justice was taken up by a 
new Shi’ite populist leader, Imam Musa Sadr, who mobilized mass 
demonstrations in southern Lebanon and south of Beirut against the neglect 
by the government of Shi’ites, and who was elected as the head of Higher 
Shi’ite Council. At the same time, Jum blatt also formed the Lebanese 
National Movement (LNM), which aimed to destroy the discriminative and 
pro-status quo consociational system which did not reflect the increased 
power of the ideological movements. The LNM was composed mainly of his 
PSP, the Independent Nasserist Movement led by Ibrahim Qulailat, the 
Lebanese Communist Party led by Niqula Shawi, the Ba’th Party led by 
Asim Qansu, and the Syrian Socialist Nationalist Party led by In’am Ra’d.
The evolution of these mass movements was also influenced by the outcome 
of the 1968 parliamentary election, which, allowing for an overlap in 
occupations, resulted in the elections of 10 landlords, 44 lawyers, 17 
businessmen, and 28 professionals. This figure means that the parliament 
did not represent the socially deprived classes, such as peasants and workers. 
The composition of parliament also excluded firom representation
[Hudson (1985b) p.281.]
Ajami (1986) pp. 123-158. /Hudson (1985b) pp.281-283.
For the details of composition of the LNM, see Deeb (1980) pp.60-69.
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ideologically-oriented radical parties/^
In the long run, since the parliament did not incorporate those radical 
groups whose power had increased in the late 1960s under Sadr and 
Jumblatt, they questioned its legitimacy and resorted to extra- 
parHamentary activities, sometimes collaborating with the Palestinians.
(3) Syria
From the beginning, the French mandate faced severe opposition from the 
Syrian Arab nationalists. Their sense of betrayal and disillusionment laid 
the ground for anti-French movements, and their bitterness was further 
fueled by French suppression of political activities and human rights, the 
division of Greater Syria into smaller units, and the French objections to the 
granting of independence to Syria, Indeed, the French authorities had not 
only done their best to prevent the spread of ideas and movements associated 
with Syrian unity, but had actively encouraged sectarian tensions, by 
granting Alawi and Druze “states” full domestic autonomy and also by 
differentiating educational systems ffom region to reg ion .S yrians, with 
their grievances against harsh French rule, were attracted to the pan- 
Arabist aim of uniting all the regions in the Arab world into a single nation­
state, and the famous early advocates of this movement were indeed Syrians 
themselves. Though the unity of the entire Arab region was a final goal for 
pan-Arabists, their first priority, especially for those who resided in Syria, 
was to unite aU parts of Greater Syria.
In 1925, a nationalist revolt, which began with a rebellion by the Druzes, 
spread fiercely throughout the country, only to be crushed by the French 
authorities in 1927. Though France still took a provocative attitude toward
Gordon (1983) pp.82-83. 
Ma’oz (1986) pp. 10-15.
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nationalists after the rebellion, their followers increased. The fifth High 
Commissioner, Henri Ponsot, in 1928 took the conciliatory step of allowing 
elections for a chamber of deputies to produce a draft for a Syrian 
constitution. However, since article 2 declared Syrian unity and 
independence, Ponsot dissolved the chamber and imposed on them a version 
which altered the wording of article 2 and was less offensive to the French.
After the constitution came into effect in 1932, the Syrians demanded an 
acceptable treaty with France. This treaty, which was concluded with the 
left-wing French government under Leon Blum in September 1936 and 
which stipulated that the prerogatives of sovereignty over Alawi and Druze 
“states” would be transferred to the Syrian government, was unanimously 
approved by the chamber in December 1936. Even though it did not reunite 
Lebanon with Syria, some Syrian politicians were apparently willing to 
settle for a “Little Syria”. Though it was never ratified by France, Syria 
finally became fully independent in 1946 after the evacuation, under strong 
British pressure, of French forces.
Since Greater Syria was not realized, many political leaders in Syria 
considered it to be an artificial and Western-imposed entity, and their 
frustrations with its identity continued to manifest themselves in Syrian 
politics and foreign policy. The Syrian perception that their state was 
detached from its natural Arab environment, and especially from Greater 
Syria, meant that any Syrian regime had to rely on pan-Arabism in order to 
be perceived as legitimate. In effect, Damascus became one of the core 
centers of pan-Arabism, and actually formed a union with Egypt in 1958. 
However, there were bitter experiences associated with this union that 
increased the gap between the ideal pan-Arabism and pan-Arab reality and
Weinberger (1976) p.51.
Tibawi (1969) pp.348-349. /Longrigg (1958) pp. 187-188.
Longrigg (1958) pp.222-224. /Tibawi (1969) p.352
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even pan-Arabists started to adopt a Syrian-centric view of Arabism. In 
addition, the existence of the state of Israel in Greater Syria, which was due 
in large part to the help given by Western countries, prevented Syrian 
nationahst aspirations firom being realized. Syrian irredentist feeling was 
clearly manifested in the late 1960s, when the regime under radical wing of 
the Ba’th  Party set out to make Damascus the center of a war of Palestinian 
liberation. This led to the disastrous defeat of the Arab states in 1967, and to 
an expansion of Israeli control into Arab lands, including the Golan Heights 
in Syria which was now occupied. The struggle with Israel now became a 
more urgent policy problem for Syria, which placed the recovery of its lost 
territory at the top of its agenda and engendered a more “realistic” policy 
orientation. Since Syria’s strategy gradually moved from the complete 
realization of its irredentist goals to the more limited goal of recovery of the 
Syrian territory which had been lost, the meaning of pan-Arabism itself was 
changed from that of a cause which required Syrian sacrifice at the expense 
of its sovereignty to that of ensuring its own security against Israel.^ ® After 
Hafez Asad seized power in 1970, he gave more attention to the recapture of 
the Golan and, unlike the previous regimes which had unconditionally 
supported the Palestinian causes, began to regulate the activities of the 
Palestinians in Lebanon so as to serve Syrian security needs.
(4) Transstate Relations between Lebanon and Syria
Despite French determination to prevent the unity of Greater Syria, 
transstate ties between Lebanon and Syria were preserved, with aU the main 
sectarian groups having “cousins” on both sides of the Lebanese-Syrian 
border. The 1925-1927 Druze rebellion spread not only within the Syrian 
region, but also into some areas of southern Lebanon. The leader, Sultan
Hinnebusch (2001) pp. 139-140.
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Atrash, recruited hundreds of Druze followers not only in the Syrian Druze 
“state” but also in the Mount Lebanon region/®
Transstate ties between the Lebanese pan-Arabists who advocated unity 
with Syria and the Syrian pan-Arabists who advocated the unity of all parts 
of Greater Syria were maintained during the 1930s. Syrian pan-Arabists had 
followers in Lebanon, especially among the Sunnis. In 1936, when the Syrian 
National Bloc called a general strike whose main slogan was the unity and 
independence of Greater Syria, many shops in Beirut were shut to show 
sympathy, and a number of demonstrations were organized in Sidon and 
TripoH. During the Second World War, there appeared in each country an 
increasing number of state-nationalist, as opposed to Arab nationalist, 
leaders. They emphasized the termination of French colonial rule rather 
than the unity of between Lebanon and Syria, encouraged consultation 
between political leaders, and replaced close relations between opposition 
elements in both countries. This new phase was strongly influenced by the 
French betrayal of its promises of independence.^^ These state-nationaHst 
trends were further reinforced when both countries became founding 
members of the Leagues of Arab States. In order to secure Lebanese 
participation in the organization, a clause affirming general respect for the 
independence and sovereignty of Lebanon within its present borders was 
inserted in the Alexandria Protocol; it aimed particularly to assuage the 
feelings of the Lebanese Maronites, who were generally suspicious of pan- 
Arabism.^^ Both the Lebanese and Syrian states had in effect resigned 
themselves to not being united, although they were in so doing destined to 
suffer from the iU fit between state and national identities resulting from the 
arbitrary French-imposed Lebanese-Syrian borders and the difficulties these
^ Longrigg (1958) pp. 154-169.
Weinberger (1976) pp.56-57.
^  Longrigg (1958) pp.351-352.
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caused in their state-building projects.
However, during their first years of independence, a significant portion of 
the Lebanese population, especially those who in the past had wanted union 
with Syria, looked to this country with respect as an ideological and political 
model. In Syria, a considerable portion of the population was pan-Arabist 
and still regarded Lebanon as a natural part of Syria, which had been 
dehberately detached from the fatherland in the interests of the French 
imperialism.^ ® Under these circumstances, by contrast to Syrian elites which 
advocated the pan-Arabism, Lebanese eHtes, especially the Maronites, had 
an interest in restricting transstate aspirations since these had the potential 
to jeopardize their sovereignty and independence.
In July 1949, when Antun Sa’ada, the founder of the Syrian Socialist 
Nationalist Party (SSNP) which firmly declared Lebanon to be a mere part of 
Greater Syria, clashed with the Lebanese government by calling for an 
armed uprising and was forced to take refuge in Syria, the Lebanese 
government swiftly moved to contain his influence and the threat he posed. 
Several factors influenced its behavior. On the one hand, Sa’ada’s afignment 
with Jum blatt and Chamoun, the main opponents to President Khoury, had 
reinforced the government’s negative perception of him. The argument that 
the Arab defeat in the 1948 War was a sign of the failure of pan-Arabism had 
led to an increase in the membership of the SSNP, and among those who now 
joined were many Sunnis, notable among whom was the famous pan-Arabist 
and supporter of Prime Minister Solh, Muhammad Ba’albaki. This 
apparently led Solh to recognize Sa’ada as a threat to his power among the 
Sunnis, though Sa’ada himself was a Greek Orthodox. In effect, Sa’ada’s 
alliance with opposition figures and his increased popularity caused both
Zisser (2000) p. 164,
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Khoury and Solh to see him as an enemy of the government/"^ On the other 
hand, Syrian President Husni Za’im initially encouraged Sa’ada to revolt 
against Solh, a close friend of his rival former President Shukri QuwatH, 
whom he suspected of plotting his overthrow, and provided Sa’ada with both 
fighters and arms. However, Egyptian pressure and the conclusion in the 
same month of a partial agreement with Lebanon on economic issues may 
have influenced Za’im to show goodwill toward the Lebanese government.^ ® 
Eventually Za’im handed over Sa’ada to the Solh government, which 
sentenced him and his followers to death. Though the leaders of the 
Lebanese government were largely motivated by personal concerns, they 
nevertheless defended the state’s sovereignty and Syria finally cooperated 
with them.
In other respects the states also went their own ways, with consequent 
clashes of interests. The Lebanese commercial-financial elites favored a 
laissez-faire and free trade system, while influential Syrian industriafists 
and farmers as well as nationafistic politicians and military officers favored 
protectionist and state interventionist economy.^ ® These differences in state 
economic orientation precipitated the dissolution of the Syro-Lebanese 
Customs Union in 1950 which had been founded during the period of the 
French mandate. When Syria demanded the unification of their economic 
systems in March, the Lebanese government, one power base of which was 
rooted in the merchant and financier classes, feared that the demand would 
lead to economic protectionism and state interventionism and decided to 
dissolve the union. This was despite a report from the government’s foreign 
advisor that the severance would be costly for Lebanon.^ ^ In other words.
Goria (1985) pp.33-34. /Zisser (2000) pp. 176-189. 
Seale (1965) pp.70-71.
Gate (&993) p.76.
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although the Lebanese government put the economic interests of merchants 
and financiers first, it nevertheless protected its sovereignty at the expense 
of overall economic benefit.
However, transstate ties continued to play an important role and were used 
as a tool of policy, especially in crisis situations. During the 1958 civil war, 
the UAR government, aiming mainly to change Chamoun’s pro-Western 
foreign policy orientation, supported opposition parties and pohtical leaders 
against him, the majority of whom were Mushms. These were armed by 
Syria and helped by Syrian fighters. Syrian inteUigence gave financial aid to 
the opposition leaders, Rashid Karami, Sa’eb Salame, and Kamal Jumblatt.^® 
In the late 1960s, when Palestinian guerilla activities in Lebanon intensified 
and the Palestinian groups clashed with the Lebanese army Syria helped 
them. It used its ties with various Palestinian groups, especially Saiqa^ ® to 
exercise leverage over Lebanon, though it officiahy stated that Saiqa’s 
activities in Lebanon were not supervised by Damascus, when the first major 
clash between the Lebanese army and the Palestinians occurred in April 
1969.®® The clash led the Lebanese government to try to persuade Syrian 
President Nureddin Attasi to contain Saiqa’s activities in Lebanon. Since 
this attempt ended in failure, Lebanese President Helou asked Nasser to
^  Johnson (1986) p. 134. /Kalawoun (2000) pp.66-67.
^  After the 1967 War, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) was 
dominated by two major political factions: Arafat’s Fatah organisation and 
several smaller groups linked to radical Arab regimes such as Syria, Iraq, 
and Libya. In Lebanon, Fatah was the most dominant organisation which set 
the pace of war and peace with the Lebanese government. Other smaller 
radical Palestinian groups were composed of the Syrian-sponsored Saiqa, 
George Habash’s Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP),
Nayih Hawatmeh’s Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), 
and Ahmad Jibril’s the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General 
Command (PFLP-GC), and were more hostile to the Lebanese authorities.
®® FCO17/833 no.86, May 3, 1969. ISWBM&y 3, 1969.
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mediate/^ An unofficial agreement (the May 9 Agreement) was finally 
concluded, whereby Syria, under the still powerful pressure exerted by 
Nasser, was forced to promise to contain Saiqa’s activities in Lebanon, 
although no restrictions were placed on the behavior of Fatah and other 
Palestinian organizations/^
In the long run, despite the attempts by the Maronite-dominated Lebanese 
government to secure its sovereignty and to contain transstate ties, these 
were to remain instruments by which Syria could influence Lebanese politics, 
as illustrated in the 1958 crisis period and in the Palestinian problems of the 
late 1960s. However, Syrian success came only with Egyptian backing, which 
in the latter case the Egyptians actually imposed restrictions on Syrian- 
sponsored activities themselves. With Egypt the dominant power in the Arab 
world and domestic instability in Syria, the transstate ties of the Syrian 
regime were insufficient to enable it to exert a controlling influence over 
Lebanese affairs.
2. CONTRASTING POLITICAL SITUATIONS IN LEBANON AND SYRIA, 
AND RELATIONS BETWEEN THE COUNTRIES (1970-1975)
(l) Gradual Paralysis of the Consociational Democracy in Lebanon
The consociational democracy in Lebanon moved gradually toward 
paralysis during this period. Palestinian guerilla activities on Lebanese soü 
were a major contributing factor to the dysfunction of the Lebanese state, 
although they had already been problematic for the authorities. The 
continuous clashes between the Lebanese army and the Palestinians during 
1969 led to the Cairo Agreement in November, which aimed to accommodate 
Palestinian guerrilla activities along the Lebanese-Israeli border with
31 Petr an (1987) p. 102.
61 ;
Lebanese sovereignty. However, a further influx of the Palestinians after the 
1970 “Black September” in Jordan, with the transfer of PLO headquarters 
from Amman to Beirut, made it harder for the Lebanese government to 
implement the agreement.®® The Palestinian refugee camps with 150,000 
inhabitants became a “state within state” beyond Lebanese authorities 
control, and their guerrilla activities against Israel from southern Lebanon 
invited IsraeH heavy retaHations, a dramatic manifestion of which was an 
Israeli commando attack in the heart of Beirut in April 1973 which killed 
three Palestinian leaders.®"*
Also the increased power of the Palestinians encouraged the radicaHsation 
of the mass movements led by Jumblatt and Sadr, and their common aim of 
destroying the Maronite-dominated Lebanese pohtical system provoked 
reactions from the Maronite mihtias, which led to the frequent violent 
clashes between them. The Palestinian presence in Lebanon disrupted the 
consociational formula, and actually constituted a major factor leading to the 
outbreak of the civil war in 1975 by “weakening the central government’s 
authority, escalating armed confhct, arming Lebanese revolutionaries, and 
provoking the Christians.”®® However, the Palestinians were not fully 
responsible for the chaos in Lebanon, which was also influenced by 
“domestic” pohtical factors. As Syria was concerned about the Palestinian 
activities in Lebanon from the viewpoints of its national security against 
Israel, they wiU be discussed more in the part of Syrian involvement in 
Lebanese affairs (pgs.58-66). Thus, this part will primarily pay attention to 
the “domestic” factors contributing to the eruption of the conflict.
After his election to the presidency, Franjieh destroyed the cooperative
®" Khazen (2000) pp. 155-156.
®® Fo^ details of the Cairo Agreement and of its implementation, see 
Brynen IjOOO) pp.48-63.
®^ Rubin (1994) pp.43-45.
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relationship between the president, representing Christian interests, and 
the prime minister representing those of Muslims, which had been the 
backbone of stabihty in the Lebanese pohtical system. He first appointed 
Sa’eb Salem, a Sunni za’im, as prime minister. However, both Franjieh and 
Salem had strong views on the extent of their respective powers, and discord 
between them set in when Franjieh began to concentrate governmental 
power in his own hands. He also withheld fuh support for many of Salem’s 
pohcies, and the spht between the two was fuUy exposed after the Israeh raid 
on the Palestinian headquarters in April 1973. Salem tried to fire Iskander 
Ghanem, the Maronite army commander and close friend of the president, 
but Franjieh backed his friend and replaced the powerful Salem with the 
second-rank Sunni pohtician, Amin Hafez.®®
Amin Hafez neither enjoyed the full support of the Sunni establishment nor 
had any influence on the Muslim community as a whole, and his selection 
was seen by the Sunni estabfishment as an attempt to further strip them of 
power, just when their own popularity was declining in the face of the rising 
power of the mass movements led mainly by Jumblatt, Sadr, and of the 
Palestinians. After Hafez was forced to resign in the face of strong Muslim 
opposition, the president proceeded to appoint, one after the other, two 
second-rank figures as prime ministers: both Takieddin Solh and Rashid 
Solh had little support from the MusHm community.®^
Although it was Franjieh who was largely responsible for the paralysis of 
the coaHtion poHtics between the Maronite president and the Sunni prime 
minister which had characterized Lebanese poHtics since its independence, 
this paralysis was also brought about by Jumblatt’s behavior and his 
influence on Franjieh. In fact, Franjieh’s election to the presidency in 1970
®® Rubin (1994) p.49.
®® Hudson (1985) p.203. / Zamir (1980) pp.63-64. 
®" Harris (1996) pp. 155-159.
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was largely due to Jumblatt, who voted for Franjieh with another three 
deputies from his party in the final ballot, since he strongly resented the use 
of the Lebanese army and Deuxieme Bureau by the Shihabist presidents to 
threaten opposition figures and was concerned that the election of another 
Shihabist would give more power to these institutions/®
In effect, Jumblatt managed to influence Franjieh’s policies, the most 
notable outcome of this being Franjieh’s selection of Rashid Solh in 
November 1974. Solh was a Jumblatt ally in the Sunni community, and 
received some assistance from Jumblatt when he was elected from Beirut’s 
second constituency in the 1972 parliamentary elections. Opposing Franjieh 
and Jumblatt were Salem and Rashid Karami, who shared concerns about 
the increasing strength of the Jumblatt-led LNM, and whose alliance was 
further consoHdated by Salem’s bitter experience with Franjieh during his 
premiership, as well as by Karami’s traditional political rivalry with 
Franjieh in northern Lebanon.®® In personal terms, Jumblatt saw Solh as the 
best candidate to be the next prime minister.
However, one should not overlook the fact that Solh was also desirable for 
Franjieh in that he had no real power base to challenge the president’s 
cabinet colleagues and for Jumblatt in that he was too weak to confront the 
growing power of the LNM, In regards to the latter, it should be understood 
that since the results of the 1972 parliamentary election again showed a 
comparable majority for the traditional and conservative groups, the radical 
opposition groups, represented in the parliament only by Jumblatt’s bloc, 
complained that the electoral system discriminated against them. For 
example, although Mount Lebanon contained no more than 20 percent of the 
population, it still held 30 percent of the parliamentary seats, a situation
®® The Times, August 18, 1970 and August 19, 1970. /Zamir (1980) pp.49-59. 
®® Goria (1985) p. 168. /Johnson (1986) p. 164, p. 169.
54
which favored the Maronites."*® With the exclusion of most radical groups 
from the parhament and his ouster from the newly formed Salem cabinet 
after the election, Jumblatt increasingly leaned toward extra-parhamentary 
activities, and sometimes collaborated with the Palestinians. Because he 
favored second-rank figures as prime minister he can be said to be partly 
responsible for the dysfunction of consociational democracy in Lebanon, 
although he should be considered less responsible in this respect than 
Franjieh.
The extra-parliament activities which began in the late 1960s intensified in 
the first half of 1970s. Sadr created the Movement of Disinherited as a mass 
Shi’ite organization which appealed to the government to address social and 
political needs by various forms of mobilization, such as mass rallies, 
rehgious celebrations, pohtical actions, sit-ins, strikes, and the observation 
of national solidarity days. The membership was mainly composed of 
dispossessed urban migrants in the suburbs of Beirut, who strongly resented 
the government’s neglect of their miserable conditions, and of members of 
the growing new bourgeoisie which had insufficient parliamentary 
representation. First appearing in public in 1973 with the submission of a 
memorandum to the government, the movement was largely independent. 
However, it was also a part of the general mobilization and sectarian conflict 
that characterized the period. In practice, it sometimes cooperated with the 
Palestinians and the LNM. Relations with the Palestinians were initially 
very close, and the latter began to provide training bases and arms to the 
movement’s military organization, Amal, in 1975."**
In the face of the increased power of radical movements and of the 
Palestinians, the Maronites were concerned that the sovereignty of the 
Lebanese state was under threat; but since Franjieh had dismantled the
40 Baaklini, Denoeux, and Springborg (1999) pp.88-90. /Hudson (1985) p.283.
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Deuxieme Bureau in 1970, the Lebanese state and army were increasingly 
incapable of dealing with the problem. The Phalange Party activated its 
mihtias and conducted street confrontations with the PLO and the radicals, 
especiahy after the failure by the army to prevent the Palestinians from 
taking over parts of suburban Beirut in May 1973.“*® In the long run, extra- 
parhamentary activities by both Christians and Mushms, which was largely 
connected with the Palestinian presence, stripped the parhament of its 
legitimacy and, along with these activities, key pohtician’s sectarian-based 
behavior contributed to the state of dysfunctional consociational democracy 
in Lebanon.
(2) The Transformation of Syria into a Regional Middle Power
While Lebanon had been generaUy stable after independence except for the 
eruption of the civil war in 1958, Syria’s experience until Asad consolidated 
his power in 1970 was entirely different. There had been a succession of 
military coups, and the artificiahty of the Syrian borders and its strong pan- 
Arabism were exploited by neighboring countries, such as Egypt, Iraq, and 
Jordan. Since their chents in Syria rehed on them for protection, patron 
states had opportunities to give aid to their chents in the form of financial 
support or the provision of arms. Since Syrian state officials faced both 
external and internal threats, they generaUy had to take into consideration 
domestic factors in shaping foreign pohcy, which precluded a “realistic” 
approach, even to the point of the very existence of the state being 
threatened in 1967, when a radical faction of the Ba’th Party provoked a war 
with Israel for the fiberation of Palestine."*®
Nasr (1985) p. 12
Harris (1996) p. 157. /Stoakes (1975) p.220. ISWB May 4, 1973, 
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In. contrast, the consolidation of the Syrian regime under Asad made it 
possible for the state to conduct foreign policy on the basis of its national 
interest: the protection of Syria from Israeli threats. Asad’s efforts were 
focused on stabilizing the domestic situation in order to maximize power and 
resources for the struggle with Israel. In the domestic security apparatus he 
estabhshed his jama’a, a core of largely Alawi personal followers, in order to 
enhance authority over both the Ba’th Party and the army two pülars of the 
Ba’thist state since 1963. On the other hand, he appeased the private 
bourgeoisie, primarily consisting of Sunnis, through a limited liberalization 
and created a new bourgeoisie controlled by the state.^ "* The radical Ba’th 
had already managed to strip Syria’s great feudal lords of their powers by 
means of land reforms that enhanced state capabilities in the rural regions."*® 
Externally Asad set up new alliances with the Gulf oil states by halting the 
ideologically-based verbal attacks against them, and thus received financial 
assistance which was desperately needed in order to rebuild and expand 
military capabilities and in order to co-opt, appease, or subdue elements of 
the Sunni bourgeoisie who had contested the legitimacy of the Alawi- 
dominated Asad regime. He also maintained close relations with the USSR 
in order to secure a supply of arms."*®
Asad’s success in creating a “presidential monarchy”"*^ that both 
subordinated sub-state groups and played them off each other allowed him to 
pursue a foreign pohcy that was relatively unconstrained by domestic 
concerns. Under Asad, Syria changed from being a victim into a regional 
player, and this new status made it possible for him “to effectively adapt
"*"* Hinnebusch (2002b) p. 148.
®^ Hinnebusch (2001) pp. 115-125.
^ Hinnebusch (2001) pp.147-149.
"*^ For the concept of “presidential monarchy”, see Hinnebusch (2001) pp.67- 
69.
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foreign policy to the changing geopolitical power balance.”^ ® Syria improved 
its relations with Egypt, and the pragmatic trend in Arab politics which had 
started after the 1967 War was reflected in the foreign policies of both Asad 
and Egyptian President Anwar Sadat.. They aligned with King Faysal of 
Saudi Arabia, in effect, forming Riyadh-Damascus-Cairo. Though their 
relations were worsened by Sadat’s unilateral conclusion of the first Sinai 
agreement with Israel and the premature fifting of the oil embargo by the 
Gulf oil states, this axis was the dominant power in the region until Sadat 
concluded the second disengagement agreement with Israel in September
1975 (Sinai H)/® Since the enhancement of Syrian power by both domestic
and external means made Syria less permeable to transstate penetration 
and made it possible for Asad to be deeply involved in and to play a more 
active role inside Lebanon, Lebanese-Syrian relations became increasingly 
asymmetrical.
(3) Syrian Involvement in Lebanese Affairs
While Asad was in the process of consolidating his power, the stability of the 
Lebanese state was beginning to be shaken by both internal and external 
factors. Since Asad understood that the turmoil in Lebanon would give Israel 
cause for intervention in Lebanon, he was forced to take measures to prevent 
this happening, and the process of his maximizing Syrian power was 
inextricably linked with the need to “orchestrate” the Lebanese situation. 
His first steps to obtain influence over Lebanese affairs in general and the 
Palestinian problems in particular were to estabfish or strengthen ties with 
sub-state groups there. He tried whenever possible to secure good relations 
with most of the factions and individuals involved.
"*® Hinnebusch (2002b) p. 148.
Hinnebusch (2001) pp. 153-154. /Taylor (1982) pp.51-52.
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Asad already had good relations with Suleiman Franjieh that dated back to 
1957, when Franjieh fled to Syria and received sanctuary in his home after 
clashing with the Duwayhi clan over influence in Zgharta, northern 
Lebanon/® In addition, he also managed to improve relations with the 
Phalange Party which, faced with the shattered situations in Lebanon 
resulting from the Palestinian armed presence, desperately needed to 
convince other Arab governments, including Syria, that the spül-over impact 
on the Arab world which would result from the disintegration of the 
Lebanese state made it a matter of vital interest for them to preserve 
Lebanese sovereignty and independence/* For Asad himself the 
establishment of ties with the party was necessary as a means for Syria to 
play a balancing role between Maronites and Mushms, especially with 
regard to Palestinian affairs. Their improved relations proved to be an 
important asset following the outbreak of civil war in 1975.
Changes in regional circumstance also gave Asad opportunities to 
strengthen ties with Mushm sects in Lebanon. While Nasser was ahve, 
Mushm leaders had considered him as their patron, but his death resulted in 
a weakening of Egyptian influence and left a vacuum that enabled Asad to 
replace Egyptian guidance and support with his own.®® Asad needed to 
maintain good relations with the Sunnis in Lebanon to show goodwill to its 
Sunni population. As for traditional Sunni zuama, Syria’s relations with 
Sa’eb Salem worsened, but its ties with Rashid Karami were generally stable 
and became the basis for Karami’s position with Damascus during the civil 
war. Sa’eb Salem was disliked because he had failed to constrain the 
activities of the pro-Iraqi Ba’thists in Lebanon when he was a prime minister 
and was a Beirut rival of Rashid Solh who had been favored by President
Harris (1996) p. 112.
®* Stoakes (1975) p.233.
Weinberger (1986) p. 114.
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Franjieh, one of Asad’s close allies in Lebanon/® Asad also needed to 
establish ties with Nasserists, since their influence was increasing as a 
result of their joining in the LNM and aligning with the Palestinians. In 
December 1971 the Lebanese government arrested Nasserists Najah Wakim 
and Kamal Shatila for publishing an illegal journal, but Syria succeeded in 
pressuring the government to release them. Wakim later won a 
parliamentary seat in the 1972 election, and Shatila was at the time 
Secretary-General of the Nasserist Union, of which both he and Wakim were 
founding members.®"*
Syrian-Shi’ite relations were based on mutual self-interest, and Asad 
calculated that if Lebanon’s Shi’ite leader acknowledged the Alawis as part 
of the Shi’ite sect, it would help him to control the majority Sunnis at home, 
who had deep misgivings about the Alawi-dominated Asad regime.®® After 
the anti-Ba’th Sunni disturbances in 1973, Musa Sadr, then the head of the 
Higher Shi’ite Council in Lebanon, responded to Asad’s need by issuing a 
rehgious sanction (fatwa) stating that the Alawis constituted a community of 
Shi’ites.®® Asad, for his part, acknowledged the increasing power of the 
Shi’ites in Lebanon under Sadr and was able to meet Sadr’s need for a strong 
external patron as a means to further consohdate his power.
Syrian-Driize relations were further strengthened, after Jumblatt 
supported the election of Franjieh to the presidency in 1970. The fact that he 
had retained his position as interior minister until 1972®^  and was
®® Goria (1985) p. 136. /Johnson (1986) pp.47-50.
®" Johnson (1986) p. 180. /Sahbi (1976) pp.61-62.
®® Rabinovich (1985) p.37.
®® Ajami (1986) p. 174.
®^ The newly-formed cabinet led by Salem after the 1972 parHamentary 
elections ousted Jumblatt, because of worsening relations between them. 
Salem actually tried to contain Jumblatt’s power during the elections, in fear 
of latter’s increasing popularity among the Mushms. [Khazen (2000) p.
203. ]
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responsible for regulating Palestinian guerilla activities, his closeness to the 
Palestinians, and the increasing power of the LNM led Asad to maintain 
close relations with him. Jumblatt, on the other hand, understood that the 
Palestinian activities in Lebanon relied largely on the supply of arms from 
Syria and that this supply and Lebanon-based operations against Israel 
could be jeopardized or impeded by a deterioration in Lebanese-Syrian 
relations. Furthermore, such a development could weaken his power and 
threaten his position, since the LNM was ahgned with the Palesthiians in a 
common struggle against the sectarian-based Lebanese state.®®
Besides these Lebanese sub-state groups, Syria used its ties with a number 
of Palestinian groups in Lebanon as a means to secure its own national 
security and its political and economic interests in Lebanon. Initially, Syrian 
relations with Fatah were poor, because, at the time of Black September in 
1970, Asad, who was then Commander of the Syrian Air Force, had declined 
to provide air cover for the armed forces entering Jordan on the side of the 
Palestinians, a refusal which resulted in the slaughter of Palestinians by 
Jordanian troops.®® In contrast, relations with radical Palestinian groups 
were fairly good/® In fact, Syria gained a position to exert influence over 
them until 1973.®* The balance was tipped toward Syria in mid-1974, when it 
was able to get its client organization, Saiqa, to soften its radicalism. Being 
thus dissociated from radicalism, Syria showed Kissinger its acceptance of 
his diplomatic approach toward the Arab-IsraeH conflict.®^
In the long run, Asad, in parallel with his gradual consolidation of power, 
was successful in establishing good relations with Lebanese sub-state groups
Goria (1985) pp. 106-107.
®® Ma’oz and Yaniv (1986) pp. 195-196.
®® Cobban (1984) p. 144. /Quandt, Jabber, and Lesch (1973) pp.62-63. / Yodfat 
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and the Palestinians, except for a few cases, and, by using these ties, he came 
to be directly involved in Lebanese affairs. In fact, Syria exerted pressure in 
order to prevent the selection of Sa’eb Salem as successor to Takieddin Solh 
by using its close ties with Jumblatt and Franjieh.®® However, Syria’s main 
concerns were the Palestinian guerrilla activities in Lebanon; and their 
effect on its security position in Lebanon along with its political and 
economic stakes there. Syrian attitude and behavior toward the Palestine 
cause were also affected by Asad’s recognition of Palestine as a part of 
Greater Syria and of the Syrian state as heart and champion of the pan- 
Arabism.
As for the PLO, the heavy losses inflicted on it by the events of Black 
September in 1970 was a major factor in determining Fatah’s cautious 
approach in Lebanon. Yet, while the PLO spokesman officially announced 
the continuation of a temporary freeze on its guerilla activities in southern 
Lebanon, the PLO leadership sometimes found it difficult to ensure that this 
order was carried out, since it was opposed by the radical PFLP, DFLP, 
PFLP-GC, and some Fatah field commanders. In fact there were a number of 
small incidents between the guerillas and the Lebanese army, but the real 
peak came in April 1973, when an Israeli commando raid in the heart of 
Beirut left three major Palestinian figures dead. The failure of the Lebanese 
army to intercept the raiders caused a storm of protest from the Palestinians 
and the LNM forces.®^
In May a Palestinian takeover of parts of suburban Beirut and provocations 
of the Lebanese army by radical Palestinian groups, such as the PFLP, the 
DFLP, the PFLP-GC, and Saiqa, all associated with the LNM, forced 
Franjieh to take action. When the DFLP kidnapped several Lebanese 
soldiers at the beginning of May the army in its largest operation against
63 Goria (1985) p.168. /Harris (1996) pp.155-156, p.l59. /Khazen (2000) p.231.
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the Palestinians since 1969, surrounded the refugee camps in Beirut, and 
Arafat’s Fatah was quickly involved/® Despite a succession of cease-fire 
agreements, clashes between the army and the commandos continued for 
over two weeks, spreading from Beirut to other parts of the country/® The 
cHmax in these confrontations was the use of the Lebanese air force against 
the commandos/^
However, the air raids were quickly brought to a halt following the 
considerable pressure exerted on Franjieh by Syria and other Arab regimes. 
Egypt and Syria, which were planning what would become the October 1973 
War, were especially anxious not to escalate the situation, and brought great 
pressure to bear on the Lebanese government. Syria closed the Lebanese- 
Syrian border on May 8, and ordered Fatah and Saiqa forces to move from 
Syria into Lebanese territory.®® Although relations between Franjieh and 
Asad were seriously aggravated by the crisis, the fact that they had long had 
a close relationship helped to make it possible for them to reach an 
accommodation. Egyptian interest in containing the conflict also contributed 
to the halting of Lebanese air raids on the Palestinian camps.®® Within two 
weeks, Franjieh responded to the request of his friend in Damascus, 
suspended army operations, and made an accord with the PLO in mid-May 
(the Melkart Agreement) which was based on the principles of the Cairo 
Agreement.™ The closure of the border was the same form of pressure that
®"* Brynen (1990) pp.61-62. /Khazen (2000) pp. 196-206.
®® Harris (1996) p. 157. /Khazen (2000) p.206. ISWBMsiy 4, 1973.
®® Sahbi (1976) p.68.
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had led to the conclusion of the 1969 Cairo Agreement/* Its success this time 
as well as the decline of Egyptian power after the death of Nasser and Asad’s 
rising power regionally and domestically enabled him to hnk the 
negotiations to reopen the border with other issues to do with Syria’s 
political and economic stakes in Lebanon.
With a lower standard of living in Syria than in Lebanon, thousands of 
Syrians went to Lebanon in search of employment, which in itself created 
tensions of a sort; their wages were lower than those of their Lebanese 
counterparts, and Lebanese employers generally preferred to hire Syrians, 
who were not accorded social security entitlements by Lebanese law.™ Syrian 
Vice-President Abdul Halim Khaddam demanded that their working 
conditions and health insurance be fully in accordance with Lebanese labour 
law. The response of the Lebanese Foreign Minister, Fouad Naffah, was to 
stress that although working conditions could be discussed in principle, to 
offer health coverage to thousands of Syrian workers, at a time when even 
most Lebanese workers were not covered, was virtually impossible. With 
regard to political issues, Syria demanded that the Lebanese government 
control anti-Syrian movements, especially the Mushm Brotherhood, a Sunni 
fundamentalist organization that had originated in Egypt and whose leader 
Issam Attar was now based in Lebanon. It also asked the government to 
censor anti-Syrian articles in the Lebanese press.™ Syria’s demands reflected 
its concern that although Asad’s power was increasing, he still had to be 
careful not to arouse anti-government feehng among Sunnis in Syria. There 
was a potential transstate influence running from Lebanon to Syria. Syria 
was in fact still somewhat permeable, and the Asad regime was actually
/Khazen (2000) pp.208-211. ISWBM^acy 21, 1973.]
*^ FCO 17/835 no.259, November 1 and FCO 17/835 no.280, November 7, 
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struck by Sunni rebellions in 1973 and later in 1977-1980 which however it 
managed to appease or repress.
As the border negotiations and other political and economic negotiations 
progressed, differing views on each issue led to a worsening of relations 
between the two countries. However, after Franjieh sent his son, Tony, to 
Damascus, Syria dropped its demands and restored normal relations by 
reopening the borders. Syria may also have been satisfied by the Lebanese 
government’s acknowledgement of Damascus as a key power b roker.T h is 
accommodation between Franjieh and Asad set the stage for the cooperative 
behavior between Lebanon and Syria during the October War in 1973: when 
Israeli and Syrian fighters clashed over Lebanese air-space over the Beqaa 
and southern Lebanon, the Lebanese government agreed to allow Syria to 
make use of Lebanon’s radar systems/^
After the end of the October War, Israel continued to carry out military 
attacks, particularly against southern Lebanon. The fighting between the 
Lebanese army and the Palestinians accordingly intensified during 1974, 
and the Lebanese government banned the carrying and use of arms in 
public.^ ® Against this, Syria, through Saiqa’s chairman Zuhair Muhsin, 
stated that it would not support a ban on firearms among commandos in the 
South.^^ On the other hand, the Lebanese Prime Minister, Rashid Solh, tried 
to buy Soviet-made SAM missiles to use against Israel’s air raids, and 
discussed this issue with Asad.^ ® While Syria opposed the restrictions on the 
Palestinian armed struggle in Lebanon fi*om the point of view of pan- 
Arabism, it took a supportive attitude toward Lebanon’s effort to defend
Khazen (2000) pp.212-214.
Khazen (2000) pp.213-214.
Goria (1985) p. 160.
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itself from the Israeli threat by strengthening its military capability.
In the long run, Kisssinger’s “step-by-step” diplomatic approach after the 
October 1973 War did little to lessen tensions in Lebanon. As Kissinger’s 
diplomacy progressed, the Arab unity evident in the October War began to 
faU apart. Syria was fearful of being isolated by Kissinger’s negotiations with 
Egypt and Israel, and began to suspect that Egypt was moving toward a 
separate peace with Israel. This led it to pay more attention to the situation 
of its neighboring countries, particularly Lebanon which could be a point of 
vulnerability Israel could exploit as Egypt disengaged from the Arab-Israeli 
power balance. The Palestinians also became increasingly worried that the 
road was being prepared for an unsatisfactory settlement in which their 
national rights to “Palestine” would be compromised. Maronite leaders were 
concerned that a situation was developing in which Lebanon would become 
the sole state hosting Palestinian activities, and that this threatened its 
sovereignty; their müitias increasingly clashed with the Palestinians.^® 
Under these destabilizing domestic and external circumstances surrounding 
the Lebanese state, civil war finally erupted in April 1975.
Brynen (1990) pp.76-78.
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m. THE LEBANESE CIVIL WAR AND SYRIAN INTERVENTION 
(1975-1989)
During the state of “semi-anarchy” of the civil war, what was left of the 
Lebanese government tried to restore internal order by political, müitary, 
and economic means. These included several reconciliation efforts and the 
formation of cross-sectarian coalition cabinets, attempts at reunification of 
the Lebanese army, and several economic reconstruction programs. In so 
doing the Lebanese state had to be mindful of Syria’s role and actions, since 
this coimtry had become the most dominant influence on Lebanese soil.
Since Syrian pohcy toward Lebanon, which was largely a reflection of the 
regional dynamics of the Middle East, was characterised by its use not only 
of diplomatic ties with the Lebanese state but also of transstate ties with 
Lebanese sub-state groups, Lebanese state officials were forced to react 
concurrently to both state level and sub-state level influence fi*om Syria, 
while at the same time keeping an eye on regional circumstances. Therefore, 
before discussing the poHtical, military, and economic dimensions of 
Lebanese state dealings with Syria, it will be helpful first to discuss the 
external and internal contexts of relations between the two countries.
1. HOW THE DYNAMICS OF MIDDLE EAST INTERNATIONAL 
RELATIONS AFFECTED LEBANON AND SYRIA j
(1) Introduction IIThe international and regional arenas inevitably had a major impact on 31Syria, Lebanon, their relations, and even the interests and actions of jILebanon’s sub-state actors. A series of inter-Arab struggles, which |Jfragmented the Arab world, affected Syrian behaviour in Lebanon and were "I
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reproduced inside Lebanon, notably the Egypt-Syria conflict over Sadat’s 
separate diplomacy with Israel and the Iraq-Syria struggle after the Iran- 
Iraq War. However, at the same time efforts through the Arab League and 
typically led by Saudi Arabia to mediate inter-Arab struggles and conflict in 
Lebanon were made. Also regional struggles such as the Israeli-Syrian 
struggle and the Iran-Iraq War impacted on Lebanon. Finally at the 
international level the Soviet-American Cold War was played out in the 
region and specifically in Lebanon as the USA intervened in the Middle East 
and Lebanese conflicts, often on the Israeh side, but occasionally to support 
Maronite actors, while the USSR gave some support to Syria.
(2) Egypt’s Separate Diplomacy toward Israel and Syrian Concern
When the civil war erupted in Lebanon on April 13, 1975, relations between 
Syria and Egypt were poor. Their discord had originated in Sadat’s decision 
during the October War not to further pursue the campaign in Sinai after 
pushing the Israefi forces back fi*om the Suez Canal, which allowed Israel to 
concentrate on the northern border and led to Syrian reverses.^ At the same 
time Saudi Arabia took the initiative on relations between Syria and Egypt, 
with its attempts to reconcile the differences between them. In mid-April 
1975 the Saudis convened a trilateral conference in Riyadh that led to a 
reconciliation, albeit partial and temporary between Egypt and Syria. Later,
the Interim Sinai Agreement in September 1975 (Sinai II) was to lead to a
further deterioration in Egyptian-Syrian relations. Since the agreement did 
not refer to the situation in the Golan Heights and made Syria more 
vulnerable to Israel while at the same time securing Egyptian-Israefi border, 
the Asad regime seemed to interpret it as a further and complete betrayal by
Taylor (1982) p.68.
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Egypt.^
It is this that led Syria to focus serious attention on Lebanon. The Egypt- 
Syria conflict spilled over into Lebanon with each having local proxies. 
Moreover, Syria was vulnerable to an Israeli attack via Lebanese territory 
since the Lebanese border stretched across the whole western part of 
southern Syria, thus offering access to Damascus and central Syria. 
Although Lebanon was a “confrontational state” only in the 1948 War, Syria 
had long recognised its neighbour’s potential military significance in view of 
its geostrategic location.^ Given Syria’s increased vulnerability to Israel as 
Egypt withdrew from the Arab-Israeh power balance, Asad gave increased 
attention to Lebanon and attempted to dampen the civil war, as the turmoil 
potentially gave Israel a cause for intervention in Lebanon. Over time, 
Syria’s initial mediatory activities and indirect intervention through proxy 
forces were stepped up to the level of direct müitary intervention.'^
(3) The US and Israeh Roles in Syria’s Intervention
At the same time, this increased Syrian involvement in Lebanon caused 
considerable Israeh concern. In 1976, when the escalation of the Lebanese 
conflict threatened to bring about a direct müitary confrontation between 
Syria and Israel over Lebanon, the “Red lin e” Agreement, the aim of which 
was to prevent this happening by guaranteeing respect for mutual security 
needs, was arranged with the support of the United States.® Kissinger 
recognised that Asad’s fear of an Israeh intervention in Lebanon to save the 
Christians forced him to attempt to keep the LNM and Palestinians under 
control and to avoid their placing the Maronites in a corner. Since such a
 ^Taylor (1982) pp.66-68.
 ^Sirriyeh (1989) pp.37-38. /Weinberger (1986) p.271. /Petran (1975) p.8.
For the detaüs of Syrian involvement, see Avi-Ran (1991) pp. 19-48.
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Syrian attempt to pacify Lebanon was beneficial to the Israelis, Israel made 
this secret agreement, allowing the entry of a small number of Syrian troops 
into the northern part of Lebanon.® The agreement also “entailed Asad’s 
renewed commitment to join in the peace process under American 
supervision with the aim of reaching an agreement with Israel on ending the 
state of war in return for its withdrawal to the pre-June 1967 borders.”^
Since Syria expected “Golan E” to be the eventual outcome, it needed to
show the USA that its activity in Lebanon was moderate and that it did not 
pose a threat to Israel. The “Red Line” Agreement stimulated a Syrian- 
Maronite alliance, and the Syrian poficy of taking the side of the Maronites 
gave a favourable opportunity to President Franjieh. Since he had been 
heavily handicapped by the powerful LNM-Palestinian coaHtion, he 
managed to deal with the coafition by afigning with Syria during the spring 
and summer of 1976.
(4) Saudi Intervention and Creation of the ADF
While Syria ahgned with the Maronites, Egypt had been supporting the 
LNM and the Palestinians. As a result, tensions between Syria and Egypt 
were at their worst. This situation heightened Saudi Arabian concerns and 
led to Riyadh’s efforts to resolve both the Lebanese conflict and the 
Egyptian-Syrian discord. On the one hand, Egypt had traditionally opposed 
attempts to unify the Eastern Arab region, and it interpreted Asad’s 
behaviour toward Lebanon as a move in this direction. On the other hand, 
Syria, by the end of September 1976, had gained a sufficiently dominant 
position in Lebanon to impose its own settlement by military force.
However, Asad’s calculation led him to conclude that the inter-Arab solution
® Seale (1988) pp.278-280. 
" Sela (1998) p. 181.
70
which Saudi Arabia was beginning to sponsor would be more advantageous, 
because of the costs, in both political and financial terms, of dominating 
Lebanon. Asad also had to worry about backlash against his ahgnment 
against the Palestinians and the Muslims, which was de-legitimised in the 
Arab world and in Syria. He thus needed to get out of the anti-PLO and 
MusHm conflict. Since Saudi-Egyptian relations were still good, Saudi 
Arabia succeeded in convening a prehminary meeting in Riyadh in mid- 
October, and a week later an Arab League conference was held in Cairo.®
Syria’s and Egypt’s cooperative behaviour in both meetings led to some 
positive measures to end the Lebanese conflict. In fact, the symbofic Arab 
Security Force (ASF) of 2,500 troops, which had been created on the basis of 
resolutions at an Arab League conference in Cairo on June 8, and whose aim 
was largely to replace the Syrian army which had already entered Lebanon 
on June 1, was expanded to the 30,000-strong Arab Deterrent Force (ADF). 
The ADF’s mandate was to implement a cease-fire, to assist the Lebanese 
government in reestabhshing its authority over pubfic affairs, and to 
supervise the withdrawal of all armed forces to the positions they had held 
before the start of the civil war. Though this decision by the Arab League 
might have intended, as in the creation of the ASF, to contain the Syrian role 
in Lebanon, it led to the legitimising of the Syrian presence under the ADF 
banner.
Since the Arab states could not reach agreement on the sizes of national 
contingents of the ADF, the Arab League left this issue to the newly-elected 
Lebanese President, Efias Sarkis. His own election to the presidency having 
been due to Syrian help, he determined that the ADF should be comprised of 
up to 25,000 Syrian troops, despite the PLO demand that the number should
Taylor (1982) p.64, pp.68-69.
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not exceed 10,000.®
(5) Sadat’s Trip to Jerusalem and Israeli Aggression under the 
Likud Government
After the creation of the ADF, the Lebanese situation was relatively calm in 
the first half of 1977. However, Sadat’s trip to Jerusalem in 1977, the Camp 
David Accords in 1978, and the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty in 1979 had a 
profound impact on inter-Arab politics as well as, by extension, on the Syrian 
and Lebanese situations. Asad’s vulnerability increased considerably since 
he was forced to stand alone against the Israeli threat.^® In addition, the 
estabhshment in 1977 of the aggressive Likud government, led by 
Menachem Begin, increased his concern, since this government aimed to 
expel Syria and the PLO from Lebanon by upgrading its alhance with the 
Maronites, which dated back to early 1976 when Israel had suppHed them 
with weapons and trained their militias. Prime Minister Begin ordered the 
Litani Operation on southern Lebanon in 1978, the beginning of an Israeh 
aggression which would culminate in the massive operation on Lebanon in 
June 1982. Due to Egypt’s expulsion from the Arab world and the resulting 
major Arab-Israeh power imbalance, Israel was able to overtly support the 
Maronites, both mihtarily and pohticahy. These circumstances led Asad to
shift his alhance from the Maronites to the Mushms and the Palestinians—
his traditional allies in Lebanon—in order to contain the Israeh threat. Since
Syria had no hope of recovering the Golan through USA mediation after the 
Camp David Accords, it had no need to show that its pohcy toward Lebanon 
was moderate by facihtating a calming of the Lebanese-Israeh border. 
Despite this shift of Syrian pohcy which opened the possibhity of increased
Pogany (1987) pp.108-109. /Thompson (2002) pp.75-76.
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turmoil in Lebanon, Lebanese President Sarkis generally refrained from 
taking any action which could be provocative to the Syrians and instead 
attempted to sohcit Arab intervention. “ Sarkis tried to sohcit some Arab and 
international backing for Tjebanese sovereignty and to get some autonomy of 
Syria without antagonising it. After the failure of short-Hved international 
efforts in the fall of 1979 by France and the USA (the latter sent former 
Under-Secretary of State Philip Habib) to resolve the Lebanese turmoil, 
Sarkis gave more emphasis to an inter-Arab settlement for the South. Since 
the PLO’s mihtary presence there was also a headache for Sarkis’s Sunni 
counterpart, Prime Minister Sahm Hoss, who had been nominated by Sarkis 
in December 1976 and was grappling with economic reconstruction, Sarkis 
gained Hoss’s backing to adopt a strong stand at the 1979 Arab League 
summit of Tunis. However, the distance between the Palestinian and 
Lebanese positions led to a heated debate between Arafat and Sarkis. Since 
Syria needed an armed Palestinian presence in the South to counter the 
increased pressure from both Israel and the Maronite Lebanese Front^^, the 
Syrian attitude during the conference was passive. Eventually the 
conference rejected a Lebanese plan calling for, among other things, the 
withdrawal of the PLO from Lebanon south of the Litani, and the summit 
session devoted to the South was finally abandoned without a final pubfic 
communiqué.^®
Since the situation in the South continued to be perilous, the Lebanese 
government instructed its representative at the Arab League as early as July 
1981 to ask for an Arab summit that would focus especially on the issue of 
southern Lebanon. When the Fez summit was convened in November to
Sela (1998) p. 195.
“ Hitti (1989) p.20. /Sela (1998) p.l95. /Zamir (1999) p.l21.
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discuss the peace plan proposed by Fahd, Lebanon submitted a paper on the 
South and managed, in spite of disagreements over the Fahd Plan, to obtain 
an unanimous resolution concerning the South. However, the effecting of this 
resolution was impeded by a polarisation between the moderate and hard- 
fine Arab states and by confrontation between Saudi Arabia and Syria 
mainly deriving from the Islamic Revolution in Iran and the Iran-Iraq War 
in which Syria backed Iran. '^^
(6) The Fragmentation in the Arab World and the Alliance between 
Syria and Iran
The Iran-Iraq War brought about a new and immediate fragmentation in 
the Arab world which manifested itself in two distinct blocs. On the one hand 
there was an Iraqi-Saudi-Jordanian axis which became increasingly viable, 
the focus of a powerful alignment within the Arab system in the first half of 
1980s. On the other hand there einerged a Syrian-Libyan axis resulting from 
the isolation of these countries. Syria was excluded from the Iraqi-Saudi- 
Jordanian axis because of the collapse of its brief unity talks with Iraq in 
1979, its support for Iran in the Iran-Iraq War, and the worsened relations 
that came with these. At the same time, Syria and Iran were driven into a 
close alliance by their common hostility or vulnerability to Iraq and Israel. 
Libya was isolated by its leader Mu’ammur Quadhafi’s many adventures and 
destructive activities with regard to neighbouring countries.^®
As a result, the relations between Syria and Saudi Arabia, which were 
important for Syria’s position in Lebanon, became strained. At the same time, 
Syria’s alliance with Iran had repercussions in Lebanon, and made Israel’s 
military operation in Lebanon increasingly costly. With Syrian agreement,
Brynen (1990) pp. 146-148. /AffifNovember 23, 1979.
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Iran sent Revolutionary Guards to Lebanon during the Israeli invasion in 
the summer of 1982/® The alliance led Syria to allow Iranian sponcership of 
Hizbollah in 1982. While Iran supported Islamic movements such as the 
Islamic Unification Movement in Tripoli and Islamic Amal in the Beqaa, its 
main pillar in Lebanon was Hizbollah.
Under the estabhshment of Israeh hegemony in Lebanon as a result of its 
1982 invasion, the aUiance between Syria and Iran made it possible for 
Hizbollah to attack Israeh forces and the Amin Jumayiel administration 
(who was elected in September 1982 under Israeli supervision after his elder 
brother’s assassination) seen by the group as a Western surrogate. In 
October 1983, Hizbollah pursued twin-suidde attacks against the American 
and French army bases in the Multi National Forces (MNF), with the aim of 
expelling Western power from Lebanon and shaking Jumayiel’s regime. 
These attacks actually contributed to the MNF’s withdrawal in February 
1984, the abrogation of the May 17 Agreement (which was concluded in 1983 
between Israel and Syria under American guidance and was a virtual 
“separate” peace treaty) in March 1984, and the resulting recovery of Syrian 
hegemony in Lebanon.^®
However, Iran’s support for the radical Hizbollah was later at odds with 
Syria’s weU-calculated and cautious pohcy toward Lebanon, and Syria was 
specifically concerned about Hizbollah’s activities such as hijacking and 
kidnapping Westerners.^® In effect, the Damascus-Tehran axis became 
strained, and the most important example of such tensions was the conflict 
between the Syrian-supported Amal and HizboUah that took place in the
taylor (1982) pp.81-91.
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latter part of the 1980s. Following these confrontations between their 
respective chents, Syria and Iran eventually managed to rein in their rivalry 
and to keep their alhance intact by forming the Damascus Agreement in 
January 1989.^ ®
(7) The USA-USSR Rivalry and the Israeh Hegemony in Lebanon
Since the détente between the superpowers was ended by the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 and by the subsequent coming to power of 
President Ronald Reagan in 1980, the Middle East, as usual in the Third 
World, became an arena for superpower rivalry and surrogate conflict. Israel 
and its Lebanese ahies, especiaUy the Maronites, exploited the new situation 
to contain Syrian-Muslim-Palestinian advances in Lebanon and to create an 
Israeh-dominated order. They reahsed that the Reagan administration 
tended to see issues in the Third World as extensions of the Cold War, and 
thus articulated their own causes in terms of the USA-USSR confrontation. 
In fact, Lebanese President Amin Jumayiel, who was elected in September 
1982 under Israeh hegemony in Lebanon as a result of its massive invasion 
during the summer, made the May 17 Agreement with Israel under the 
pretext of defending the Middle East from “communist threats”. He may also 
have calculated that encouraging the USA to look at L^ebanon in Cold War 
terms might result in Lebanon being able to negotiate more equahy with 
both Syria and Israel.^^
During the Lebanese-Israeh negotiations, the Amin Jumayiel 
administration considered a peace treaty with Israel as out of the question 
since that would risk further domestic conflict and outside intervention,
^  Elhs (1999) p. 14. /Sela (1998) p.240. /For the details of Syrian-Iranian 
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especially from Syria. But Israel hoped, as the price for its withdrawal from 
Lebanon, to conclude a peace treaty, normalise relations, and isolate Syria, 
and it became clear that the USA had no intention of pressuring Israel to 
change this position.^^ Lebanese-Israeh negotiations reached a stalemate, 
and it was the shuttle diplomacy between Israel and Lebanon of Secretary of 
State George Shultz that helped them to complete a draft agreement which 
was finaUy signed by both Lebanon and Israel on May 17, 1983 (the May 17 
Agreement), However, Shultz, despite his earlier pro-Arab stance, did not 
assume the role of impartial mediator, surrendered to the powerful pro- 
Israeli lobby in the USA, and ignored Syrian interests : the agreement was, in
spite of Lebanese objections, a virtual “separate” peace treaty. The Lebanese 
government was disappointed with the USA.®®
In fact the agreement would have imposed Israeh hegemony in Lebanon by 
opening Lebanon to Israeh armed forces and products, and by banning Arab 
forces on Lebanese land, with the simultaneous withdrawal of Syrian forces 
being stipulated as a condition for Israel’s withdrawal. Though the USA and 
Israel calculated that a mihtarily weakened Syria had no choice but to accept 
these terms, Syria refused to withdraw from Lebanon on the basis of this 
agreement and demanded its complete abrogation.®"  ^This demand was based 
firstly on Syria’s assertion that the agreement violated Lebanese sovereignty 
and that it would strengthen Israeh-Maronite ties. In this regard Syria 
objected particularly to the formation of Lebanese-Israeh Joint Supervisory 
Teams, which were to be under the control of Israeh mihtary officers and 
whose role was to patrol the Lebanese-Israeh border. Secondly, Syria 
considered the agreement as a threat to its own national security since it 
accorded considerable control to Israel over the whole of the south.
®® Salem (1992) p.20.
®® Seale (1988) pp.405-409.
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prohibited any opposition on its territory to Israel, and banned the passage 
through Lebanon or its air space of troops, weapons, and equipment to or 
from any state not having diplomatic relations with Israel. Thirdly, as a self- 
proclaimed champion of the Palestinian and Arab cause, Syria calculated 
that any step-by-step arrangement with Israel would weaken Palestinian 
leverage, not to mention its own leverage in bargaining over the Golan. It 
dismissed the agreement as the second “Camp David” accord.®®
Syria in the end refused to withdraw from Lebanon on the basis of the 
agreement, and its initiatives to promote Lebanese opposition to the 
agreement resulted in the National Salvation Front (NSF). Syria and the 
NSF confronted the Israeli forces and its allies in Lebanon, notably the 
Jumayiel administration and the Maronites in the Shuf during the summer 
and autumn of 1983, so-called the “Shuf War”. Though Jumayiel relied on 
Israel and the USA to contain the Syrian-backed NSF forces, Israel suffered 
large numbers of casualties and, mindful of the risks that would follow a 
confrontation with Syrian forces that were reinforced by Soviet aid, chose in 
September to withdraw from the Shuf to the Awah river in the South.®® 
Based on a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with the Soviet Union 
which Syria had concluded in October 1980, negotiations between the two 
countries had led the USSR in late 1982 and early 1983 to send some 5000 
military advisors to Syria, together with SAM-5 missiles, thus providing 
Asad with enough power to confront the Israeh forces and to destroy the May 
17 Agreement between Israel and Lebanon which would have dragged 
Lebanon into Israel’s orbit.®^  In addition, a succession of fierce Shi’ite attacks
against the US presence in Lebanon—the April bombing of its embassy and
^  Hinnebusch (1998) p. 143. /Seale (1988) pp.408-409. /Thompson (2002) p.78. 
®® Haddad (1985) pp.94-95. /Petran (1987) p.311.
®® Hinnebusch (1998) p. 144. /Seale (1988) p.414.
®" Seale (1997) pp.70-72.
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the October bombings of MNF facilities including the US Marine Corps 
barracks—had an impact on the Reagan administration, and the USA finally
decided in February 1984 to withdraw its MNF troops/® Jumayiel’s leaning 
toward the USA and Israel evoked disapproval in Mushm circles supported 
by Syria and Iran and also led to huge and violent uprisings, resulting, in 
March 1984, in the Lebanese abrogation of the May 17 Agreement. Having 
lost his two patrons, Jumayiel now attempted without much success to 
reestabhsh close relations with Syria.®®
(8) Arab Intervention in the Lebanese Conflict : Road to the Ta’if 
Agreement
With Israeli hegemony in Lebanon decreasing, Syrian began to rebuild its 
hegemony there. However, Lebanon continued to be in a dangerous condition 
during the latter part of 1980s, since Syria and its cHent force Amal were in 
confrontation with, the Arafat-led PLO and Hizbollah in the battle of 
Palestinian refugee camps, the so-called “Camps War”. Initially, Arab 
countries had left Lebanese affairs in Syrian hands. However, the end of the 
Iran-Iraq War in 1988 led to the redirection of Arab attention firom the Gulf 
region to the Levant, the other areas of unrest in the region. In addition, 
Egypt’s retru-n to the Arab fold in 1987 reversed the fragmentation within 
the Arab system. As a result, Arab countries began early in 1989 to show 
more interest in the Lebanese conflict and to take responsibility for resolving 
the conflict. An Arab League committee criticised Syria for a lack of 
cooperation in its mediation efforts and Iraq, whose attention was now fi*ee of 
the Iran-Iraq War, called for an Arab emergency summit to discuss the crisis 
in Lebanon arising from the failure to elect a successor to Jumayiel whose
®® Seale (1988) pp.405-418. 
Salem (1994) p.75.29
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term was expired in September 1988, and which brought about the collapse 
of government unity. Iraqi-Syrian rivahy played out in Lebanon led to heavy 
conflict there, thus stimulating increased Arab involvement in attempts to 
settle it. Iraq supplied arms to the Lebanese Forces and supported the 
government led by General Michael Awn, whom Jumayiel had nominated as 
prime minister, whereas Syria declared that the government led by Sahm 
Hoss continued to be the legitimate government.®® In September 1989, Saudi 
Arabia, backed by the USA and other Arab states, finally succeeded in 
persuading Syria, which had been putting up a tough fight against the 
Iraqi-backed Lebanese forces, into accepting the Arab peace plan for 
Lebanon (the Ta’if i^reement), which became the basis for the formation of 
post-war Lebanon and also stipulated the “special” relationship between 
Lebanon and Syria. The reason why the Saudis were able to play an 
important role in making the Ta’if Agreement was that the Gulf Cooperation 
Council (GCC) estabfished in May 1981, which consisted of Oman, Bahrain, 
the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait, and which was 
led by Saudi Arabia, served to considerably increase Saudi power in the 
regional arena.® ^
(9) Brief Summary
In sum, it could be said that Lebanon’s collapsed and penetrated condition 
was affected by the international/regional rivahies in the Middle East. This 
was true particularly in terms of the inter-Arab struggles between Syria and 
Egypt and between Syria and Iraq; the regional struggles, manifestations of 
which being the conflict between Syria and Israel and the Iran-Iraq War; and 
a dimension of USA-USSR Cold War confrontation in the Third World. While
Sirriyeh (1989) pp.45-46.
Barnett (1998) p.201. /Ismael (1986) p.61.
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Saudi Arabia and the Arab League tried to contain regional rivalries and to 
stabilise Lebanon through the introduction of the ADF and the formation of 
the Ta’if Agreement, these Arab and Saudi efforts tended to end up 
legitimising Syria’s role in Lebanon.
2. THE BASIC INTERESTS OF LEBANESE SUB-STATE GROUPS 
AND SYRIA, AND A BRIEF SURVEY OF THEIR RELATIONS
(l) Introduction
The state of “semi-anarchy” in Lebanon allowed sub-state actors to increase 
their activities and to become more or less organised and armed militias. The 
main groups, such as the Maronites, the Sunnis, the Shi’ites, the Druzes, 
and the Palestinians, all had relations in one form or another with Syria. 
These relations were largely determined by Syria’s position as a regional 
middle power in the Middle East, by Syrian domestic circumstances, and by 
the calculations of the sub-state groups in Lebanon. On the one hand Syria 
used these sub-state groups to serve its own national interests, acting as a 
balancer, aggressor, and patron during the conflict. Syria also tried to 
minimise its rehance on any single group or identification with a particular 
side in the conflict for purposes of legitimising its presence in Lebanon, even 
though Abukhalil’s characterisation of Syrian policy as one of drawing a 
distinction between firiends and foes at particular junctures seems vahd.®® 
For their part, the Lebanese sub-state actors saw Syrian involvement as an 
opportunity for them to pursue or protect their own interests, and their 
behaviour was mainly determined by a combination of power calculations 
and the identity of each group. This section will briefly focus on the 
behaviour of the sub-state groups in Lebanon and on their relations with
®® Abulhalil (1994) pp.128-130.
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Syria.
(2) The Maronites and Syria
The three main parties with a Christian-Maronite orientation, and their 
militias, constituted the political and military pillars of the Maronite 
community. They were Pierre Jumayiel’s Phalange Party, Camille 
Chamoun’s National Liberal Party, and Suleiman Franjieh’s group. Maronite 
identity would, other things being equal, have made them opponents of 
Syrian influence in Lebanon; but power calculations could either reinforce or 
dilute this orientation, depending on the context. The Phalange Party 
initially took a position between Franjieh’s cooperative attitude toward Syria 
and Chamoun’s long-term distrust and hostility toward it, which had its 
origin in the 1958 civil war, and Jumayiel actually visited Damascus in 
December 1975. Despite their different points of wew, Jumajdel and 
Chamoiin formed in January 1976 the “Front for Liberty and Man“ (later 
known as the Lebanese Front), with Chamoun as president and with 
Jumayiel leading the Lebanese Forces as a joint militia against the powerful 
Mushm-PLO forces. In addition to these groups, there were “moderate” 
Christian leaders who had flexible views on power sharing with the Muslims 
in the Lebanese pohtical system, and who attempted to find a modus vivendi 
with the Palestinians that would stfil preserve Lebanese sovereignty. After 
the spring of 1975 Elias Sarkis, the former Shihabist statesman, became the 
most prominent representative of this trend.®® Maronite relations with Syria 
changed dramatically as their needs and circumstances altered.
Fearing that the Lebanese Forces would not be able to withstand the heavy 
offensive by the LNM-PLO coalition, Franjieh and Jumayiel requested Sj/ria 
in May 1976 to send its army into Lebanon. The conditions of the deal were
®® Deeb (1980) pp.21-59. /Rabinovich (1985) pp.60-74.
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that Syria would protect the Maronites from the coalition and implement a 
pohtical solution based on the “Constitutional Documents” which had been 
formed under Syrian supervision in February and which stipulated the 
preservation of confessional system, and that the Maronites in turn would 
agree to a Syrian “special role” in Lebanon. However, once the Maronites 
were free from the threat of mihtary and pohtical defeat, they graduaUy 
came to oppose Syria, partly because Syria was renewing its ahiances with 
the Mushms and the Palestinians. However, they also understood that to 
expel the Syrians would be more difficult than it had been to invite them into 
Lebanon, and that they had to some extent surrendered their freedom of 
action.®^
Afber 1976 there emerged three types of attitude toward Syria among the 
Maronite leaders. Franjieh, who had maintained close ties with the Syrians 
and particularly with the Asad famihes, and who also owed the prevention of 
his earher ouster from the presidency to Syrian help, advocated that close 
relations with Syria be maintained. President Sarkis accepted Syrian 
influence as a dominant force in Lebanon, but sought to contain it with the 
help of the United States and other Arab countries. A third, but prevailing, 
Maronite attitude toward Syria advocated by the Lebanese Front sought the 
recovery of Maronite political and military power against Syria by seeking a 
strategic alliance with Israel, and took the form of the Lebanese Forces (LF) 
leading an armed struggle against the Syrian-led ADF in Lebanon. Aware 
that the Maronites could not restore their hegemony over Lebanon, the 
Lebanese Front also sought a Christian mini-state as part of a “canonisation” 
of Lebanon which provoked strong Syrian opposition, since it would lead to 
an increased Israefi role in Lebanon.®^
In addition to the above hostile attitude toward Syria, the Lebanese Front
34 Zamir (1999) pp. 119-120.
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also sought leverage over Syria by supporting the Muslim Brotherhood 
which inflicted severe blows on the Asad regime during the late 1970s and 
early 1980s. Though Syria accused the Phalange Party of facilitating the 
brotberbood’s movement in l^ebanon and of being involved with it inside 
Syria, Syria hoped to put an end to this alleged involvement by improving 
relations with the Lebanese Front. In addition^ Syria was keen on 
terminating the new relations between the Lebanese Front and its hostile 
neighbour Iraq after Chamoun stated that Iraq should play a more effective 
role in Lebanon.®®
After the assassination of Bashir Jumayiel by an alleged Syrian agent, the 
Mamnites realised tbat tbeir alliance with Israel had become too costly and 
a threat to Maronite solidarity as it split the community between pro-Israeli 
and pro-Syrian figures. In Maj?^  1983, Franjieh joined the National Salvation 
Front (NSF) with Karami and Jumblatt, which was formed at Syria’s 
initiative and mediation between the three leaders, and which aimed to 
abrogate the May 17 Agreement with Israel®^ Maronite solidarity was also 
shattered by internal conflict. Faced with younger militia leaders such as 
Ehe Hubayka and Samir Ja’ja, who had consolidated their power through 
armed conflict and by challenging the traditional leadership, the ageing 
Camille Chamoun and Pierre Jumayiel began to lose the power they had 
once possessed within the community.®® The death of Pierre Jumayiel in 
August 1984 had a particularly strong impact on the solidarity of the 
Maronite community. In February 1985 the Lebanese Forces, led by the pro- 
Israeli Ja’ja, revolted against the Phalange Party and its leaders. He 
objected especially to Amin Jumayiel seeking terms with Syria and declared
®® Zamir (1999) pp. 120-121.36 J^une 25 and June 26, 1980. 
®" Petran (1987) pp.313-314.
®® Salem (1995) p. 176.
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the LF’s independence of the party in the areas of security, politics, finance, 
and information/®
However, perceptions within the Lebanese Forces changed, and the idea of 
reaching an accommodation with Damascus, which had been advocated by 
the intelligence chief Hubayka, began to gain support within the group. This 
was due to the Israeli army’s withdrawal in stages between January and 
June 1985 fi*om most of southern Lebanon and the southern Beqqa to a 
“security zone” along Israel’s northern border, and to the heavy defeat of the 
LF by the NSF in Sidon, for which Ja’ja had been responsible/® However, 
since his cooperative attitude toward Syria was largely based on his desire to 
contain Ja’ja’s power and to consolidate his position within the T<ebanese 
Forces by using recovered Syrian hegemony in Lebanon, Hubayka’s policy 
did not receive much support within the Maronite community Afber he 
signed the “Tripartite Agreement” with Nabih Berri and Walid Jumblatt in 
December 1985 to stabilise Lebanon under Syrian hegemony the Lebanese 
Forces splintered. Ja’ja, backed by strong Maronite opposition to the 
agreement stemming partly from offence taken at Syria’s disregard for and 
by-passing of the Jumayiel’s presidency and also supported by a majority in 
the Lebanese army command and anti-Syrian Maronites, managed to have 
Hubayka and his followers ousted to Syrian-controlled Beqqa/^ After this, 
Maronite-Syrian relations remained poor and Syria was not successful in 
finding reliable leaders in the community other than Franjieh.
(3) The Sunnis and Syria
Among the Sunnis in Lebanon the major actors were the “traditional”
®® Petran (1987) pp.358-359. 
®^ Harris (1996) pp. 192-193.
Hanf (1993) pp.306-310. /Harris (1996) pp. 193-201. /Petran (1987) pp.368- 
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leaders (zuama), the “moderate” pohtical leaders, the Nasserist 
organisations, and the Sunni fundamentalists. From a Syrian point of view 
the Sunnis were a natural ally because of their Arab-oriented identity. Syria 
also needed to maintain good relations with the Sunnis, since the Alawi- 
dominated and secular-oriented Asad regime was seen with suspicion by the 
Sunnis in Syria, especially in the late 1970s and early 1980s when the Asad 
regime was engaged in military confrontations with the Sunni 
fimdamentalist group, the Mushm Brotherhood. Also, since the Sunnis 
controlled the premiership in Lebanon, cooperation with them was necessary 
if Syria was to put its Lebanese pohcy into effect smoothly. On the other 
hand, because the Sunnis in Lebanon lacked military forces, apart from the 
relatively weak Nasserist organisations, the community needed the 
protection of Syrian mihtary and pohtical power. Although they could 
conceivably have relied on other Arab states to compensate for their 
decreasing relative power during the civil war, it seems that geographical 
proximity with Syria played an important role in making it their natural 
protector.
Syria rehed on Sunni zuama power to counter the powerful LNM-PLO 
coahtion and also, in particular, to confront the Israeh-backed Maronite 
forces, though the power of zuama had diminished during the conflict 
because of the rising power of the so-caUed “radical” groups in the Mushm 
community such as the LNM and Hizbohah. Along with Jumblatt and 
Franjieh, Rashid Karami participated in the NSF, which was formed to 
counter the May 17 Agreement between Israel and Lebanon. Sa’eb Salem 
was initiahy reluctant to ahy himself with the Syrian-backed NSF, even 
though he condemned Amin Jumayiel’s election to the presidency. However, 
once it was clear to him that the Jumayiel administration had failed to 
restore security in West Beirut, the seat of his own power base, he associated
8 6
himself more closely with the NSF/®
Syria relied for its reconstruction efforts mainly on the “moderate” Sunni 
pohtical leadership. Both Sahm Hoss and Shafiq Wazzen were prime 
ministers under the Sarkis presidency who tried to pacify the country in 
cooperation with Syria.'^ ® But Syrian relations with Nasserist organisations 
such as the Independent Nasserist Movement and its mhitia, Murabitun, 
remained strained, except during the first phase of the civil war when Syria 
supported the LNM-PLO forces. These organisations demanded the abohtion 
of the confessional system, tried to drive the Maronties into a corner, and 
attempted to further fortify Lebanon as a power base for the Palestinian 
armed struggle against Israel. Syria was concerned about their behaviour 
since it would provide a base for Syrian dissidents and a pretext for Israeh 
penetration into Lebanon. Syrian relations with Mushm fundamentahsts in 
Tripoli were also poor, since many Mushm Brotherhood members were 
flowing into the city and finding protection there, especiahy after the Hama 
massacre in 1982.'^ ^
(4) The Shi’ites and Syria
The Shi’ites community had two main pohtical groups. One was Amal, led 
by Nabih Berri and calhng for a moderate reform of the Lebanese pohtical 
system. The other was HizboUah (the Party of God), fi'onted by its “spiritual 
leader”, Sheikh Muhammed Hussein FadhaUah, and taking a more radical 
stance that sometimes brought about clashes with the Syrians.'^® Although 
both groups had connections with Syria, Amal was the closer ahy.
Amal benefited in a number of ways from its relations with Syria. After the
®^ Johnson (1986) pp.203-210.
®^ Johnson (1986) p. 198 and pp.210-211.
Petran (1987) pp.352-853.
For the details of each group, see Deeb (1988) pp.683-698.
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disappearance of Musa Sadr, the leadership of Amal, Hussein Husseini from 
1978 to 1980, and that of his successor Nabih Berri, ensured that there were 
good relations with Syria. Having become a dominant force in the Shi’ite 
community, Amal decided to break ranks with the LNM-PLO coalition since 
the latter controlled the Shi’ite areas in southern Lebanon using harsh 
measures, including torture, and this led to an antagonistic Shi’ite attitude 
toward the coalition. Thus, Amal became one of a small number of pro-Syrian 
organisations when Syria aligned in June 1976 with the Maronites to 
contain the LNM-PLO forces. This was perceived by most Muslims as a 
Syrian betrayal, and in return Syria thereafter treated Amal as one of its 
most reliable allies in Lebanon. Syrian was motivated in so doing not only by 
the rising Shi’ite political, military, and demographic power in Lebanon, but 
also by its need to have a Mushm force in Lebanon to counterbalance the 
Sunni community, especiahy when the Muslim Brotherhood attacked the 
Asad regime. In fact, Amal had a rehable mihtia, and its strong sympathy 
toward Asad dated back to 1973, when the then head of the Higher Shi’ite 
Counch in Lebanon, Musa Sadr, issued a fatwa declaring that the Alawis 
were a Shi’ite Islamic community. Asad also needed Amal as support for his 
regional pohcies. Since the penetrated and fragmented Lebanese state was 
an arena for regional power rivalries, Amal was able to serve as a proxy for 
Syria’s anti-Iraqi activities. Indeed, in the pre-1982 period many pro-Iraqi 
Ba’th leaders were assassinated by Amal, which was against Saddam 
Hussein’s war on Shi’ite Iran.'^
After the Israeh invasion, the Iranian-backed Hizbohah increased its power 
in Lebanon, and Amal emerged as an important means by which Syria could 
prevent Iran from dominating the Shi’ites in Lebanon. Syrian relations with 
Amal temporarily worsened as a result of Amal’s initial tacit cohaboration
Abukhalil (1990) pp. 10-12. /Ajami (1986) pp.174-175. /Deeb (1988) p.687.
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with the Israeh invasion of 1982, its initial hesitation to join in the NSF, and 
its attempt to balance and mediate between the NSF and the Jumayiel 
government. However, their relations were soon improved since Jumayiel’s 
refusal to discuss even the moderate reforms which the Shi’ites requested 
drove Amal into the opposition and made the NSF more powerful. Amal was 
subsequently a phlar of the 1985 “Tripartite Agreement” brokered by Syria 
among the leaders of the three main Marontie, Druze, and Shi’ite militias. In 
addition, Syria and Amal had a shared interest in preventing the 
resettlement of Arafat’s PLO forces in Amal-based southern Lebanon, as it 
risked bringing about an Israeh retahation that might result in the massive 
destruction of infrastructure, as had taken place in 1982. Amal needed both 
a patron and arms in order to support this goal, and Syria supphed the 
movement with large amounts of weapons and ammunition.
As a result, their coinciding interests meant that Amal could play a pivotal 
role in the attack on the PLO during the “Camps War” by which Amal sought 
to prevent a resurgence of Arafat’s presence in Lebanon in the late 1980s. 
However, Berri’s ahgnment against Palestinian forces cost the movement its 
unity Amal’s earher dynamism was also affected by its growing inefficiency, 
corruption, and poor leadership. However Amal stUl retained a broad power 
base, especiahy in the vihages of the South, while Hizbohah supplanted 
Amal in southern Beirut.'^ ® Since Syria recognised and supported Amal’s 
intentions and actions to prevent the reemergence of Palestinian power in 
Lebanon, their relations continued to be close unth the end of the Syria-PLO 
conflict,
Syrian relations with Hizbohah were more problematic, and Asad had to 
walk a tight-rope in his dealings with the Shi’ite fundamentahst movement.
Abukhahl (1990) p. 12. /Ehteshami and Hinnebusch (1997) pp.121-122 and 
pp.130-132. /Petran (1987) pp.313-316.
"® Norton (1998) p. 151.
89
Firstly, HizboUah was ideologically opposed to the Asad regime’s advocacy of 
secular pan-Arabism. Secondly, its “extreme” activities, such as Western 
hostage-takings and suicide bombings, which were risky for the over­
cautious and calculating Asad, were detrimental to the image of his regime. 
Since Iran had a powerful influence over BdzboUah, relations between 
HizboUah and Syria reflected Asads balancing between his stake in the 
Syrian-Iranian aUiances and Syrian interests in Lebanon. What happened, 
in effect, was that when Syrian and Iranian interests converged, Syria and 
HizboUah were able to coordinate their efforts. In the early 1980s, HizboUah 
supported Syrian struggles against the IsraeH presence in Lebanon and 
against the MNF. Their coordination contributed to the political climate 
which forced President Jumayiel to abrogate the May 17 Agreement with 
Israel. HizboUah played an important role in reestabUshing Syrian influence 
as a dominant force in Lebanon, after a brief diminution of its role in the 
wake of the IsraeU invasion in 1982.^^
However, in the late 1980s, the aUiance between Iran and Syria became 
strained by the “Camps War”. Iran, which was trying to create a 
Palestinian-Shi’ite aUiance against Israel, demanded that Syria stop Amal’s 
attacks on the PLO. In addition, HizboUah was opposed to Amal’s attempt to 
calm the southern border with Israel and continued to side with PLO forces. 
Amal-Hizbollah clashes were frequent, with HizboUah insisting that it 
should have positions and freedom of activities against IsraeU forces in the 
South, whUe Amal rejected these demands. Syria was forced to enter into 
West Beirut to save Amal from HizboUah advances, and February 1987 saw 
the most significant confrontation between Syrian troops and HizboUah take 
place, resulting in the massacre of 23 members of HizboUah.®®
Afterwards, Syrian relations with HizboUah, and by extension with Iran,
49 AbukhaUl (1990) pp. 13-15. /Ranstorp (1997) pp.40-49 and pp. 110-119.
90
deteriorated seriously, aggravated by the treatment of Western hostages. 
When Ayatollah Montazeri rejected Asad’s appeal to release the American 
Colonel, William Higgins, Asad ordered Amal to crack down on HizboUah, a 
decision which enraged “radical” figures in the Iranian government. Iran’s 
attempt to mediate the confrontation between Amal and HizboUah faded 
because the Iranian leadership itself was spUt, Since the “radical” Ah Akbar 
Mohtashemi backed HizboUah, and the “moderate” Hashemi Rafsanjani 
blamed both sides equaUy, a reflection of the Iranian power struggle could be 
seen in the Lebanese situation. However, as soon as the dual President 
Rafsanjani-AyatoUah Khameni leadership became consoUdated in Iran, it 
worked to contain the Amal-Hizbollah clashes and cooperated with Syria to 
form the Damascus Agreement in January 1989, by which Syria permitted a 
HizboUah presence in southern Lebanon on condition that HizboUah would 
restrain its operations against Israel so as not to invite massive Israeli 
retaliation. Now that Syria had finaUy seemed good relations with both 
Amal and HizboUah, it was in a position to balance and mediate the two 
main groups of the Shi’ite community. This became an important asset for 
Syria in the implementation of its post-Ta’if Lebanese poUcies.®^
(5) The Druzes and Syria
During this period, the leadership position within the Druze community 
was occupied by the Jumblatt famUy in the Shuf. After the outbreak of civU 
war, relations between the LNM and the Syrians were initiaUy good because 
of their mutual interest in containing Maronite power. However, their 
relations soon deteriorated dramatically since Kamal Jumblatt’s demands 
for thorough reforms of the Lebanese poUtical system were not acceptable to
®° AbukhaUl (1990) p. 16. /Ehteshami and Hinnebusch (1997) pp. 131-133.
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Syria which hoped for moderate reforms and whose intention was 
manifested in the “Constitutional Documents” pubhshed in February 1976. 
Jumblatt claimed that the “Constitutional Documents” would not change the 
confessional character of the political system which prevented the Druzes 
from occupying top governmental posts such as president, prime minister, 
and speaker of parliament.®^ He was not satisfied with the Syrian proposal, 
and sought to force Syria to take a more radical stand for political change in 
Lebanon, since the LNM was at that time militarily superior to the Lebanese 
Forces. To achieve this aim, the LNM renewed hostihties and engaged in 
attacks against the presidential palace and the Lebanese Forces, which led 
Syrian-supported President Franjieh and Pienre Jumayiel to ask for the 
entry of Syrian army into Lebanon.®^
Jumblatt’s rejection of the Syrian reform plan, and his refusal to cooperate 
with Asad’s pragmatic strategy toward Lebanon, led to a bitter conflict 
between them during the summer of 1976, and he was finally defeated by 
Syria both mflitarUy and pofiticaily. Syria succeeded both in assuming a 
dominant role in Lebanon and in persuading other Arab states to accept its 
role. After Kamal Jumblatt was assassinated, possibly by a Syrian agenL his 
son, Walid, and his followers improved relations wdth Syria.®^  It seems that 
the weakened LNM, especially after the assassination of its leader, had no 
choice but to accept Syrian hegemony in Lebanon.
This restoration of its alliances benefited the Asad regime, especially when 
it fought against the IsraeH armed presence in Lebanon and against the 
Jumayiel administration in the 1980s. The Druzes were a reliable pillar of 
Syrian support, and Walid Jumblatt joined in the NSF in 1983 and later in 
the “Tripartite Agreement” in 1985. The improved relations with S5nria made
®2 Rabinovich (1985) pp.76-77.
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it possible for the Lebanese Druzes to receive financial assistance, weapons, 
and munitions fi*om Syria.®®
However, during the late 1980s Jumblatt confronted Syria over its strategy 
with regard to the “Camps War”. Though he fought with Berri against 
Jumayiel and the IsraeH forces during the “Shuf War” in order to abrogate 
the May 17 Agreement, his force did not aHgn with Berri against the 
Palestinians during the “Camps War”. One reason is that the Palestinians 
constituted a substantial part of Jumblatt’s military forces. Another is that 
sympathy for the Palestinians remained among the Druze community in 
Lebanon. This was his father’s legacy, and he refused to be seen as going 
against the Palestinians. In defiance of Syrian pressure, his militias blocked 
the coastal highway to prevent Amal reinforcements fi*om reaching the 
camps, and assisted in bringing suppHes to the camps. In addition, he 
aUowed the radical Palestinian forces, Abu Musa group and the DFLP, to 
launch artülery and rocket barrages from the Shuf that inflicted heavy 
damage on Amal positions, so as to reheve the pressure on the Palestinian 
camps.®®
Relations between the Druzes and Syria were decisively worsened in 
February 1987, when Syria deployed its army in West Beirut to save Amal, 
and when Jumblatt tried to estabHsh a strong foothold there. Jumblatt’s goal 
was not only to make it  easier to provide support to Palestinian forces, but 
also to increase his power among the MusHms. However, Syria now made it a 
top priority to weaken the Druze forces, calculating that stripping the pro- 
Palestinian groups outside the camps of their power would badly affect the 
PLO’s military operations. The attacks on Jumblatt, which took the form of 
forcing him to hand over a senior aide to the Syrians and of purge his 
command in favour of a composition acceptable to Damascus, incurred bitter
55 Petran (1987) p.319.
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resentm ent of the Syrians among the Druzes.®^
(6) The Palestinians and Syria
Since Israel could potentially attack Syria through Lebanon, Asad sought 
both to control PLO military activities against Israel on Lebanese soil during 
the chdl war and to avoid IsraeH penetration into Lebanon. In pursuit of this 
end, Syria changed its relations with the Palestinians dramatically during 
this period Syria initially supported the LNM-PLO coalition, and when the 
Maronite müitias launched a heavy offensive in January 1976 aimed at 
partitioning Lebanon and estabHshing a mini-state, thereby risking an 
Israeli invasion , Asad ordered the dispatch of units of the Palestinian 
Liberation Army (PLA) into Lebanon to prevent the Maronites from reaHzing 
their goal.®® However, Palestinian-Syrian relations soon deteriorated over 
the “Constitutional Documents”, as a result of which the PLO finally decided 
to aHgn with Jumblatt.®® Ultimately, the Syrian army invaded Lebanon, 
siding with the Maronites in June 1976 and aiming to prevent the 
radicaHsation of Lebanon by the LNM-PLO coaHtion since this situation 
threatened to give Israel a pretext to invade Lebanon and thus would 
endanger the Syrian state itself.®®
After the Likud government upgraded its alliances with the Maronites as a 
consequence of the Egyptian withdrawal from the Arab-Israel power balance, 
Asad tried to contain the IsraeH aggression toward Lebanon by resuming ties 
with the Palestinians. However, his renewed relations with the PLO were
®® Petran (1987) pp.362-363.
®" Harris (1996) pp.215-217.
®® Hinnebusch (1986) pp.3-5. /Rabinovich (1985) pp.49-50.
®® The main reason for Arafat’s ahgning with the LNM, under the pressure 
on him by Asad that he should choose between Syria and Jumblatt, was that 
Jumblatt generally respected the freedom of the Palestinians.
[Joumblatt (1982) pp.64-69. /Ma’oz (1986) p. 129.]
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not firm. During the Litani Operation in 1978 and the IsraeH invasion in 
1982, Syria remained rather inactive and allowed the Palestinians to be 
attacked by the IsraeH forces. The PLO reahsed that Syrian devotion to the 
Palestinian cause was suspect and that Syria would not risk its own security 
for the sake of the PLO.®^  After 1982, although Syria supported guerrilla 
operations against the IsraeH forces in Lebanon, it had no intention to 
confront Israel directly by aUowing the PLO to engage in open mfiitary 
action. In fact, Syria restricted the Palestinian activities in the Beqaa.®  ^
Although Syria claimed to be a patron of the PLO, it did not fulfil the 
responsibihties attached to this self-assumed role.®®
Despite this Syrian claim, the PLO had no intention of ceding its autonomy 
to Syria. On the contrary, Arafat and his Fatah organisation tried to 
maximise their freedom of action, while Asad sought to weaken Arafat by 
installing a leadership more subject to Syria, or at least by reducing the 
independence of the PLO from Syrian influence. Syria supported several 
chaUenges to Arafat from dissidents within the PLO and from its own 
Palestine organisations or allies.®^  After the PLO withdrew from Beirut in 
September 1982, spHts within the PLO forces occurred mainly over differing 
attitudes toward the “Reagan Plan”: a version of Camp David-style 
autonomy for the West Bank, and over the relations with Jordan. BeHeving 
that Syria had no right to a protectorate over the PLO because of its failure 
to defend the Palestinians in 1978 and 1982 and with much reduced options 
afber the PLO’s expulsion from Lebanon, Arafat gave the plan serious 
consideration and began to consult with Jordan over it. In addition, Arafat 
kept pace with King Hussein in proposing negotiations with Israel over the
®® Hinnebusch (1986) pp. 5-6.
®^ Ma’oz and Yaniv (1986) p.202.
®^ Brynen (1990) pp. 183-184.
®® Hinnebusch (1986) p. 11.
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issue of the West Bank.®®
His actions were not acceptable to the Syrians, and when rebellions against 
Arafat actually broke out within the PLO, Syria exploited the inner discord, 
trying to oust him and to reshape a pro-Syrian PLO. In 1983, the Syrian- 
backed Palestinian forces launched heavy offensives against Arafat, which 
led to his eventual evacuation from Tripoli. Later during the “Camps War”, 
Syria sponsored the Palestinian National Salvation Front (PNSF), which, 
though it was composed of anti-Arafat factions, did not give Syria a rehable 
alternative to Arafat’s PLO.®®
However, despite its desire to control and its wiUingness to actually 
militarily attack the PLO, Syria was caught in a dilemma. Since the Asad 
regime assumed a self-imaged role as the champion of Arab nationalism and 
at the same time continued open conflict with the PLO, symbol of the Arab 
cause, there was danger of damage to Syria’s credibiHty. Therefore Syria 
generally used the tactics of negotiation and dialogue to accompany its 
pressure on the Palestinians and never actually severed relations with them 
during this period.
(7) Brief Summary
Overall, the identity of each sub-state actor shaped an underlying 
predisposition in their relations with Syria: the relations between Muslim 
and Palestinian groups and Syria were generally better than those between 
the Maronites and Syria, and the Asad regime, in terms of Arab nationahsm, 
did not want to confront the MusHms and Palestinians. However, as clearly 
seen in 1976 by the aUiance between the Maronites and Syria as weU as the
®^ Mclaurin (1989) p. 19.
®® Brynen (1990) pp. 185-191. /Hinnebusch (1986) pp. 14-17. /Hinnebusch 
(1998) p. 144.
®® Hinnebusch (1986) pp. 13-17.
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conflict between the LNM-PLO coalition and the Syrian army, and also seen 
in the late 1980s by the clashes between HizboUah-backed Palestinian forces 
and Syrian-supported Amal during the “Camps War”, Lebanese and Syrian 
power calculations were sometimes a decisive factor for their relations. In 
addition, there was interdependence between Syria and Lebanese sub-state 
groups. The former used these groups to consohdate its hegemony and the 
latter exploited Syrian power to increase their own interests and status.
3. POLITICAL DIMENSIONS : RECONCILIATION EFFORTS AND THE 
FORMATION OF CABINETS
(1) Introduction
The Lebanese government never ceased attempting to restore some 
internal pohtical order throughout the civil war. This included various kinds 
of reconciliation efforts as well as the formation of cabinets through which 
various parties involved in the war might be co-opted. In doing so, the 
government had to take into consideration both internal and external factors, 
especially the dominant power of the Syrians. Syria also took an interest in 
restoring Lebanese order so as not to give Israel any cause for intervention, 
and more importantly to show its presence as a “benefit” to the international 
community.®  ^As a result, it mediated between warring factions, interfered in 
the formation of the Lebanese cabinet, convened reconcifiatory meetings, 
and presented its own peace plans, though at the same time it sometimes 
encouraged the sectarian conflicts which made it possible to perform “divide 
and rule” poMcies.
These kinds of Syrian efforts to pacify Lebanon might theoretically have 
matched in part with the interest of the Lebanese government. However,
®^ Thompson (2002) p .75.
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since sectarian-based Lebanese leaders tended to interpret “reconciliation” 
differently, and since they sometimes exploited their official status in favour 
of their own sectarian communities, conflict resolution was rarely successful. 
As the president’s power was superior to that of his counterparts, the prime 
minister and speaker of parhament, this section wiU mainly focus on the 
president’s behaviour toward the Syrians.
(2) The Franjieh Period (1975—1976)
After the Ayn Rummaneh clashes between the Phalange Party and the 
Palestinians on April 13, 1975, the spread of fighting between rival mihtias 
intensified the iuternal polarisation within Lebanon. On the one hand, the 
Jumblatt-led LNM protested against the slaughter of the Palestinians and 
called for a pohtical and economic boycott of the Phalange Party. On the 
other hand, the Maronites raUied behind the Phalange Party and the 
National Liberal Party, and demanded the intervention of the Lebanese 
army. They accused the Solh government of not having dispatched the army 
during the initial phase of clashes at Ayn Rummaneh and used this as a 
pretext for the resignation of the Phalange members firom the cabinet, which 
led to the collapse of the Solh government.
Responding to these developments, President Franjieh initially continued 
with his pohcy of antagonising the Sunnis, which had its origin in the 
formation of the government under Amin Hafez in 1973, and formed a 
government composed of military officers under an aged Muslim brigadier, 
Noureddin Rifai. This was welcomed by the Phalange Party and the National 
Liberal Party but was rejected by the LNM-PLO coafition.®® Since the 
MusHms and Palestinians considered the Lebanese army to be a Maronite 
symbol, and since the high ranks were actually dominated by the Maronites,
®®Haddad (1985) p.47. /Weinberger (1986) p. 149, p. 151.
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Franjieh’s action was considered to be an example of his sectarian bias. As a 
consequence, the strong opposition from the LNM-PLO coahtion forced him 
to dismantle the mihtary cabinet and to appoint as prime minister his 
traditional opponent, Rashid Karami, with whom Syria had good relations.®®
Until the formation of the mihtary cabinet, Syria had avoided clear pubHc 
reactions to Lebanese events, with the exception of press statements 
supporting the rights of the Palestinians, However, since Franjieh’s actions 
had caused heavy armed confrontations and a political stalemate, Syrian 
leaders were forced to involve themselves more actively in the Lebanese 
situation.^® In particular, Syria would have been seriously embarrassed by a 
new confrontation between the Lebanese army and the Palestinian 
commandos, which would have forced Syria to intervene on the Palestinian 
side. This scenario was not at all favoured by the Syrian government.^^ As 
long as Syria rehed on the Kissinger approach to recover the Golan Heights, 
Asad did not want to take any action that would be viewed unfavourably by 
the United States. To avoid the scenario being reahsed, Syria immediately 
decided to launch a diplomatic initiative with Foreign Minister Abdul Hahm 
Khaddam, Air Force Commander Naji Jamil, and Chief of Staff Hikmat 
Shihabi."^
The Syrians played an important role in forming the Karami cabinet, 
taking into consideration the preferences by the Sunni estabhshment, the 
LNM, and the PLO, all of which perceived him as the sole candidate for the 
premiership. This was desirable for Syria as Karami was traditionally a 
strong supporter of Syrian influence in Lebanon. Backed by domestic support 
for Karami, Syria managed to force Franjieh to accept Karami, his long term
®® Gordon (1983) p. 108. /Petran (1987) pp. 167-168.
”^® Weinberger (1986) p. 153.
Salibi (1976) p. 108.
These three figures became key figures in Syrian policy toward Lebanon.
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political rival in northern Lebanon, as prime minister. After Karami 
assumed the premiership he had to remove two major obstacles in order to 
form his cabinet. Having called for the boycott of the Phalange Party, 
Jumblatt refused to join any cabinet in which representatives from the party 
would be present. Jumayiel for his part was not willing to cede to Jumblatt’s 
demands. Karami soon faced pohtical deadlock, which was accompanied by 
heavy fighting, and had to rely on Syria for mediation. Syria suggested a 
plan for a temporary mini-cabinet, and a six-member cabinet was finally 
formed in July. In addition to the appointment of Karami, the mini-cabinet 
was a further blow to Franjieh since he hoped to have both Phalange and 
LNM members included. Karami also made a painful concession in 
designating Chamoun as interior minister as they had not been on speaking 
terms since the 1958 civil war.^ ®
Karami and Syria may have calculated that Chamoun’s presence in the 
cabinet would appease or at least decrease the opposition from Jumayiel and 
Jumblatt to the Karami cabinet, and thus would stabüise the country since 
Chamoun was backed by Jumayiel and was not vetoed by Jumblatt. 
However, their choice of Chamoun brought about the opposite result. 
“Chamoun refused even to consult with Karami and used his position at 
every opportunity to sabotage the government’s pohcy and to advance the 
rightist (Maronite) cause.”^® Karami’s effort to stabifise the country by 
forming a “neutral” government, which was strongly backed by the Syrians, 
faced a severe blow from Chamoun.
Though Syria forced both Franjieh and Karami to relinquish some of their 
political preferences in helping to form the cabinet, Franjieh had to made
[Seale (1988) p.270.]
®^ Dawisha (1980) pp.88-90. /Khazen (2000) pp.295-297. /Weinberger (1986) 
pp.155-156.
Khazen (2000) p.296.
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more concessions by nominating Karami and excluding Jumayiel and 
Jumblatt from the cabinet than Karami was obhged to do by appointing 
Chamoun as interior minister. While Franjieh may have considered that the 
inclusion of Phalange and LNM members into the cabinet would contain 
their “radical” activities on the ground, Syria might have been calculating 
that their inclusion would further paralyse the country because of the 
pohtical deadlock among cabinet members that would have resulted. Under 
the heavy offensive against the Maronites by the LNM-PLO forces bolstered 
by Syria, Franjieh was forced to obey the Syrian initiative.
After the signing of the Interim Sinai Agreement in September 1976, the 
intensity of communal fighting reached such a level that the Karami 
government asked President Asad to intervene to help Lebanon in mid- 
September. However, since relations between Franjieh and Asad had 
worsened after the formation of Karami cabinet, Franjieh accused the 
Syrian-supported LNM-PLO forces of starting the fighting and even 
indicated the possibihty of resorting to the Arab League or to some other 
major Arab countries for conflict resolution. Since Syria did not want the 
“Arabisation” of the conflict, Khaddam immediately responded and 
negotiated a cease-fire as well as the formation of the National Dialogue 
Committee (NDC) in order to propose reforms and achieve reconciliation 
between various groups and movements.^®
The NDC was composed of 20 members equally divided between MusHms 
and Christians. Some of the most prominent politicians were represented: 
these included Kamal Jumblatt; the distinguished Sunni poHticians, Sa’eb 
Salem, AbdaUah Yafi, and Rashid Karami; the Speaker of BarHament, Kamil 
Asad; the Secretary-General of the pro-Syrian organisation of the Ba’th 
Party, Amin Qanso; the leader of the Phalange Party, Pierre Jumayiel; ex-
76 Petran  (1987) p. 168.
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President and the leader of the National Liberal Party, Camille Chamoun; 
and the leader of the National Bloc Party Raymond Edde/^ The fact that the 
pro-Iraqi organisation of the Ba’th Party had no representative on the NDC 
was an indication of increasing Syrian influence in internal Lebanese 
politics.
However, the result of this Syrian mediation effort was disappointing and 
the NDC meeting finally became a “dialogue of the deaf’. The agenda of the 
NDC discussions was preoccupied with the following issues: Lebanese 
territorial sovereignty put forward by the Phalangiste and their allies; and 
pohtical reform, including the aboHtion of confessionaHsm, advocated by the 
LNM and their alhes. When the representatives from the Phalange Party 
and the National Liberal Party boycotted the NDC meeting, the sub­
committee on pohtical proposed reform to cancel Article 95 of the Lebanese 
constitution, which involved sectarian distribution of parliamentary 
representation, to lower the voting age to eighteen, and to set up an economic 
and social council, all demanded by the LNM. Consequently the Maronite 
side labelled the NDC as “the supreme revolutionary command” and Karami 
and Franjieh, who were fearful of further polarisation and were also keen on 
preserving confessionahsm as their power basis, reached a compromise deal 
whose content was not the abohtion of Article 95 but its reinterpretation.
The escalation of violence between the Maronite mihtias and the LNM-PLO 
forces, especially around the Palestinian refugee camps of Tel Zatar and Jisr 
Basha, as weh as IsraeH raids on the camps during December 1975 and 
January 1976, forced Asad to appease each side. Firstly in order to prevent a 
Maronite attempt to partition Lebanon and establish their own mini-state, 
which might draw Israel into Lebanon, in mid-January Syria dispatched
Deeb (1980) p. 124.
Deeb (1980) p.3.
Deeb (1980) p.4. /Khazen (2000) pp.316-317, /Petran (1987) pp.179-180.
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units of the Syrian-based Palestinian Liberation Army (PLA), which was 
officially under PLO leadership but in reaMty was a part of the Syrian army. 
After stopping the Maronite progress, Syria imposed a cease-fire on January 
21.™ “While Asad sought to tame the Maronite estabhshment, his objective, 
in early 1976, was not to defeat Christian forces mihtarily.”®® On the contrary, 
Syria needed Maronite and Sunni zuama cooperation in order to curb the 
LNM-PLO forces whose mihtary offensive against the Maronites had the 
potential of giving Israel cause for intervention.
Syrian contacts with the Phalange Party in December 1975 and a heavy 
mihtary offensive by the LNM-PLO forces in January 1976, which led to the 
faU of Chamoun’s stronghold, D amour, changed Maronite perceptions toward 
Syria and thus led to a situation in which their cooperation with Syria was 
an option to prevent further damage. Until then, Franjieh had not managed 
to convince Maronite leaders about the merits of working with the Syrians, 
though he had secretly negotiated with Syria over a pohtical settlement 
since November 1975, by using his close associate, Lucien Dahdah, then 
Chairman of the Board of the Intra company. Franjieh calculated that by 
ahgning with Syria he could redress the balance in favour of the Maronites. 
In February, the Maronite changes of perception and situation led Franjieh 
to go to Damascus to finahse the Syrian-initiated peace plan, later cahed the 
“Constitutional Documents”. While the peace plan reasserted the aUocation 
of major pohtical posts to specific rehgious sects, it stipulated a division of 
the parhament equally between Christians and MusHms, strengthening of 
the position of prime minister, and the conditions for Palestinian respect for 
Lebanese sovereignty.®^
™ Hinnebusch (1986) p.5. /Hinnebusch (1998) p. 140. /Ravinovich (1985) 
pp.49-50. /Sahbi (1976) pp.149-159.
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Deeb (1980) p.6 and p. 125. /Khazen (2000) pp.327-328. /Petran (1987)
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Karma, who also went to the Syrian capital along with Franjieh, objected to 
the opening up of the posts of prime minister and speaker of parhament, 
which had been stipulated in the original Syrian plan to satisfy Jumblatt, 
and instead urged for the continuation of the present pohtical formula. In the 
final official text of the “Constitutional Documents”, the plan for the opening 
up of the above two posts was not adopted. Karami might have recognised 
the Syrian need to cooperate with him iu its attempt to pacify the country 
and succeeded in maintaining Sunni communal interests. After Franjieh 
announced the “Constitutional Documents” on February 14, Jumblatt 
criticised it vehemently. One of the reasons for this was that while it 
formulated a more balanced confessional composition in governmental posts 
and provided a moderate resolution for the Lebanese conflict, it did not adopt 
the LNM’s most crucial program: the abohtion of pohtical confessionahsm.®^ 
The other reason was that Jumblatt’s desire to be premier or speaker was 
ignored. However, since military balance was still in favour of the PLO-LNM 
forces, compromise was not a real choice for Jumblatt.
In reahty though the “Constitutional Documents” was supposed to resolve 
the Lebanese pohtical agenda, to put an end to the armed conflict, and to 
start a new era of peace and reconstruction, the opposite took place. 
Jumblatt’s dissatisfaction with the Syrian plan and his demand for Syria to 
press for more radical changes caused the resumption of heavy fighting, 
especlaUy around the presidential palace. Because of this, there was heavy 
pressure in March for Franjieh’s resignation.®®
Syria’s future position in Lebanon thus became dependent on the outcome 
of an early presidential election for a successor to Franjieh whose wide
p. 182. /Weinberger (1986) pp. 173-175.
®" Khazen (2000) pp.328-330. /Petran (1987) pp. 189-190.
®® For example, 66 deputies in Lebanese parhament (two-thirds of deputies) 
signed a petition for his resignation. [Khazen (2000) p.340.]
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unpopularity deprived him of sufficient stature to stabilise the country. The 
Syrian option was that a successor would be elected prior to the end of 
Franjieh8 term with the understanding that the president resign following 
the election. Asad’s three main envoys, Jamil, Shihabi, and Khaddam, 
negotiated these issues with Franjieh, who initially opposed this treatment. 
However, the unanimous adoption of a constitutional amendment (Article 
73) by the Lebanese parliament, which made possible the early election of 
Franjieh’s successor, on top of both Syrian and prominent Maronite pressure 
on Franjieh to resign as well as a mounting threat by the LNM to estabhsh a 
revolutionary government, finally led him to sign the amendment of Article 
73.®^
Two main candidates for elections emerged in late April. One was Raymond 
Edde who criticised not only the Phalange activities in the initial phase of 
war but also Syria’s role in Lebanon. Since he had ahenated the Maronite 
leadership, he was supported by the LNM-PLO forces. The other was Elias 
Sarkis who was supported by the Phalange Party, the National Liberal Party 
and Karami. The official Syrian position was that the election of the 
Lebanese president was an internal affair and Syria would not intervene. 
However, Syrian support for Sarkis was obvious, since Edde stated the 
Syrian military intervention since January was a central issue for the 
Lebanese. The Shihahist Sarkis’s “neutral” pohtical stand was acceptable to 
both Christians and Muslims and was seen favourably by the Syrians in the 
hght of its attempt to stabüise Lebanon. However, Sarkis lacked wide 
popular power base and army support, and thus needed Syrian support. In 
fact, prior to his election, Sarkis met the three Syrian envoys in. the 
presidential palace and worked closely with Franjieh.®®
Khazen (2000) pp.340-341. /Petran (1987) p. 196. /Weinberger (1986) p.201. 
®® Odeh (1985) p. 168. /Khazen (2000) p.340. /Petran (1987) pp.196-197. 
/Weinberger (1986) pp.201-203.
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As Deeb pointed out, when the parliamentary deputies met on May 8 to 
elect a new president, Syrian mihtary presence in Lebanon (Saiqa and the 
PLA), as weU as the direct pressure exerted by Syria on some reluctant 
deputies to vote for Sarkis, may weU have affected the final result of the 
election.®® Indeed, a group of deputies in Beqqa was virtually forced to vote 
for Sarkis since the Syrian mihtary presence in their districts was 
overwhelming. It is also said that Saiqa troops forcibly brought anti-Syrian 
deputies suspected of boycotting the election to the parhament session.®  ^
Consequently, Sarkis gained 66 votes out of 69 deputies present and the 
number of deputies who actuaUy boycotted the election was only three: 
Raymond Edde, Sa’eb Salem, and Rashid Solh, who were aU on bad terms 
with Syria and/or Syria’s close aUy Franjieh.®® Even though Syrian influence 
in the election was obvious, almost ah the Lebanese deputies, forced or not, 
chose to elect Sarkis to the presidency, and their actions seemed to be based 
on his Shihabist stance,
(3) The Sarkis Period (1976—1982)
After the election, President-elect Sarkis expressed the hope of budding a 
pohtical consensus among the Lebanese. However, Lebanese hopes of 
terminating the conflict generated by the election of a new president soon 
changed into disdlusionment.®® Franjieh announced that he had no wish to 
resign until the formal conclusion of his term in September. He might have 
calculated that if he resigned under strong mihtary pressure from the LNM-
®® Deeb (1980) p. 130. 
Petran (1987) p. 197.
®® Khazen (2000) p.344.
®® It seems that these Lebanese hopes were based on the facts that he was 
generally refereed to as a “moderate”, he had no private army, he had never 
engaged in violent attacks against the Palestinians, and he had no direct 
responsibdity for the outbreaks of the civd war. [Mortimer (1976) p.4]
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PLO forces, his position within the Maronite community would be further 
weakened, especially since his political rivals in the community, Jumayiel 
and Chamoun, had increased their power by forming the Lebanese Front.
It seems, however, that Syria tolerated Franjieh’s unwillingness to resign, 
because of the indirect benefit of having a well-known figure in office. As a 
result, a new wave of violence led by the LNM-PLO forces and aimed at 
subverting the result of the presidential election continued throughout May 
1976.®® This led to the direct intervention of a sizeable part of the Syrian 
army on the side of the Maronites. The intervention started in June and 
ended in October through the mediation of the Arab countries, particularly 
Saudi Arabia and Egypt. It also gave Franjieh an opportunity to contain the 
LNM-PLO forces by using Syrian army power.®^  Since the LNM-PLO forces 
intended to defeat the Maronites mihtarily and since some Maronites were 
prepared to draw Israel into the fighting on their behalf, Asad “hoped to win 
over the Maronites by demonstrating Syria’s unwilhngness to countenance a 
sectarian triumph over them.”®^ With the Syrian intervention, the power 
balance between the sub-state groups tilted toward the Maronites, and the 
Syrian-Maronite alignment managed to smash the LNM-PLO forces.
Sarkis’s iuauguration in September, which took place in Shtura, Syrian- 
occupied Beqqa, close to the Syrian border, further convinced the Lebanese 
that Sarkis was a puppet president of Syria, especially since his election to 
the presidency was more or less owed to the Syrians. In fact, more Syrians 
attended this ceremony than Lebanese, and the Syrian armed presence of 
hundreds of tanks and soldiers in Shtura and its environs seemed 
remarkable. Though sixty-seven deputies attended the ceremony, Edde,
®® Weinberger (1986) pp.208-204.
®^ For the detail of this period. See Weinberger (1986) pp.209-231. 
®^ Hinnebusch (1998) pp. 140-141.
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Jumblatt, Salem, and their supporters boycotted it.®®
Though Sarkis’s presidential term started with these troubles, he initially 
tried to implement a “neutral” pohcy to pacify the country.®'^  In the formation 
of his cabinet, Sarkis’s decisions were largely defined by his debt to the 
Syrians for his election to presidency. Despite this, he persisted in his 
Shihabist pohtical views. While he took into consideration the Syrian 
opposition to LNM participation in the cabinet, he managed to put in place a 
cabinet without representatives firom any of the warlord factions. He 
nominated as prime minister the respected economist Sahm Hoss, who 
formed a “technocratic” cabinet composed of four Christians and four 
Mushms in December 1976.®® The Sarkis-Hoss administration began to take 
measures to restore pubhc order, on the basis of which it hoped to launch a 
process of economic rehabihtation. The Lebanese government was strongly 
opposed to any schemes from radical Maronites and the PLO compromising 
or impairing the pohtical integrity of Lebanon.®® This attempt to construct 
such a centrahy-controUed state was matched with Syria’s interests, since 
the stabihsation of its western flank under a Syrian-influenced regime would 
decrease the potentiahty of Israeh penetration into Syria through Lebanon.
However, thefr common desire to estabhsh a strong state faced strong 
opposition from the zuama, especiahy the Maronite warlords, whose 
aspirations had fluctuated between a tendency toward their own mini-state 
and a desire to dominate the country as a whole. It also worsened Syrian-
®® Petran (1987) p.212. /Weinberger (1986) p.224. /Though Petran mentioned 
Karami as one of main figures who boycotted the ceremony, it seems correct 
that Weinberger mentioned Salem instead of Karami, since Karami 
supported Sarkis during the electoral process and Salem was generally on 
bad terms with the Syrians before the outbreaks of the civil war.
In fact, “Sarkis, in his speech afber the (inauguration) ceremony, tried to 
depict his role as that of a middle-of-the-road statesman.” [Deeb (1980) p. 15.] 
®® Kassir (1994) pp.257-258. /Rabinovich (1985) p.56.
®® Hoss (1984) p.20.
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Maronite relations, which were already under increasing strain after the 
Maronites, having managed to maintain their positions by ahgning with 
Syria in 1976, no longer felt they needed Damascus.®^
The change in Maronite-Syrian relations and Sarkis’s disappointment at 
the Syrian attitude toward the Shtura Agreement gradually caused him to 
distance himself from Syria.®® While Sarkis became closer to the Lebanese 
Front during the fighting between the Lebanese Forces and Syria in 1978, he 
carefully tried not to ahenate and antagonise Muslim and Palestinian forces 
in Lebanon and avoided an aU-out confirontation with Syria.
However, when his order for the Syrian troops to stop fighting against the 
Lebanese Forces was ignored, Sarkis tendered his resignation in July, 
probably calculatiug that he was irreplaceable and indispensable to the 
Syrians. Immediately, Syria asked Sarkis to remain in office, since the 
Syrian military presence in Lebanon under the umbrella of the ADF owed its 
legitimacy to Sarkis who had the right to call for an end to the ADF mandate. 
Thus, the Syrian army ceased its attack against the Lebanese Forces, and 
Sarkis withdrew his resignation.®® Considering the result of his defence of 
the Lebanese Front, it might be possible to say that he leaned to 
sectarianism.
On the other hand, as a Shihabist, Sarkis continued to take into 
consideration the Syrian and Muslim preference for Hoss. Indeed, relations 
between Sarkis and Hoss were generally good.™® When Hoss tendered his 
resignation in May 1979 in protest against the lack of pohtical will for 
reconcihation among key poHticians, Sarkis asked Hoss to form a new
®^ Muir (1977) p.7.
®® As for the details of attitudes taken by Sarkis and Syria over the Shtura I
Agreement, see the section on the military dimension. j
®®Hanf(1993)p.239. |
®^® Conversation with Salim Hoss (a former Prime Minister), July 10, 2001. I
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cabinet.™^
After Sarkis’s “Arabisation” effort to pacify Lebanon between 1979 and 1981, 
for which he had gained support from his Sunni counterparts, was disrupted 
not only by antagonism between Arab states but also by Syria’s passive 
attitude, he finally decided to abandon the extension of the ADF mandate in 
July 1982, though he had previously requested the continuation of the 
mandate upon its periodic expirations. Furthermore, he demanded the 
withdrawal of aU non-Lebanese forces from Lebanon and managed to obtain 
an agreement with Arab states, including Syria, to terminate the ADF 
mandate at the Fez Arab summit in September.™^ These actions were clearly 
anti-Syrian but were arguably in fine with the position of Prime Minister 
Shafique Wazzan, a technocrat who assumed his post as Hoss’s successor in 
1980. In fact, after the “Missile Crisis” in mid-1981, which threatened to 
bring about direct Syrian-Israeh mihtary confrontation in Zahle,™® Sarkis 
and Wazzan were able to reach agreement on the important issues and 
presented a joint program; the Lebanese Front would break ah contacts with 
Israel; the Palestinians would observe the provisions of the Cairo Agreement 
strictly; and the Syrian forces would withdraw in stages by August 1982, 
though Wazzan confirmed Syria’s right to deploy missiles in Lebanon.™^
Though Sarkis’s independent-mindedness was a blow to Syria, he stih took 
Syrian demands into account. He agreed, at the 1982 Fez meeting, that the 
implementation of a Syrian withdrawal at the end of the ADF’s mission 
would be left to Lebanese-Syrian negotiations. ™® Thus, “Asad was able to 
maintain the legitimacy of Arab League sanctioning of the presence of Syrian 
forces in Lebanon even after the termination of the ADF mandate. As long as
Kassir (1994) p.434. /MEIMay 25 and July 6, 1979.
Thompson (2002) p. 77.
103 poy the details of “Missile Crisis”, see Seale (1988) pp.368-373. 
FBISJune 9, 1981. /Hanf (1993) p.251.
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the Israehs maintained forces in Lebanon, Syria would have a written 
endorsement of its continued presence.”™® Sarkis, whose policy concerning 
the Syrian forces was supported by Wazzan, could have put more pressure on 
Syria for its complete and immediate withdrawal. There were two reasons 
for this; firstly, Syria was isolated in the Arab world by virtue of its siding 
with Iran in the Iran-Iraq War; and secondly, its dominant position in 
Lebanon was largely shattered by the Israeh invasion in June 1982, though 
its forces remained entrenched in Beqaa. However, he perhaps considered 
the growing power of the Shi’ites in Lebanon, their relations with Syria, and 
Israel’s ahgnment with the Maronites, and so avoided antagonizing Syria.
It seems possible to say that as a Shihabist he not only avoided aU-out 
confrontation with Syria and even tried to appease it by using the Arab 
League, but also strove to work together with his Sunni counterparts.
(4) The Jumayiel Period (1982 — 1989)
After the assassination of his younger brother, Bashir, on September 14, 
1982, Amin Jumayiel was elected as president by an overwhelming majority 
of parhament, winning the votes of 77 of the 80 representatives, and he took 
office on September 23. Unlike Bashir, who was said to have hnks with CIA 
and Mossad, Amin was known as a “moderate”, though he was also a 
member of the Phalange Party. ™^ He retained Wazzan as prime minister, and 
Wazzan selected as ministers nine competent technocrats who had no 
pohtical or governmental experience.™® Jumayiel himself may have been 
eager to form a broad coahtion of ah the important pohtical groups in 
Lebanon, but since he was elected under the Israeh occupation, his pohcies
™® Salem (1982) p.l2. /Thompson (2002) p.77.
Thompson (2002) p. 78.
™" Haddad (1985) p.84. /Seale (1988) pp.391-393.
™® Petran (1987) p.295.
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needed to take Israel’s position in Lebanon into consideration. Thus, he did 
not try hard to involve Syria’s main allies in Lebanon, Berri and Jumblatt, in 
his government.™® It seems that as a second choice, considering that he 
needed to appease Israel, Jumayiel formed a “neutral” technocrat 
government that would not harm his personal reputation.
Jumayiel initially took an even-handed stance toward “occupation forces”: 
he, along with many Lebanese, wanted the USA-led Multi National Forces 
(MNF), which was created after the Israeh invasion in June 1982, to 
supervise the evacuation of Palestinian guerrhlas from Lebanon, as weh as 
Israeh and Syrian forces.^ ™ Though he perhaps desired to take a “neutral” 
position toward these forces, the USA did not seriously pressure Israel into 
withdrawing its forces. In addition, Amin came to closely ahy with Israel and 
the USA and to ignore the Syrians and their Lebanese proxies. These were 
the results of the existing Maronite-Israeh connection, the weakening of 
Syrian influence in Lebanon as a result of the Israeh invasion, the newly 
estabhshed Israeh hegemony in Lebanon, and the Cold War context in the 
Middle East.^“ In effect, Mushm hopes for him to develop a pohcy of national 
reconcihation dwindled, and their anti-Jumayiel feelings constituted the 
basis for strengthening ahiances with Syria in the hope of destroying the 
American-backed Israeh-dominated order in Lebanon. Their opposition 
aUiance with Syria was later reahsed in the form of the National Salvation 
Front (NSF), which caused the Israeh army huge damage.
With Israel graduaUy decreasing its mihtary presence in Lebanon in the 
autumn of 1983 when it started, in large-scale, to withdraw its troops from 
the Shuf, Syria once again began to play an important role. As a first step, 
Syria arranged a Lebanese conference of “National Reconcihation” which
™® Hanf (1993) p.270.
™^ Hudson (1988) pp.216-218.
Gerges (1997) p.97.
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met in Geneva in late October. Syrian Foreign Minister Khaddam set agenda 
and its sequence: Lebanese identity, the May 17 Agreement, and Lebanese 
internal reform.^™ Despite the Syrian demand for the abrogation of the May 
17 Agreement, Jumayiel managed to gain a mandate to work with the USA 
on a re-negotiation of the agreement largely because two of the four staunch 
Syrian aUies in Lebanon, Karami, and Berri, followed Franjieh and softened 
their attitudes toward the agreement in exchange for the Maronite 
recognition of the Arab character of the Lebanese state. These three figures 
advocated the fi’eezing of the agreement as a mechanism to give Jumayiel 
time to consult with the USA. At the same time, Jumblatt, bolstered by his 
mihtary victory over the Maronites in the Shuf, which contributed to the 
Israeh withdrawal in the autumn, consistently supported the Syrian position. 
Karami, Berri, and Franjieh argued that while the agreement should not be 
ratified, it also could not be abrogated, since both paths would lead to the 
continuation of Israeh occupation: if ratified, Syria would not withdraw and 
consequently Israel would stay; if abrogated, Israel would not withdraw and 
consequently Syria would stay. Khaddam’s attempt to persuade his alhes to 
reiterate their support for abrogation was not successful.^™
Internal support for the renegotiations with the USA—even among the pro-
Syrian figures—and Jumayiel’s confidence in the USA to check the power of
Syria and its alhes in Lebanon made it possible for him to defy Syria and 
thus to gain manoeuvrabihty. However, his trip to Washington in December, 
which aimed to get US support to resolve the Lebanese deadlock over the 
May 17 Agreement, was unsuccessful. Since the US presence in Lebanon had
As for the internal reform, there was not much progress, since the 
principal issue was not internal reform but other two topics raised by Syria. 
[Jureidini and McLaurin (1984) p,25.]
Haddad (1985) pp. 109-114. /METNovember 11, 1983.
113
been attacked twice that year and since the USA perceived Syria as the 
problem obstructing the withdrawal process, Reagan had no intention of 
pressuring Israel, whose relations with the USA were at their best, to 
renegotiate with Lebanon/™ Jumayiel “discovered belatedly that the US was 
unwilling to over-invest in Lebanon, and it could not afford the high costs 
involved: Lebanon was not worth it.”™® Once his Western protector, the MNF, 
evacuated Lebanon in February 1984, Jumayiel acknowledged the danger of 
neglecting pan-Arab and anti-IsraeH feeling among the Lebanese, especially 
the Mushms, and found himself with no choice but to enter a new 
relationship with Syria to protect his presidency from the strong NSF, 
especiahy Druze and Shi’ite, pressure/™ In exchange for Jumayiel’s 
statement that he was prepared to abrogate the agreement, Jumblatt and 
Berri were persuaded by the Syrians not to drive Jumayiel into a corner.
The battle was now off and the Lebanese government took the necessary 
constitutional step to formahy cancel the May 17 agreement, which was 
reahsed on March 5.™^ Syria then initiated the second national dialogue 
meeting in Lausanne in mid-March. The meeting was supposed to be more or 
less under Syrian guidance. However, Syria was racked by the fraternal war 
between pro-Asad and pro-Rifat factions which resulted from Asad’s illness 
and so did not have enough power to orchestrate the conference. Khaddam 
failed to get his Lebanese aUies, Berri and Jumblatt, to drop their basic 
demand for the resignation and trial of Jumayiel. He also failed to persuade 
them to moderate their demands for more power within the Lebanese 
pohtical system. Moreover, Franjieh demanded the preservation of ah 
Maronite privileges just when a nine-point plan submitted by Jumayiel was
Haddad (1985) p. 117.
™® Gause (1997) p.98.
™® For the details of the conflict situation, see MSTNovember 25, 1983, 
February 10, 1984, and February 24, 1984.
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about to be finalised. There seems no evidence that Syria tried to persuade 
its traditional ally, Franjieh, to withdraw his demand. Jumayiel was 
probably disappointed at Syria’s behaviour toward its allies even though he 
would have recognised the extraordinary conditions in Syria.
In April, a “national unity government” led by Karami was formed, which 
was delicately balanced both between and within various sects, although the 
important posts such as foreign and defence minister were allocated either to 
Muslims or pro-Syrian figures. Although the cabinet tired to reunite the 
country and to restore state sovereignty in all parts of Lebanon on the basis 
of Karami’s ministerial statement, by the time it received its crucial vote of 
confidence on June 12, the cabinet itself had become as battered and 
disunited as the country. Christian and Muslim ministers were divided on 
major issues and their ability to control the fighters in the street was 
increasingly in doubt. Under these fi*agmenting conditions, Jumayiel 
initially expected Syria to help him via its relations with Franjieh, Karami, 
Hoss, Berri, and Jumblatt. However, since most of these politicians 
possessed their own müitias, it was difficult for even Syria to bring them into 
line to back Jumayiel. Moreover, Syria did not want to strengthen the 
president at the expense of its trusted a l l ie s .E v e n  when Jumayiel’s 
leadership of the Phalange Party was challenged by Ja’ja in February 1985,
Mg’/M arch 9, 1984. /Seale (1988) p.417.
ikffi7March 23, 1984.
On this respect, Petr an pointed out that given Franjieh’s close relations 
with Asad, his sudden demand “raised the questions about the real Syrian 
position,” [Petran (1987) p,356.] However, Syria closely watched the 
conference and feared the failure of dialogue and the resulting fierce 
internecine fighting. [FIRZS'May 21, 1984.] It seems that Syria did not 
manage to put pressure on Franjieh, because of its preoccupation with the 
inner power struggle.
M M M s l j  4, 1984,
'2' M M  June 15, 1984,
^  Salem (1995) p. 176.
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he did not ask Asad for help, even though Asad had offered to send any help 
he would need to calm the rebeUion/^^
The soured Jumayiel-Syrian relations and the failure of the Karami cabinet 
to end the conflict and achieve national reconciliation and full Israeh 
withdrawal, led Syria to sideline the Lebanese government and to promote 
an accord between the three main pro-Syrian militia leaders: Hubayka of the 
pro-Syrian factions in the Lebanese Forces, Berri of Amal, and Jumblatt of 
the Druzes. This was an explicit recognition by Syria “given to the militias as 
the effective wielders of power in Lebanon.” In late December 1985, these 
leaders met in Damascus and agreed on the following: an end to the state of 
war, gradual reform of the sectarian political system, and the “special” 
relationship between Syria and Lebanon.
The “Tripartite Agreement” aimed to be a “Pax-Syriana” that would pacify 
Lebanon, but this agreement soon collapsed in January 1986. Since it 
stipulated the transfer of the prerogative of the Maronite president partly to 
the Sunni prime minister and partly to a council of ministers, almost all 
Maronite leaders, including Franjieh, opposed the terms that Hubayka had 
accepted in their name. Backed by this strong anti-Hubayka feeling among 
the Maronites and also resenting Syria’s sidehning of him in the “Tripartite 
Agreement”, Jumayiel, with the help of Ja’ja, who shared his feelings toward 
Hubayka and Syria, militarily defeated Hubayka and his factions in the 
Lebanese Forces, thus dashing any hope of the agreement being 
implemented.
Salem (1995) p. 193.
^  The Israeli forces withdrew to the “security zone” in June 1985 and 
maintained its proxy forces: “South Lebanese Arm]/’, which was created in 
1978 after the Litani Operation and was led by Antoine Lahad after the 
death of the first leader Saad Haddad in 1984,
Rabinovich (1987) p.63,
126 jt/Ef January 10, 1986. /Thompson (2002) pp.78-79.
Hanf (1993) pp.306-310. /Harris (1996) pp. 193-201. /METJanuary 24 and
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After the collapse of the agreement, Syria tried, mainly by using its proxy, 
Amal, to contain the “radical” HizboUah forces and to prevent the PLO forces 
from restoring their presence in Lebanon. This Syrian effort toward what 
they called “normalisation” may have influenced Jumayiel’s perception of the 
Syrians, causing him to recognise the merit of improving relations with Asad. 
However, Syria set the condition that the dialogue would approach all issues 
under the spirit of the “Tripartite Agreement”.T h o u g h  Jumayiel actually 
acknowledged the necessity of taking the Syrian factor into consideration in 
resolving the Lebanese question, he opposed this Syrian condition.
Finally, Jumayiel’s disappointment at Syria and his presidential power 
being largely owed to Ja’ja and the Lebanese Forces, since he could no longer
count on external powers—the USA and Israel—to contain Syria and its
allies in Lebanon, reinforced his Maronite-oriented approach, and this 
continued until the last phase of the civil war. As his presidential term 
neared its end in September 1988, the Lebanese parliament was unable to 
elect his successor because of the deep division between the Lebanese 
factional groups. After a Syrian attempt to elect Franjieh resulted in failure, 
Jumayiel stepped down without nominating a successor and appointed the 
Christian Commander of the Lebanese army, Michael Awn, as the acting 
prime minister. This was unacceptable to the MusHms and Syrians who 
continued to consider Sahm Hoss, who had succeeded Rashid Karami after 
his assassination in June 1987, as the legal prime minister. Since Hoss 
refused to step down, two rival governments appeared in Lebanon: the Awn 
government, supported by the Lebanese Forces and most of the Maronites; 
and the Hoss government, backed by Syria and its Mushm aUies. This
February 7, 1986. /Petran (1987) pp.368-369.
128 por the details, see Hinnebusch (1998) pp. 145-148.
129 FBISJunu2o^ y 9, 1987. /Salem (1992) p.32.
Devlin (1988) p.90.
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situation made the complete breakdown of the Lebanese state itself more 
probable than ever, as did Awn’s declaration of the “War of Liberation” 
against the Syrian forces in Lebanon in March 1989. Arab concern for 
Lebanon was thus heightened, and this led to the conclusion of the Ta’if 
Agreement in October 1989.^ ^^
(5) Brief Summary
Overall, the attempts by the Lebanese government to stabilise Lebanon 
through reconciliation efforts and the formation of cabinets were seldom 
successful. While Syria interfered in these Lebanese attempts in order not to 
give Israel a pretext for intervention in Lebanon, it also encouraged its 
Lebanese allies to fight on the ground so as to recover and consolidate its 
hegemony there. In effect, the Lebanese government was continuously under 
interrelated threats fi’om Syria, and the leaders tried to generally appease 
and occasionally contain the Syrians, with taking into consideration the 
regional dynamics in the Middle East and its effects on Syria. Then 
alignment with Syria was also affected by Liebanese identity factor, 
especially the Arab nationahsm, and pohtical interdependence. As regards 
the latter, Syria did not want to antagonise the president and the prime 
minister and hoped to receive their support for its Lebanese policy, in order 
to legitimise its intervention. They, in turn, sometimes exploited Syria to 
consolidate their power and favour their own community. However, these 
actions fuelled opposition figures and groups, resulting in the failure of 
conflict resolution.
Rabinovich (1989) pp. 103-104. /Thompson (2002) pp.79-80.
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4. MILITARY DIMENSIONS : DISINTEGRATION AND
RECONSTRUCTION OF THE LEBANESE ARMY
( 1 ) Introduction
The cohesion or disintegration of the Lebanese army was a crucial factor in 
the capacity of the government and its potential to stop the civil war and 
restore order. During the civil war, although the army’s cohesion decreased 
and some sectarian-based brigades acted outside of government control, the 
Lebanese army remained a symbol of Lebanese sovereignty. As a result, 
Syria had not only to avoid clashing with the Lebanese army openly but also 
to refrain from supporting the factional tendencies and activities within the 
army, since this sort of behaviour might weaken the legitimacy of Syria’s 
Lebanese intervention in the international arena. However, the “Christian
character” of the Lebanese army—its senior officers were mostly Christians
and the Maronite president had a general policy of maintaining this
characteristic of the army as a means to suppress opposition groups—made
it difficult for Syria to cooperate with the army, though Damascus sometimes 
supported its activities. This section will deal, in the order of Lebanese 
presidential terms, with Lebanese-Syrian relations over the issue of the 
Lebanese army
(2) The Beginning of the Disintegration of the Lebanese Army
(1975-1976)
After the outbreak of the civil war, the Lebanese army did not initially 
interfere in the fighting, not only because of the lesson learned in the 1958 
civil war that the policy of non-interference in fighting assured the 
“neutrality” of the army, but also because of the conviction that the army’s 
intervention would be interpreted as action siding with the Christians on the
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basis of its “Christian character” However, the heavy fighting between 
Maronite militias and Muslim militias in the outskirts of Tripoh in the late 
summer of 1975 led to the situation where the army was the only force 
available to prevent further escalation of sectarian violence. Though the 
Karami cabinet was hard pressed to prevent the escalation of fighting, 
Karami hesitated to accept the deployment of the army in his hometown, 
since the Muslims and the PLO did not consider the Commander, Iskandar 
Ghanem, to be “neutral” and a suitable choice for the post.^ ®^  In fact, Ghanem 
failed to intercept the Israeli commando operation in the heart of Beirut in 
April 1973 which led to the killing of three senior Palestinian leaders. 
Finally, Franjieh agreed to replace Ghanem with Hanna Sa’id who was 
considered less political than his predecessor, and also agreed to give Karami 
more authority to command the army with hope that these concessions 
would make it easier for the army to intervene in the fighting. However, 
Karami, pressured by the LNM-PLO forces, was still opposed to army 
intervention, and so the army was deployed only as a buffer force between 
the combatants.
However, the army’s immobility and its continuing “Christian character”, 
despite the Muslim demand to reshape Lebanese army with a balanced 
sectarian composition, led to its disintegration as a result of Muslim officers’ 
rebellions. In late January 1976, a Sunni Lieutenant, Ahmad Khatib, formed 
the Lebanese Arab Army (LAA) by recruiting supporters fi’om most of the 
army units throughout the country. Though he may have considered that 
by harming the army’s solidarity as Christian force the power balance would 
be more favourable to the Muslim and PLO forces, his actions were primarily
Rabinovich (1985) p.47.
Khazen (2000) pp.313-315. /Petran (1987) p. 176.
134 Pqj. details of this incident, see Khazen (2000) pp.203-208. 
Khazen (2000) pp.314-315.
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influenced by the Palestinians, who feared that if the army sided with the 
Maronites, it might carry out a heavy attack against them/^^ “The LAA 
program issued on February 3 called for a nonsectarian army, a new 
democratic Lebanon based on secularism and Arabism, electoral law reform, 
and the abolition of all private militias.” The rebellion was partly directed 
against Syria, which was engaged in reconcihatory efforts aimed at 
preserving a reformed sectarian system and did not want to drive the 
Maronites into a corner, even though Syria stopped a Maronite offensive 
against the LNM-PLO coalition by arranging a cease-fire on January 21.
On March 11, another Sunni Brigadier General, Azib Ahdab, announced 
that he was assuming power as provisional military governor and declared a 
state of emergency. He demanded that Franjieh resign within 24 hours, and 
called on parliament to elect a new president within a week. Although he 
commanded fewer than a thousand troops, his action stimulated a general 
call for Franjieh’s resignation.^^® Ahdab proclaimed his support for Syria but 
Damascus perceived the coup to be directed against the Syrian role in 
Lebanon. Indeed, the coup was intended to oust Syria’s main ally, Franjieh, 
from the presidency. Furthermore, it was a part of Palestinian effort to 
counter Asad’s attempt to bring the PLO under his control. After this, the 
Lebanese army ceased to behave as a single body.
However, the LAA attracted very few Sunni officers and almost all of its 
adherents were lower-rank officers, while the senior Sunni officer corps 
remained loyal to the state, the government, and the army. The Sunni 
officers were also loyal during Ahdab’s coup. Though his objectives of a 
united army and the end of domestic violence was shared by senior army
Deeb (1980) p.7. /McLaurin (1984) pp.93-95.
Hanf (1993) pp.213-214.
Petran (1987) p. 190.
Randal (1984) pp.95-96.
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officers regardless of their sectarian background, the illegality of Ahdab’s 
actions prohibited many who identified with his objectives from siding with 
him/"^  ^ The fact that the army still had a considerable number of Sunni 
officers became a crucial asset for both Franjieh and Syria, especially when 
the Syrian army and the remainder of the Lebanese army confronted the 
LNM-PLO coalition backed by the LAA during the spring and summer of 
1976. In other words, the army’s continuing cross-sectarian composition 
made it possible for Franjieh to deny that the army was a “Christian army” 
and at same time to label the LAA as a rebel army with sectarian motivation. 
In addition, Syria was able to show other Arab states and the international 
community that it sided with the legitimate armed forces in Lebanon.
(3) The Deployment of the Lebanese Army and the Withdrawal 
of the ADF (1976-1982)
After Sarkis assumed the presidency he tried to pacify the country by using 
the Lebanese army. In doing so he had to consider the Syrian presence in 
Lebanon, which had been legitimised by the Arab League as a part of the 
Arab Deterrent Force (ADF) and which later constituted the majority in it. 
The relations between the Lebanese army and the Syrian-dominated ADF 
will here be the main focus of the following discussion.
After the Riyadh and Cairo conferences in October 1976, the PLO began to 
reinforce its positions in southern Lebanon and so brought about a 
confirontation with the newly-created Christian müitias, which were led by 
Major Saad Haddad and armed and financed by Israel. The PLO-LNM and 
Haddad forces intensified their fighting and the cycle of violence continued 
firom the latter part of 1976 to the first part of 1977. Syria, however, found
Khazen (2000) p.333. /Petran (1987) p. 191. 
McLaurin (1984) pp.95-96.
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itself caught in a dilemma. While it sought a containment of Israeli influence 
in the South and favoured the PLO-LNM forces there, it also feared that 
intensification of the fighting there would invite further Israeli intervention. 
In addition, Syria could not send the ADF to southern Lebanon because of 
Israeli opposition based on the “Red Line” Agreement.
To resolve the perilous situation ia the South, Syria sponsored a meeting 
with the Palestinians and the Lebanese government in Shtura. The 
conference brought into existence the Shtura Agreement, which was 
concluded between the Palestinians and the Lebanese state under the 
auspices of Syria in July 1977.^ ^^  “It provided that the Palestinians would 
respect Lebanese sovereignty, stay out of Lebanese politics, move their 
military forces to restricted areas in the South, and refi*ain from attacks 
across the (Israeh-Lebanese) border, while the Lebanese army would move 
south and take control of the border area firom Haddad.” However, the 
Shtura Agreement was not carried out completely.
The process was to take place in two stages. However, it was carried out 
fully only in northern Lebanon and implemented partially in southern 
Lebanon. Although Syria was the power-broker for the agreement, it began 
to lose interest in the implementation because of regional pohtical shifts. The 
installation of the new Likud government, as well as increased Israeh- 
Maronite cooperation, led Syria, deterred by Israel firom maintaining a direct 
presence in the South (the “Red line” Agreement), to need controllable 
Palestinian armed forces as a proxy there. Though Sarkis continued to 
press for a Palestinian withdrawal fi’om the South and the deployment of the 
Lebanese army there on the basis of the Shtura agreement, because of
142 pogany (1987) pp. 122-124.
Hinnebusch (1986) p.8.
For the details of implementation process, see Avi-Ran (1991) pp.75-76. 
Ma’oz and Yaniv (1986) p.200.
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passive Syrian attitudes these measures did not materialise. At the same 
time Sarkis probably understood the difficulties of rebuilding an army 
capable of this task.^ '*^  He tried to have UN forces stationed in the South, but 
this did not materiahse, because of Syria’s objections that the introduction of 
such a force would diminish the role of the ADF and thus badly affect Syrian 
power in Lebanon.
However, after the Israeh Litani Operation in March 1978, Sarkis and Asad 
agreed to send a Lebanese army unit to the South, with Syria securing 
Palestinian cooperation. The agreement seems to have been estabhshed as a 
result of the foUowing factors. On the one hand, Asad may have thought that 
containment of the Haddad’s force in southern Lebanon would in turn 
weaken the Maronite forces, especiahy the Lebanese Forces in northern 
Lebanon which the Syrian-led ADF had mihtarily confronted since February 
1978, and also that further objection to the deployment of the Lebanese army 
in the South would decrease its legitimacy in Lebanon. On the other hand, 
Sarkis hoped to gain prestige for the Lebanese army in the South and also to 
transfer Syria’s attention to the South/"*® Perhaps he aimed to increase the 
legitimacy of the government by exploiting Syria’s delicate position in 
Lebanon. The newly created Litani Brigade of the Lebanese army, numbered 
at 650 and which was put together under Prime Minister Hoss, aimed to 
reach the UNIFIL zone bordering Israel by passing through the area 
controlled by Haddad, but its progress was halted by shellfire from Haddad’s 
mihtias.^ "*®
As the fighting between the Syrian forces and the Lebanese Forces 
continued, the latter called for the replacement of the ADF by an
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international peacekeeping force. Pressured by Maronite demands/®® and by 
securing support from the Arab countries financing the ADF, Sarkis 
managed to successfully negotiate with Asad at Beiteddine in mid-October 
1978, who feared a Lebanese refusal of the renewal of the ADF’s mandate. 
The conference called for the rebuilding of the Lebanese army with a 
balanced sectarian composition, to replace the ADF. This was followed by the 
Lebanese parliament’s approval of the new army law in March 1979. Though 
non-Syrian troops of the ADF withdrew from Lebanon completely by May, 
Syrian troops carried out only a partial withdrawal from East Beirut and 
stiU held some strategic positions especially in the centre of Beirut. The 
Syrian attitude was explainable by the rejection of this army law by Sarkis, 
who, fearing that any müitary reform would strip the Maronites of their 
prerogatives, sided with the Lebanese Forces. He was also influenced by the 
continuing bad relations between Syria and the Lebanese Forces.^ ®*
In January 1980, Syria further redeployed most of its forces which had been 
stationed in northern Lebanon and East Beirut to Beqqa, though it still kept 
several thousand troops in West Beirut. Syria’s actions seem to have been 
influenced by two factors. Firstly, by concentrating its forces in Beqqa, Syria 
tried to ensure additional protection for its most vulnerable flank in the 
event of future Israeli attacks, the probability of which increased after the 
establishment of the Likud government. Secondly since the Asad regime was 
facing a series of military attacks at home from the Muslim Brotherhood, the 
concentration of its troops in the area relatively close to Damascus made it
*®® Camille Chamoun stated that since the Syrian forces abandoned its 
original peacekeeping role and transformed a party to the conflict, they could 
not stay in Lebanon permanently and the Maronites would continue the 
fighting until the last Syrian soldiers could be expelled from Lebanon.
[Cobban (1978) pp. 15-16. /Hanf (1993) p.234.]
H addad (1985) pp.60-61. /P etran  (1987) pp.248-249. /Pogany (1987)
pp.132-134.
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easy for security forces in Syria to be reinforced by units of the ADF/®^  
Thirdly, but more importantly since the mandate of the ADF had to be 
renewed every six months, Syria might have calculated that it was necessary 
to appease Sarkis in view of the continuation of hostilities between the ADF 
and the Lebanese Forces. However, in March, Syria rejected the demand by 
General Khoury, Commander of the Lebanese army, “that Lebanese troops 
should replace Syrian forces in all sectors of Beirut.”*®® In addition, Syria 
continuously prevented the Lebanese army from going to the South by 
strengthening its surrogate PLO-LNM forces there when the Lebanese 
government tried to estabHsh a symbol of authority in the South by sending 
an army unit there in mid-April/®*
Despite these actions by Syria to preserve its prestige and power in 
Lebanon, Sarkis continued to extend the ADF mandate on its periodic 
expirations until his resignation in 1982. His action seems to have been 
influenced not only by Syria’s still dominant power in Lebanon and its 
occasional gesture of appeasement toward him but also by regional factors 
and his own perception. Since he reHed on other Arab states as 
counterbalances to Syrian power in Lebanon, their views that the 
termination of the mandate would only lead to an alternative bilateral 
agreement between Lebanon and Syria, one that would only decrease 
whatever influence Arab states could exert on Damascus to moderate its 
pohcies in Lebanon, may have affected his actions.*®® In addition, as a 
Shihabist he probably did not want to provoke the Syrians, which could 
alienate the Muslims. However, Sarkis’s rehance on the Arab community to 
resolve the hostihties between the ADF and the Lebanese Forces and to
*®^ Pogany (1987) pp. 135-138. 
*®® Pogany (1987) p. 137.
*®^ Haddad (1985) p.62.*55 Thompson (2002) p.76.
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secure the deployment of the Lebanese army in all Lebanon’s territories 
resulted in failure. In fact, though the Arab League summit in Fez in 1981 
stipulated support for the Lebanese government’s plan for the army’s 
deployment in the South, the polarisation between the moderate and hard- 
hne Arab states, especially antagonism between Saudi Arabia and Syria 
which resulted from the former supporting Iraq and the latter aligning with 
Iran in the Iran-lraq War, prevented the actualisation of the deployment.*®®
(4) Further Disintegration of the Lebanese Army (1982—1989)
After Amin Jumayiel assumed the presidency he began to restore the 
army’s capability by using emergency powers, including the power to 
legislate by decree, which he was given by the parHament. However, because 
of the Israeh occupation, he was forced to take into consideration the 
interests of Israel and its ally in Lebanon, the Lebanese Forces.
Jumayiel nominated Ibrahim Tannous, who had been the head of the 
Phalange’s military training for the past nine years, as the new army 
commander. He then exploited Tannous’s power to purge officers considered 
pohtically undesirable by the Lebanese Forces. By issuing Decree Law 10, 
Jumayiel also restored the commander’s absolute authority, which had been 
somewhat reduced by the new army law in March 1979. Since the army was 
staffed with officers favoured by the Lebanese Forces and since those officers 
won rapid promotions, the army’s “Christian character” was strengthened, 
and this prevented it from functioning as a symbol of national reconciliation. 
In addition, reflecting Jumayiel’s rehance on the USA, Washington promised 
to supply the Lebanese army with a great quahty of arms and mhitary 
equipment, and to send American advisors to help train the new army.*®^
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How did all this affect relations between the army, which still retained its 
“Christian character”, and Syria? The relations were clearly manifest in the 
following three dimensions: the “Shuf War”, the battle for the “Tripartite 
Agreement", and the “Camps War“.
With the beginning of Israel’s partial withdrawal from the Shuf in July 
1983, Asad’s main allies in Lebanon, Jumblatt and Berri, voiced their 
rejection of the Lebanese army’s deployment in the region since they 
considered the army sectarian and confessional/®® However, Jumayiel 
managed, with the help of the USA and France, to hold meetings with 
Jumblatt in order to materialise the Lebanese army’s dispatch to the Shuf. 
Jumblatt may have concerned the probable resumption of hostilities in the 
Shuf and the resulting further damage and casualties there, if a pohtical 
arrangement was not reached. In August, a series of meetings between the 
Lebanese government and Jumblatt were held in Paris and an agreement, 
which was to be implemented by the legal authorities, including the 
Lebanese army, and which would provide security for the Shuf, was 
concluded. It was also agreed that Jumblatt would seek the consent of Syria 
and its alhes. However, Syria rejected this accord.*®® Since Syria desperately 
needed strong coahtions between its alhes in Lebanon in order to abrogate 
the May 17 Agreement, it may have considered Jumblatt’s actions to be 
destructive of the sohdarity of those opposed to Jumayiel. Syria’s actions also 
undermined the role of the Lebanese army by rejecting its role in the 
pacification of the Shuf which was to be carried out in line with the accord in 
Paris.
Though the sectarian appeal to Druzes within the army to abandon the 
institution had some effect during the “Shuf War“, the number of persons 
who were affected by the appeal was initiahy smah and the unity of the army
158 Haddad (1985) pp.lOO-lOl.
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was still preserved.*®® However, with his external patrons, the USA and 
Israel, decreasing their presence in Lebanon, Jumayiel increasingly tried to 
use the army against his rivals, especially the Druzes and Shi’ites, and thus 
the army further drifted toward full alignment with the Lebanese Forces. As 
a result, most Druze soldiers had abandoned their posts by the end of 1983, 
and the army’s mainly Druze brigade disintegrated when it was sent to the 
Shuf to suppress Jumblatt’s forces. Later in February 1984, the sixth brigade 
of the Lebanese army, composed mainly of Shi’ite and pro-Amal figures, 
followed the caU of Berri’s defection and joined him.*®* The coalition between 
Amal and the sixth brigade of the Lebanese army may have had a positive 
outcome for Syria during the “Camps War”. Since this made it possible for 
Syria to demonstrate its alliance with a brigade of the Lebanese army, the 
criticism against the legitimacy of its pohcy of surrounding the Palestinian 
refugee camps might have been somewhat decreased.
While Syria succeeded in inserting a clause in the “Tripartite Agreement” 
that the Lebanese army command should be rehabilitated under Syrian 
guidance, this Syrian action, along with its support for Hubayka, strongly 
antagonised not only the Maronite warlords but also the army’s Maronite 
leadership. Syria bombed East Beirut to protect Hubayka’s factions and the 
army made a counterattack in early 1986, which had negative consequences 
for Syria. Firstly, Syria’s open clashes with forces representing “Lebanese 
legitimacy” hurt its status in the international arena. Secondly, the ties 
between the Lebanese Forces leader, Ja’ja, and the army Commander, Awn, 
were solidified. In fact, after the Syrian army cleared militias from the 
streets of West Beirut in March 1987, it suggested that Jumayiel and Awn 
take the same measure in East Beirut against Ja’ja. However, due to
*®® Haddad (1985) pp. 101-103. /McLaurin (1984) p. 103.
*®® Betts (1988) pp. 112-113. /McLaurin (1984) pp. 107-108. 
*®* McLauriu (1984) pp. 107-108. /Petran (1987) pp.348-349.
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Jumayiel’s reliance on Ja’ja and the close relations between Awn and Ja’ja, 
this Syrian ploy failed/®^
The strong ties between the army and the Lebanese Forces considerably 
deepened Syria’s suspicion of the army’s “neutrality”. When clashes and 
tensions persisted between Amal and the Palestinians at Chatila and Bourj 
Barajineh refugee camps in June 1986, Joint Committees were set up to 
supervise the truce and the deployment of the Lebanese army’s “special 
forces” which were made up of a number of different army brigades as a 
buffer force around the camps.*®® Though the Lebanese army’s role in easing 
the tensions was sometimes helped by the Syrian army, the Lebanese side 
could not rely on full Syrian support. Even when the Lebanese army entered 
into West Beirut to implement the Syrian-sponsored security plan, Syria
dispatched only symbolic numbers—about 200 men—from its battalion. *®^
(5) Brief Summary
Overall, though the Lebanese government tired to increase the army’s role, 
most of the efforts resulted in failure, since the army still remained a 
“Christian army”, and Syria was generally sceptical and sometimes opposed 
to the deployment of such a confessional army. Though Syria generally 
criticised the separatist movements in the army, it sometimes gave tacit 
consent to these currents through support of those army units favourable to 
its strategies.
5. ECONOMIC DIMENSIONS : THE MILITIA ECONOMY AND 
RECONSTRUCTION EFFORTS
*®2 Harris (1988) pp.93-97.163 MET June 27,1986.
164MET July  11,1986.
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(1) Introduction
As the civü war progressed, so did the fragmentation in Lebanon/®® This 
situation affected the economy: as the militia economy emerged, the 
“normal” economic system nearly ceased to function. Under the flourishing 
militia economy, attempts by the Lebanese government to reconstruct a 
national economy was one of its important activities to restore state 
functions by securing revenues. In doing so, the government had to take into 
consideration Syrian economic interests, since Syria was involved not only in 
the militia economy through smuggling, but also in the attempts by the 
Lebanese government to reconstruct its economy. This section will begin by 
briefly surveying the militia economy in Lebanon and Syria's involvement in 
it. This will be followed by a discussion of Lebanese efforts toward economic 
reconstruction, and again of Syria’s involvement.
(2) The Spread of the Militia Economy in Lebanon
The militia economy came into being with “the transition from the local 
mobilisation of armed defence groups in villages or neighbourhoods that 
operated within the framework of a unified state to the monopolisation of 
resources and means of coercion by large, organised, and hierarchical 
militias that gradually carved up the Lebanese territory after 1976.”*®® In 
particular, the Lebanese Forces, the PSP, Amal, and HizboUah attempted to 
consolidate their power in their own communities by looting state property 
and by depriving opponents of strategic resources such as oil and electricity. 
They gave priority to securing access to resources without having to rely on 
the mediation of the enemy, for example, by constructing separate ports,
*65 pQy the details of fragmentation process during the civU war, see Harris |
<1996) pp.203-233. 1
*®® Picard (2000) p.293. j
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since Lebanon imported more than 50 percent of its consumer goods.*®^
In addition, militias began to be involved in criminal economic activities, 
and even Syrian forces in Lebanon became deeply engaged in smuggHng in 
the 1980s. In fact, nearly 70 percent of Syria’s annual imports were 
smuggled in from Lebanon, and thousands of tons of cement, petrol, sugar, 
and other goods which were sold in Syria at subsidised prices were smuggled 
into Lebanon where their prices were higher,*®® Syrian troops stationed in 
Lebanon were involved in these processes in the Beqqa.
In the Beqqa adjunct to Syria, Zahle was a strategic point because of its 
nexus of east/west and north/south communications with the interior of 
Lebanon. The control of Zahle would therefore mean the control of Beqqa and, 
by extension, Lebanon as a whole. Thus, the loss of Zahle would have been a 
serious blow to Damascus. Zahle also overlooked the Beirut-Damascus 
highway, an important supply and communication line. More importantly, 
Syria believed that its control of Beqqa was justified for security reasons, 
because a drive northward through it led to the Syrian city of Homs, the 
headquarters of Syria’s transport communications.*®® The Asad regime 
continued to give particular attention to Zahle and its surrounding district, 
especially after Syria consolidated its hegemony in Lebanon in 1976.
After the outbreak of conflict, certain factors resulting from the security 
problems in other parts of Lebanon became paradoxically advantageous for 
the economy of both Zahle and the Beqqa as a whole. In particular, the 
continual fighting in and around Beirut encouraged economic 
decentralisation, and so Zahle became more important as an entrepot and 
service centre for the east region, and experienced commercial and industrial 
expansion. This economic vitality in Zahle attracted the Syrians, and the
*®" Picard (2000) pp.293-299. 
*®® Sadowski (1985) pp.6-7.
169 H addad (1982) p. 34.
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number of Syrian visitors increased. After Syrian troops came there, a series 
of economic networks was quickly formed for smuggling drugs, consumer 
goods, and other materials between Lebanon and Syria.**"®
Though the Lebanese drug trade dated back to the early 20*^  century, it 
increased dramatically after the outbreak of the conflict, due to international 
demand and decreased control by the central government. It is said that the 
trade was tacitly supported by the Syrian regime, and a number of high- 
ranking Syrian military and intelligence officials, such as Rifat Asad, the 
brother of President Asad, and Defence Minister Mustafa Tlas, permitted 
drug processing and allowed smugglers to travel unhindered between 
Lebanon and Syria. The Syrian-imposed closure of a large area of mountain 
vineyards as military areas, along with the rising prices of drugs, no doubt 
influenced those local farmers who were devoted to drug cultivation, which 
was an activity that generated about USD 3 biOion annually. The profits the 
drug smugghng gave to Syrian officials remained useful for cementing their 
allegiance to the Asad regime until 1990, when Syria, hoping to advance 
relations with Western countries, accepted the USA demand to restrict 
Lebanese drug cultivation.*^*
The smugghng of consumer goods and other materials fi-om Lebanon to 
Syria was also tacitly encouraged by the Syrian government. When Syrian 
businessmen organised the acquisition of building materials for the Syrian 
construction industry in late 1983, Zahle acted as an agency for obtaining 
timber, iron, and porcelain. To the Beqqa as a whole the deals were estimated 
as up to approximately USD 5 million per day, and two-thirds of the business 
went through Zahle. However, Syria’s financial and pohtical crises in 1984 
caused an economic downturn in Beqqa. Syrian foreign reserves decreased 
sharply as problems in obtaining aid from Arab oil states occurred both as a
170 H arris (1986b) pp.282-283.
133
result of Syria siding with Iran in the Iran-lraq War and the economic 
difficulties facing these Arab states. In addition, Asad’s anti-corruption 
campaign adversely affected the smuggling trade on the Beirut-Damascus 
highway. This was a reflection of the power struggle over the potential 
succession between Rifat Asad and other prominent Alawis. Rifat was 
prominent in Beqqa commercial operations, and the assault on the 
smuggling may well have contributed to the decrease in his pohtical 
status.
However, drug smugghng between Lebanon and Syria continued until the 
end of the conflict. It seems that Asad on the one hand did not want to 
further antagonise his senior officials, which might have shaken his regime 
and that the weak Lebanese state on the other hand had no choice but to 
accept the smugghng. Despite these discouraging circumstances, the 
Lebanese government tried to reconstruct its economy and Syria, for ah its 
involvement in the mhitia economy and the drug trade, showed interest in 
the process.
(3) The Lebanese Government’s Attempts at Reconstruction
The spread of the ihegal militia economy created a situation where the 
Lebanese government lost control over pubhc revenues and income but 
“continued to spend in order to maintain essential services, pay wages and 
salaries and subsidise some basic imported goods.” Given this asymmetry 
between revenues and expenditure, the government had to reconstruct its 
economy by relying on foreign, especiahy Arab, financial assistance. 
However, its attempts were seldom successful, and the responsibhity for this, 
albeit indirectly, was Syria’s.
*"* Abdelnour (2001). /Harris (1985) p.283. /Joffe (2000).
Harris (1985) pp.283-284.
134
After the Lebanese government created the Council for Development and 
Reconstruction (CDR) in January 1977 to formulate the reconstruction plan 
and to mediate external funds, state officials frequently visited the oil- 
producing Gulf countries to secure finandal a s s i s t a n c e T h i s  Lebanese 
effort bore fruit and at the 1979 Tunis summit Arab states pledged to pay 
USD 2,000 million over five years toward Lebanese reconstruction. However, 
their promises did not fully materialise, and by December 1981 Lebanon had 
received a total of only USD 372 million, though the amount should have 
reached USD 800 milhon.**"® The Gulf states’ hesitation was primarily due to 
the political instabiHty and uncertainty in Lebanon, especially as a result of 
the continuation of hostilities between the Lebanese Forces and the Syrian- 
dominated ADF.
During the late 1970s and early 1980s, reflecting the strained relations 
between Sarkis and Asad, the economic relationship between Lebanon and 
Syria was not always a good one. However, Syria agreed with Lebanon in 
1981 to amend the 1953 trade pact to allow the export of a greater variety of 
Lebanese goods to Syria. Since Syria was moving into self-sufficiently in 
cement production and Lebanon had traditionally exported both black and 
white cements to Syria, Lebanon clearly needed to diversify its export goods 
to Syria. Syria may well have been attending to the Lebanese economic 
needs so as not to further antagonise Sarkis.
However, the closure of the trans-Syrian pipeline and the halt of Iraqi crude 
oil export to Tripoli in April 1982, which resulted from the hostihties between 
Syria and Iraq, worsened the Lebanese attitude toward Syria. After a 
delegation of local businessmen visited Iraq, the Lebanese cabinet approved
*"® Chami (1992) p.326.
MEED December 31, 1977.
MEED December 18, 1981. /Starr (1984) p.71.
MEED August 4, 1978, April 10, 1981, and March 5, 1982.
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plans to establish a centre in Baghdad to promote Lebanese industrial 
goods/^^ In the context of the strained relations between Lebanon and Syria 
as well as the antagonism between Syria and the Gulf states, especially 
Saudi Arabia, although the Lebanese government tried to improve economic 
conditions with the help of these Arab states, it also had to avoid the 
severance of economic relations with Syria since some aspects of Lebanese 
economic life depended on Syria. For example, the Electricité du Liban 
network, which covered 85 percent of Lebanon’s electricity needs, and which 
suffered from heavy losses as a result of illegal tapping of electricity Hnes by 
individuals and miLLtias, was forced to import electricity from Syria through 
the Beqqa. In addition, Syrian was a transit route for Lebanese goods to 
the Gulf countries.
With Syrian hegemony in Lebanon gradually recovering in the mid-1980s, 
Syrian influence in Lebanese economic pohcy was acknowledged. The 
Lebanese government had to take into consideration Syrian chents’, 
especially Berri’s, economic interests. Firstly, the Ministry of the South, 
headed by Berri, was created in 1984 to guarantee his cooperation with the 
Karami cabinet. The Ministry of the South was initially merely a pohtical 
gesture, but it soon absorbed the funds and functions of the Council of the 
South which had been created in I960 to reconstruct the South after the 
Israel’s Litani Operation.*^® Secondly, in the 1985 budget the cabinet 
approved the ahocation of USD 40 million toward an aid program for the 
South.*®® Thirdly, the cabinet asked the Council for Development and 
Reconstruction (CDR) to revive a 1982 project to upgrade the highway from 
Beirut to the Syrian boarder at Masnaa, and the CDR agreed to provide USD
*"" MEED April 16, April 23, and June 4, 1982. 
*"® Starr (1984) p.76.
*"® Harik (1994) p.20.
*®® MEED October 19 and December 14, 1984.
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2,5 million to the Ministry of the South. Since the project was carried out by 
the Syrian Mount Kassioun Company, Syria’s influence with its chent, Berri, 
was apparent.*®* Fourthly, when the cabinet agreed to close illegal ports in 
September 1986 so as to secure customs revenue, Syrian allies in Lebanon, 
Amal and the PSP, were not cooperative. There seems no evidence that Syria 
pressured them to side with the government, and thus the attempt resulted 
in failure.*®^
Did Syria, despite its deep involvement in smugghng, contribute in any 
positive way to Lebanese economic reconstruction? From the above, it 
appears that Syria interfered in the economic process in such a way as to 
maintain and promote its own or its chents’ economic interests, and thus 
distorted the process of reconstruction.
However, Syrian involvement sometimes brought benefits for the Lebanon. 
Firstly, in the faU of 1976, the Syrian-led ADF created conditions in Beirut 
for the Lebanese banking system to return to normal. This was favourable 
not only for Beirut’s financial community, since the precarious security 
condition after the outbreak of the conflict made it impossible for the 
banking sector to find domestic outlets for its holdings, but also for Syrian 
enterprises to have used the traditionaUy highly regarded system.*®® The 
same took place in Tripoh when Syrian troops estabhshed security after 
clashing with the Sunni fundamentahst movement: five Beirut banks opened 
branches there.*®"* Secondly, when poor Mushms, especiahy the Shi’ites, 
protested against a probable rise in the cost of hviag in late August 1987 
after the Lebanese government made a decision to cut subsides to basic 
goods in order to contain its spiral deficits, the Syrian army intervened to
*®* MEED November 23, 1984, December 7, 1985, and April 18, 1987. 
182 m e ed  September 13, October 11, and October 18, 1986.
*®® Lawson (1996) p.95.
184 m e e d  January 25, 1986. /ME/October 11, 1985.
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break up the demonstration/®® Though this action had been suspended 
because of widespread opposition, the government finally cut the petrol 
subsidy, though only partially/®® In these ways, it could be said that Syria, 
though indirectly, helped economic reconstruction in Lebanon.
(4) Brief Summary
Overall, the reconstruction efforts by the Lebanese government were for the 
most part directly or indirectly affected by Syrian actions, and the 
government generally had to pay careful attention to Syria’s intentions. This 
appears to have made it difficult for the Lebanese state to carry out its 
reconstruction programme in terms of a “pure” economic calculation.
185 m e e d  September 5, 1987.
186 m e e d  September 26, 1987.
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N, THE RECONSTRUCTION OF THE LEBANESE STATE UNDER 
SYRIAN HEGEMONY (1989-2002)
Since the end of the Lebanese civil war, the Lebanese government has tried 
to reconstruct the country. In doing so, the state has had to take into 
consideration Syrian hegemony in Lebanon, which was firmly legitimised by 
the Treaty of Brotherhood, Cooperation, and Coordination in May 1991. As a 
result, though the Ta’if Agreement stipulated that postwar Lebanon would 
continue to be a “consociational democracy”, democratic practice has been 
restricted under Syrian indirect rule. In reality, Syria has frequently 
intervened in Lebanese pohtical, economic, and social affairs to serve its own 
interests. In turn, Lebanese state officials have tried to exploit the Syrians 
for their own interests, while keeping an eye on the regional dynamics of the 
Middle East which has largely affected Syrian diplomatic ties with the 
Lebanese state as weh as its transstate ties with Lebanese sub-state groups. 
However, faced with Syria’s dominant position and its alhes there, their 
attempts often have ended in failure. Therefore, as in the previous chapter, 
the external and internal circumstances surrounding the Lebanese state’s 
dealings with the Syrians, along with the consolidating process of Syrian 
hegemony in Lebanon, will be briefly discussed, and these will be followed by 
a detailed presentation of the political, economic, and social aspects of 
Lebanese-Syrian dynamics. Finally there will be a consideration of the 
impact of the unequal relationship between Syria and Lebanon on current 
discussion in Lebanon of the Syrian presence in the country.
1. THE DYNAMICS OF MIDDLE EAST INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 
AND THEIR IMPACT ON LEBANON AND SYRIA
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(1) Introduction
Even though the civil war has ended, Lebanon continues to be an arena for 
regional rivalry. Syria has used Lebanon in its regional/international pohcies, 
a fact which has arguably both weakened or strengthened the Syrian 
position in Lebanon. Syria’s two main external concerns after 1989 have 
been the Syrian-lraqi rivalry and the Syrian-lsraeh negotiations. The focus 
here wül be on the respective impact of these concerns on Lebanon.
(2) The Syrian-lraqi Rivalry and Lebanon
The ending of the Iran-lraq War in August 1988 marked the start of a new 
phase in the rivalry between Syria and Iraq over Lebanese territory. In 1989, 
when there were two rival governments in Lebanon, Iraq now found itself 
free from having to attend to the eastern border with Iran and began to focus 
on its western border. In a manifestation of its desire for vengeance against 
Syria for the latter’s support of Iran during the Iran-Iraq War, it increased 
its involvement in Lebanon by extending aid to the anti-Syrian Awn-led 
government, while Syria supported the rival government under Hoss. Iraq’s 
backing allowed Awn to declare in March a “War of Liberation” against the 
Syrian forces, and fierce fighting continued between the Syrian army and 
Awn forces throughout the spring and summer. This situation intensified 
Arab mediation efforts, and in May a three-state committee was formed, 
composed of Saudi Arabia, Morocco, and Algeria. Using their financial and 
pohtical power, the Saudis played a dominant role in pushing the Lebanese 
toward reconciliation and the Ta’if Agreement was finally concluded in 
October, under the auspices of the Arab League, as a basis of Lebanese 
national reconciliation.^
The agreement stipulated a Syrian “special” status by inserting two
 ^Thompson (2002) pp.79-80. /Zisser (2001) p.53 and pp. 136-137.
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provisions which gave Syria the legal right to keep its army in Lebanon. How 
long it would be able to do so was not to be determined by any outside body 
and the army would be able to respond to perceived threats against Syrian 
security within Lebanese territory.^ However, Syrian hegemony in Lebanon 
was not completely consohdated, and was still being challenged by Awn. 
When Iraq invaded Kuwait in August 1990, Syria joined the USA-led anti- 
Iraqi coahtion, an act which secured tacit IsraeH permission to use both its 
troops and air force against Awn —a clear violation of the “Red Line”
Agreement—and thus succeeded in defeating him.^ The surrender of Awn in
October strengthened Syrian hegemony in Lebanon, which was firmly 
legitimised in May 1991 with the ratification of the Treaty of Brotherhood, 
Cooperation, and Coordination. Thereafter, the established Syrian hegemony 
in Lebanon has enabled the Asad regime to “play the Lebanon card” in 
carrying out its regional policies.'^
(3) The Syrian-lsraeh Negotiations and Lebanon
In addition to the bitter relationship between Syria and Iraq and the 
possibility of getting financial aid for the stagnant Syrian economy fi*om both 
the West and firom the Gulf states, anofher factor behind the Syrian decision 
to join the anti-Iraqi coahtion may weU have been the breakdown of global 
bipolarity that took place in 1989. The decline and eventual dissolution of the 
USSR as a rehable patron stripped Syria of the option of going to war as a 
means to settle the Arab-lsraeh conflict.^ Syria’s lack of any real alternative 
to the peace process forced Asad to abandon Syria’s traditional conditions:
 ^Thompson (2002) pp.80-81.
® Ehteshami and Hinnebusch (1997) pp. 136-137. /Hinnebusch (1998) p. 149.
Hinnebusch (2002b) p. 158.
® Hinnebusch (1994) p. 175.
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UN sponsorship and a united Arab delegation. He was also forced to accept 
the USAs procedural terms, which were designed to shape the course of the 
negotiations to Israel’s advantage.® Syria attended the Madrid Peace 
Conference in October 1991, and a succession of Middle East peace 
negotiations has affected Syrian regional pohcy especially toward Lebanon, 
and also Lebanese foreign relations.
The conference stipulated two ways for the post-Madrid negotiations to 
proceed: multilateral talks concerning development, refugees, security, water, 
and the environment; and bilateral talks between Israel and the frontline 
Arab states.’ Although Syria entered direct negotiations with Israel, these 
negotiations were fraught with difficulties and obstacles, and no real 
progress was made until June 1992, when the Labour government under 
Yitzhak Rabin was established.® The stalemate of the negotiation process 
during this period intensified Hizbollah’s military activities against Israel’s 
occupied “security zone” in southern Lebanon. Faced with Syrian 
determination to use HizboUah to acquire negotiating leverage with Israel, 
the weak Lebanese government had no choice but to accept.
At the Syrian-lsraeli negotiations in August 1992, Israel stated that though 
UN Resolution 242 apphed to the Golan Heights, it did not call for 
withdrawal from all the occupied territories. Syria, in contrast, maintained 
that since UN Resolution 242 clearly required fuU IsraeH withdrawal, a 
partial withdrawal was not acceptable. Despite these differences, Asad 
continued to demonstrate his seriousness toward the negotiations. Indeed, 
Syria took the initiative in encouraging the Palestinians, Jordanians, and 
Lebanese to resume peace talks, and even supported their dialogues when 
they were interrupted by the IsraeH expulsion of Hamas members to
® Hinnebusch (1996) p.48.
’ Barnett (1998) pp.221-222.
8 Zisser (2001) p. 105.
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southern Lebanon in December 1992.®
In 1993, their different stances on the Golan Heights stalled the Syrian- 
lsraeli negotiations. Frustrated and claiming to respond to HizhoUah’s 
attacks on its presence in the South, Israel launched massive military 
incursions into southern Lebanon in July, known as “Operation 
Accountability”. Although recognising that the heavy IsraeH attacks against 
both HizboUah in the South and its forces in Beqqa were aimed to force 
concessions in their negotiations, Syria did not wish to abort the peace 
process itself, and cooperated with Israel in the resolution of the crisis.^ ® This 
cooperative behaviour led Israel to consider Asad to be a serious negotiating 
partner who wanted peace. However, the continued diverse stance on the 
Golan-for-peace equation pushed Israel to give priority to the IsraeH- 
Palestinian peace negotiations. The Oslo Accord in September 1993, and the 
subsequent separate agreements that Israel reached with Jordan and the 
PLO, not only made it possible for Syria to negotiate for anything else but 
the Golan, but also weakened Syria’s bargaining power with Israel. In this 
context, Lebanon, especiaUy HizboUah’s operations against the “security 
zone”, became a more important asset for the Syrians, a condition which, 
arguably, led Asad to pay more attention to considering ways in which the 
Lebanese situations might serve his poHcies.^^
Firstly, since Asad reaHsed that Israel could benefit firom a Syrian move to 
control HizboUah’s activities in the South, he Hnked a solution to the 
problem of southern Lebanon and HizboUah’s mUitary activities there to an 
overaU solution of the Arab-lsrael conflict, and included in this a solution to
® Hinnebusch (1996) pp.51-52. /Ehteshami and Hinnebusch (1997) pp. 165- 
166.
Ehteshami and Hinnebusch (1997) pp. 149-150. /Hinnebusch (1998) p. 56. 
Hinnebusch (1996) pp.50-53.
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the Golan problem that would be in his favour/^ Secondly, when Lebanese 
Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri announced in February 1993 his readiness to 
sign any agreement with Israel under UN Resolution 425 (which called for 
an end to Israeli occupation in the South) against Syrian wishes, Syria 
contained this move in order to avoid the possibility that it might weaken the 
Syrian negotiating position toward Israel/®
The year 1995 was crucial for the peace process, and the Syrian-lsraeli 
negotiations were accelerated by the change of leadership in Israel after the 
assassination of Yitzhak Rabin. The succeeding Prime Minister, Shimon 
Peres, declared that the Golan was Syrian territory, and both Peres’s 
eagerness to reach an agreement with Syria and the post-assassination shift 
in Israeh pubhc opinion brought Asad to the negotiating table in late 1995. 
Nevertheless, no breakthrough ensued, and in April 1996, as it had in July 
1993, Israel launched heavy military operations against HizboUah and 
Lebanon’s infrastructure: this was “Operation Grapes of Wrath”. The 
exacerbated tensions between Syria and Israel and the Israeh election 
campaign led Peres to suspend negotiations.^^
After the Likud Party won in the May 1996 election, the IsraeU Prime 
Minister Benyamin Netanyahu attempted to separate the Lebanese-lsraeU 
peace track from the Syrian-lsraeU peace track, and insisted that the 
Syrian-lsraeh negotiations should be resumed with no preconditions and 
irrespective of progress in negotiations between Syria and the former Labor 
government.^® Against this, Asad maintained that peace was a strategic 
choice, that negotiations should be resumed from the point at which they 
were interrupted, that aU understandings reached between them concerning
Zisser (2001) p. 147.
Hinnebusch (1998) p. 157. /Norton (1997) p. 10.
Ehteshami and Hinnebusch (1997) p.72. /Hinnebusch (1996) p.54. 
/Hinnebusch (1998) p. 156.
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withdrawal of Israeh forces from the Golan and arrangements about security 
affairs should be considered stih vahd, and that the Syrian and Lebanese 
tracks were inseparable/®
The “Lebanon First” option advocated by Netanyahu was a response to 
pressure from the Israeh army which had already begun to question the 
effectiveness of the Israeh presence in the “security zone” after “Operation 
Grapes of Wrath”. Since the option aimed to spht Lebanon and Syria and 
also to ehminate the Syrian “trump card” by leaving the South unilateraUy, 
it was not surprising that Syria rejected this proposal. Though Hariri 
initiahy tried, against the wishes of the Syrians, to promote the “Lebanon 
First” option by using his close ties with the West and the Gulf states, his 
attempt again met with stubborn Syrian objections and resulted in failure. 
As a result, the stalemate in Syrian-lsraeh negotiations intensified 
Hizbohah’s miHtary activities in southern Lebanon.^’
The number of Israeh casualties in the South increased, and thus the 
“security zone” became a habihty for Israel. In 1998, Netanyahu announced 
Israel’s readiness to accept UN Resolution 425, and demanded Lebanon calm 
its boarder with Israel. Syria rejected this proposal, and Lebanon, having no 
choice but to fohow Syria, also rejected it.^ ® After Ehud Barak was elected as 
prime minister in May 1999, he announced his intention to withdraw the 
Israel Defence Forces (IDF) from Lebanon within one year, in cooperation 
with Syria. Then, fohowing prolonged and exhaustive dehberations, Syria 
and Israel decided to renew negotiations. Sponsored by US President, Bih 
Chnton, Barak and the Syrian Foreign Minister, Faruq Shar, met in 
Washington in mid-December 1999. However, the meetings between the two
Hajjar (1999) pp. 112-113.
'® Hajjar (1999) pp. 122-123.
Fliimebusch (1998) p. 157. /Norton (1997) p. 12. /Zisser (2001) pp. 146-147. 
Zisser (2001) p. 146.
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there, and later at Shepherdstown, did not lead to real progress. Eventually 
Barak announced that the opportunity for peace with Syria was closed, and 
he decided on a unilateral IDF withdrawal from Lebanon, which was effected 
on May 24 2000. The Israeh presence in Lebanon had come to an end.^ ® 
However, Israeh retention of a shver of disputed territory, the “Shabaa 
Farms”, has enabled Syria to continue using Hizbohah’s attacks on Israeh 
positions to give Israel the message that it could not have peace in the 
northern border without a comprehensive settlement with Syria and 
Lebanon.
After Ariel Sharon visited the Aqsa mosque in Jerusalem in September 
2000, the second Palestinian intifada erupted against the IDF in the West 
Bank and Gaza. In sympathy, Syria has tolerated and even encouraged 
limited HizboUah military activities against the IDF in the Shabaa Farms, 
which Syria and Lebanon have regarded as stUl Israeh-occupied Lebanese 
territory. However, the Syrian new leadership, led by Bashar Asad, who took 
on responsibihty for Lebanese pohcy from Vice President Khaddam in 1998 
and who was elected as president after his father’s death in June 2000, was 
not interested in a conventional mihtary confrontation, and thus did not 
retahate against the retahatory Israeh attacks on Syrian mihtary 
instaUations in Lebanon in April and July 2001 fohowing HizboUah’s 
military operations in the Shabaa Farms.^® Repeated Palestinian uprisings 
and strained Palestinian-lsraeh relations have continuously influenced 
Syrian poUcy toward Lebanon. When Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah released 
his peace proposal in mid-February 2002 to set the agenda for the March 27- 
28 Arab League summit in Beirut, Asad visited Lebanon on March 3 to 
firmly impress that Syria should be a leading player in the Arab-lsraeh 
peace process. However, his visit was also aimed at softening, ahead of the
19 Zisser (2001) pp. 124-125, p. 146.
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summit, the Maronite opposition to the Syrian presence in Lebanon, as well 
as at managing divisions within the Lebanese government/^
In the aftermath of “September 11”, American officials initially avoided 
mentioning HizboUah in the context of the US war against terrorism. The 
Bush administration, in order to secure Arab backing for the American-led 
war in Afghanistan, calculated that it would not expUcitly target HizboUah 
and other Syrian-sponsored guerriUa groups in its war on terror, as long as 
Syria cooperated by causing its surrogate forces to refrain from launching 
violent provocations against Israel. Syria, for its part, hoped that its 
participation in the anti-terrorism campaign could be traded for US pressure 
on Israel over the Golan Heights.^^ However, it soon became clear that this 
hope could not be reaHsed under the pro-IsraeU Bush administration, and 
HizboUah launched mihtary attacks twice in October 2001, an action which 
resulted in Washington adding HizboUah to its “terrorist” Hst.^ ® The 
unprecedented level of American pressure, which included the possibiUty of 
economic sanctions, on Syria and Lebanon to rein in HizboUah has placed the 
Hariri government in a difficult position, a position which was clearly 
evident in its negotiations during the December over the Euro- 
Mediterranean Partnership Agreement, which would estabhsh a free-trade 
zone on both sides of the Mediterranean by 2010. The European countries, 
especiaUy Britain, demanded Lebanon to show its expHcit stance of 
combating terrorism.
(4) Brief Summary
Ghadbian (2001) pp.627-628. /Perthes (2001) pp.37-38.
GambiU (2002-3/4). /For the detaUs of AbduUah’s plan and its analysis, see
Montagu (2002).
^  Ehteshami and Hinnebusch (2002) p.348. 
^ AfA/October 26 and November 23, 2001.
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Now that the regional rivalry between Syria and Iraq over Lebanese soil 
has ended, the regional Syrian-lsraeh power struggle has taken on more 
diplomatic and military dimensions, and continues to have a strong effect on 
the Lebanese state.
2. THE END OF THE CIVIL WAR AND THE CONSOLIDATION 
OF SYRIAN HEGEMONY
(1) Introduction
Before discussing relations between Lebanese sub-state groups and Syria, it 
would be useful to deal with the process of Syria’s strengthening hegemony 
in Lebanon after the civil war. This was brought about by a number of 
factors: the formation of the Ta’if Agreement, Awn’s defeat, the disarming of 
Lebanese militias and the PLO, and the conclusion of the Treaty of 
Brotherhood, Cooperation, and Coordination. These set the basic framework 
for Lebanese-Syrian relations under Syrian indirect rule during the post-war 
period.
(2) The Formation of the Ta’if Agreement and Awn’s Defeat
After Awn declared a “War of Liberation” against the Syrians on March 13, 
1989, he received aid from the Lebanese Forces (LF) headed by Samir Ja’Ja. 
In spite of the animosity between them, which had originated in Awn’s open 
battle with the LF over the control of Beirut port while he was in the process 
of consoHdating his authority over the Christians, they coordinated to 
confront the common enemy: Syria.^^ The escalation of fighting placed more 
pressure on Arab mediation efforts, and led to the formation of the Ta’if 
Agreement in October.
Abul-Husn (1998) pp .107-108, /Salem  (1991) pp.65-67.
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The Ta’if Agreement, firstly, aimed to lay foundations for the estabhshment 
of a new Lebanese pohtical order by bringing in a series of constitutional 
amendments concerning the system of government. These measures 
included reducing the Maronite president’s power and placing him on an 
equal footing with the Sunni prime minister and Shi’ite speaker of 
parhament, expanding the parhament’s power, and estabhshing parity in the 
number of seats between Christian and Mushm deputies, even though the 
Christians were now a demographic minority. To materiahse these changes, 
the agreement stipulated the Lebanon’s constitutional amendment. Secondly, 
the agreement caUed for the disarming of mihtias and the restoration and 
extension of the authority of the central government in Beirut to ah of 
Lebanon, including the South. Thirdly, it stipulated that the number of 
Syrian troops stationing in Lebanon would be determined only by the two 
states and that the Syrian army would redeploy to Beqqa two years after the 
amendment of the constitution. It also formahsed the Lebanese “special” 
relationship with Syria. Fourthly, it demanded the Israeli withdrawal from 
the “security zone” in compHance with UN Security Council Resolution 425 
and other UN resolutions.^® Syria was able, by using its political power and 
diplomatic skih, to secure an internationaUy recognised legal basis for its 
presence. It was also enabled to do so by the fact that the agreement was 
sanctioned not only by the Lebanese government but also by the Arab 
League and the United Nations.^®
After the Ta’if Agreement was concluded, Syria and its allies in Lebanon 
began to make an effort to implement it, with international and regional 
backing. Ehas Hrawi was elected as president after the assassination of 
Rene Muawwad, and he, in cooperation with Prime Minister Hoss, tried hard
^ Hamdan (1997) pp.216-226. /Norton (1991) pp.461-464. /Zisser (2001) 
p. 137.
^ Thompson (2002) pp.80-81.
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to implement the agreement. In fact, the Hrawi-Hoss administration 
dismissed General Awn, suspended payments to civil servants under him, 
imposed an economic blockade on the districts controlled by him, and 
appealed to opponents of the agreement to support the peace process in 
Lebanon.^’
Awn rejected the Ta’if Agreement on the ground that it did not call for a 
Syrian withdrawal from all Lebanese territory, but only for a redeployment 
of Syrian forces to the Beqqa Valley. Awn’s followers launched a series of 
attacks against pro-Ta’if figures. In contrast to Awn’s popularity among the 
Christians, that of the LF commander Ja’ja diminished, and he came to fear 
being marginalised within the community. He began to distance himself from 
Awn, stated his acceptance of the Ta’if Agreement, and even sent messages to 
Hoss indicating his willingness to serve in the Hrawi-Hoss administration. 
The spht resulted in the open battle between Awn-led army units and the LF 
in January 1990, and Awn’s massive support among the Maronites made it 
possible for him to launch mihtary attacks against the LF.^ ®
For a long time, Syria had restrained itself. It was concerned that direct 
Syrian action against Awn might cause a bloody battle, might arouse 
opposition not only from within Lebanon but also in the regional and 
international arena, and might also provoke outside, especiahy Israeh, 
intervention against the Syrians.^®
The condition for a mihtary move against Awn became ripe for Asad in the 
latter part of 1990. Domesticahy, Syria had won support for the post-Ta’if 
process from most of the pohtical and mihtary forces in Lebanon, such as 
Hizbohah, the LF under Samir Ja’ja, and the Maronite rehgious
Harris (1996) pp.264-266. /Nasrahah (1993) pp. 106-107.
^ Norton (1991) pp.464-465. /For the details of Ja’ja-Awn spht and their 
causes, see Laurent (1991) pp.88-101.
^ Zisser (2001) pp. 140-141.
150
establishments represented by Patriarch Nasrallah Sfeir. Backed by Syria, 
Hrawi had already started to negotiate with Ja’ja in June, which resulted in 
the acceptance of the process by the LF. The increased Maronite support for 
the post-Ta’if politics consequently enabled Hrawi to request Syrian 
assistance officially in order to oust Awn. Internationally, during 1990 and 
particularly after the outbreak of the Gulf Crisis, Syrian participation in the 
USA-led anti-Iraqi coahtion improved its relations with Western countries, 
especiaUy the United States. Through the USA, Syria received tacit Israeh 
acceptance for its mihtary move against Awn. The domestic and 
international support outhned above led Syria to order its troops in October 
to attack Awn’s enclave around the presidential palace in Ba’abda, an act 
which led eventuahy to the capture of all of East Beirut. Awn initiahy took 
refuge in the French Embassy before going into exile in France. The aUeged 
assassination by Syrian inteUigence forces of Dani Chamoun, a leading 
supporter of Awn and hence one of Syria’s main remaining opponents in 
Lebanon, jfinaUy ehminated mihtary opposition to the Syrian presence.®®
(3) Disarming Lebanese Mihtias and the PLO, and the Conclusion
of the Treaty of Brotherhood, Cooperation, and Coordination
In the wake of the Gulf Crisis, the post-Ta’if process became firmly 
“Syrianized” with tacit American blessing. Reaping the fuU benefits of its 
membership in the anti-Iraqi coahtion, Syria had the Lebanese parhament 
pass the constitutional reform proposals on August 21, 1990, which was 
stipulated in the agreement. September 23 of the fohowing month, when the 
new constitutional amendment was promulgated, was due to be the start of 
the “Ta’if clock” with regard to the dissolution of militias and the
®® H arris (1996) pp.274-278. /Zisser (2001) p. 141.
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redeployment of the Syrian army to Beqqa. According to the Ta’if Agreement, 
these were timed to occur respectively six months and two years after the 
amendment of the constitution.®^
The government, led by Prime Minister Omar Karami, was named under 
Syrian auspices on December 24. The cabinet had the following items as its 
main agenda, aU mandated by the Ta’if Agreement: to appoint new deputies 
to the parliament so as to make Christian-Muslim representation equal, to 
dissolve müitias at the same time as extending government authority 
throughout the country, and to formahse “special” relations with Syria.®^  
This section will deal with the latter two issues respectively.
In 1991, there remained four powerful Lebanese mihtias: Amal, HizboUah, 
the Druze mUitia under WaUd Jumblatt, and the Maronite Lebanese Forces. 
Though both Lebanese and Syrian governments had common interests in 
dissolving them, the process by which they went about this was largely 
influenced by Syrian strategic calculations. In March, the Defence Minister, 
Michael Murr, ordered the Lebanese army to occupy the headquarters of four 
mihtias, and later ordered aU Lebanese and Palestinian mihtias to disarm by 
the end of AprU 1991. This was seven, not six, months after the “Ta’if clock” 
had been set in motion. The decision meant that the Lebanese army, backed 
by the Syrian army, could use force against any mUitia fading to comply with 
the order. This, however, proved to be unnecessary, as the process of 
disarming Lebanese mihtias was remarkably successfiU.®® “With the Syrian 
army backing a rejuvenated Lebanese army, and with strong international 
support for the dissolution of the mihtias, particularly from the US, few 
mUitias were in any real position to resist.”®^ In a paraUel development, the
®^ MaUa (1994) p.41. /Norton (1991) p. 461. 
®^ Salem (1994b) p.49.
®® Norton (1991) pp.468-469.
®" Najem (2000) p.27.
152
Lebanese army began to deploy its troops throughout the country as an 
additional step in the recovery of the sovereignty and authority of the central 
government.
However, the Lebanese government had to make some concessions to Syria. 
Firstly, the government was forced to allow HizboUah to keep arms in the 
South to support the Syrian aim to keep pressure on Israel mUitarUy though 
it recognised that such treatment would invite Israeh retahation against its 
territory and offer the IDF a pretext to continue stationing itself in the 
southern “security zone”.®® Secondly, the government compromised on the 
surrender of heavy weapons. The Druze mUitia handed over its weapons to 
the Syrian army, and the Lebanese Forces mUitia was aUowed to store heavy 
weapons untU they could he shipped abroad.®®
As for the treatment of Palestinians, the Gulf Crisis and the subsequent 
Gulf War gave the Lebanese and Syrian governments good opportunities to 
remove weapons from refugee camps, which could otherwise become an 
obstacle for both states in their efforts to stabUise the country. At the end of 
January 1991, the remnants of the PLO in the South declared open a second 
front in order to support Saddam Hussein, and actuaUy fired missiles and 
rockets into northern Israel and the “security zone”. As Israel responded 
with shelling and hehcopter attacks, the Lebanese army was forced to act, 
and thus an army brigade went to the South to sUence all guns in the region. 
The Syrian Defence Minister, Mustafa Tlas, who was backed by unanimous 
Lebanese feeling against the Palestinian armed activities there and was well 
aware of the danger caused by such Palestinian behaviour, announced that 
all mUitias, Lebanese and non-Lebanese, had to disarm. This was also 
consistent with the long-standing Syrian pohcy of containing the 
Palestinians. From AprU to July, heavy fighting between the Lebanese army
36 Najem (2000) p.27.
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and the Palestinians continued. However, as the Palestinians found no 
rehable aUy among the Lebanese, their future was clear from the start of 
battle. On July 4, the PLO announced it would hand over medium and heavy 
weapons to the Lebanese authorities.®’
Parallel to the disarmament process, Syria continued to negotiate with 
Lebanon, as the Ta’if Agreement stipulated only the frameworks for their 
relations and left the particulars to be worked out in bilateral agreements. 
The first bilateral agreement concluded in accordance with the Ta’if 
Agreement was the Treaty of Brotherhood, Cooperation, and Coordination, 
which was signed on May 22, 1991, in Damascus. However, reflecting the 
strengthening of Syrian hegemony in Lebanon, which had been brought 
about by Awn’s defeat, by the success of the disarmament of Lebanese 
militias and the PLO, and by the sanction of the international community as 
a result of Syrian participation in the anti-Iraqi coahtion, the treaty clearly 
favoured Syria and placed Lebanon in a disadvantageous position.®® Unlike 
the Ta’if Agreement, it stipulated that the duration and size of the Syrian 
army s redeployment in Lebanon would be decided on the expiration of that 
provision in the Ta’if Agreement, thus making it possible to put off decisions 
on the redeployment of Syrian troops until the last possible moment. Since 
the Syrian pohcy toward Lebanon was mainly prompted by mihtary and 
security interests, the treaty again stipulated that Lebanon should not be a 
source of threat to Syrian security, and should not ahow itself to become a 
base for any force, organisation, or state hostile to Syria. On the other hand, 
the treaty also mentioned that Syria, keen to preserve Lebanon’s security, 
unity, and independence, should not ahow any action that would constitute a
®®Hanf(1993)p.617.
®’ Hanf (1993) pp.620-621.
®® “The overwhelming consensus in hterature deahng with this issue suggest 
that the provisions in the treaty have institutionahsed Syrian dominance of
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threat or danger to Lebanon’s security/® The Syrian security interest was 
further emphasised in the September 1991 Defence and Security Agreement, 
by which Syria soMdified its right to use its mihtary force in Lebanese 
territory and to formaUy prevent any hmits on its behaviour there/®
After the signing of the Treaty of Brotherhood, Cooperation, and 
Coordination, the treaty, particularly its treatment ahout the Syrian army’s 
redeployment, was widely and fiercely criticised, especiaUy by the Christians. 
The Maronite Patriarch Sfeir, comparing it to the May 17 Agreement in 1983 
and the “Tripartite Agreement” in 1985, charged that it was an accord 
between unequal partners and also that it was an imposed trea ty .O th e r 
opponents stated that the treaty would hnk Lebanon too closely with Syria 
and that since Syria was in the stronger position, it merely provided 
legitimacy for Syrian domination of Lebanon. In contrast, advocates of the 
agreement, including President Hrawi, maintained that an aUiance with 
Syria was a rational choice for Lebanon, so as to secure the state from 
regional and international pressure and also to improve its negotiating 
position toward Israel.^® In sum, the treaty stipulated that the Lebanese 
would deal with the Syrians fi*om a disadvantageous position.
3. THE BASIC INTERESTS OF LEBANESE SUB-STATE GROUPS 
AND SYRIA, AND A BRIEF SURVEY OF THEIR RELATIONS
(l) Introduction
the Lebanese political system.” [Najem (2000) p.29.]
®® Thompson (2002) pp.82-83. /As for a text of the treaty, see The Beirut 
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Under indirect Syrian rule, the main suh-State groups in Lebanon—the
Maronites, Sunnis, Shi’ites, and Druzes—have had differing relations with
Syria.'^ These relations have been mainly shaped by the regional dynamics 
of the Middle East, the Syrian stake in Lebanon, and the interests of 
Lebanese sub-state groups. On the one hand, Syria has needed the support of 
sub-state groups to justify its presence in Lebanon, and has struggled to gain 
broad support. However, when behaviour by a sub-state actor has clearly 
been against Syrian interests and beyond its tolerance, Syria has, together 
with its Lebanese allies, clamped down on the group. On the other hand, 
Lebanese sub-state groups, whose power has been inferior to that of the 
dominant Syrians, have nevertheless attempted to use the Syrian presence 
to their advantage. Their behaviour has been mainly determined by power 
struggles in the reconstructed state both between and within groups, and 
also as a result of the self-identity of each group. Although its self-identity 
has determined the basic tendencies of each group, it appears that power 
calculations have had more effect on a group’s relations with Syria.
(2) The Maronites and Syria
The Ta’if Agreement gave Syria an opportunity to neutralise the Maronites 
who had long been an opponent of “Pax-Syriana”, both because of their 
traditional "Lebanon-oriented” identity and their bitter relations with Syria 
during most of the civil war period. The Phalange Party, the Lebanese Forces 
(LF), the Maronite patriarch, and most of the Maronite zuama, which had no
The reason why 1 exclude the Palestinians is mainly that their power in 
Lebanon was weakened by the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon, the PLO’s 
evacuation from Beirut, the " Camps War “ in the late 1980s, and the 
Lebanese army disarming of them in 1991. In effect, Syria did not need take 
into much consideration their presence in implementing its Lebanese policy. 
For the details of their situation, see Peteet (1996) pp.27-30.
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credible external patrons after Israel downgraded its support for them, 
accepted the agreement, while Awn and his supporters rejected it. The 
acceptance of the former groups provided some pohtical legLtimisation for the 
post-Ta’if process, though most of them became disillusioned with it later.^ ® 
The head of the LF, Samir Ja’ja, who had helped the Syrians to oust Awn, 
was a member of the first post-Ta’if government, but was later forced to 
resign. He refused to recognise Syria’s predominant position in Lebanon, and 
was not involved in the successive governments on Syrian terms. Syria may 
weU have calculated that Ja’ja would revert to being an opponent of its rule, 
and his decreased power in the Maronite community gave it an opportunity 
to leave him out. In fact, Ja’ja’s unpopularity among the Maronites, largely 
due to his having aided Syria in topphng Awn and also to his having 
dissolved the LF as a mifitia, which had long been his power base, in 
accordance with Syrian pohcy, led to his electoral defeat in the Phalange 
Party. Afterwards, the Lebanese government, in fine with Syrian wishes, 
declared a ban on the LF in March 1994. Ja’ja was later arrested in April for 
the murder in October 1990 of the National Liberal Party leader Dany 
Chamoun, who had succeeded to the leadership after his father’s death in 
1987 and had taken an anti-Syrian stance, along with Awn, during the “War 
of Liberation”. He was also charged with leading the Zuq bomb incident in 
February 1994, which targeted the Maronites and raised concerns about 
Lebanese stability. Ja’ja denied the charges in both cases.^ ® In addition, 
members of the LF, the pro-Awn movement, and the National Liberal Party 
led by Dory Chamoun, who had succeeded his elder brother after his 
assassination, were detained during the 1990s for plotting against national
Hinnebusch (1998) pp. 148-149.
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security/’
The Maronite Patriarch Nasrallah Sfeir originally supported the Ta’if 
Agreement, and did nothing to stop the collapse of Awn’s power/® However, 
he later expressed resentment of Syrian indirect rule in Lebanon, which had 
made it possible for Damascus to encroach on the Lebanese sovereignty and 
held that the Lebanese regime’s lack of popular legitimacy was a result of the 
election process being set up to favour pro-Syrian candidates. He charged the 
Syrian-supported order with discriminatory treatment of Christians as a 
whole."^ ® Though Sfeir accepted Lebanon’s “privileged relations” with Syria in 
a joint Christian-Mushm working paper on the condition that they would not 
contradict “Lebanese sovereignty^’, he stood out as the only senior Lebanese 
rehgious leader who never visited Damascus through the first half-decade of 
the 1990s.®® His behaviour was mainly based on the traditional Maronite 
“Lebanon-oriented” identity, but his stance, as was manifested in the paper, 
provided a basis for Lebanese acceptance of some Syrian presence in 
Lebanon. The discussion of the Syrian presence was re-activated especiaUy 
after Sfeir’s statement in September 2000 caUing for the redeployment of the i
Syrian army in accordance with the Ta’if Agreement, and was largely 1Jtriggered hoth by the IsraeU evacuation from the “security zone” in May and JIperceived Syrian interference in the parUamentary elections during the J
summer. |
In contrast to Ja’ja, the Phalange leadership, embodied by its chairman 
George Saade and two Arab-leaning ideologists, Karim Pakradouni and 
Joseph Abukhalil, adopted a reaUst poUcy in order to accommodate the 
Syrian presence. They modified their agenda and reconsidered their
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attachment to the party’s “Lebanon-oriented” identity. Indeed, the leadership 
declared its allegiance to the Arab identity of Lebanon in its 1994 annual 
convention. The party also became supportive of the post-Ta’if process and 
praised Syria’s role in Lebanon.®  ^Following Saade’s death in 1998, Mounir 
Haji succeeded to the leadership in 1999 and also aligned with the Syrians. 
During the parliamentary elections in 2000, Haji joined the electoral Hst led 
by the pro-Syrian Interior Minister, Michael Murr, but his failure to win a 
seat seriously undermined his political stature. As a consequence, power 
struggles in the party occurred during 2000 and 2001 between a faction 
wishing to distance itself from Syria and a faction wishing to cooperate with 
Damascus. The leading figure associated with the former trend was Amin 
Jumayiel, who was ironically permitted by Syria to return to Lebanon in 
July 2000, while it was Pakradouni who represented the latter trend. 
Pakradouni was eventually elected as the party president in October 2001, 
and he chose, after calculating that an excess of anti-Syrian activities under 
Syrian indirect rule would strip the Phalange Party and, hy extension, the 
Maronites of pohtical power, to bandwagon with Syria.®^  In addition to the 
new leadership in the Phalange Party, a former LF leader Ehe Hubayka and 
the northern za’im, Suleiman Franjieh, continued to cooperate with Syria. 
Franjieh has been one of the key pillars supporting “Pax-Syriana” in the 
Lebanese government, and indeed has occupied official posts such as health 
minister except for few years. Hubayka, however, was not a rehable chent for 
the Syrians; he had no real power and legitimacy in the Maronite community 
and was assassinated in January 2002.®®
®^ Phares (1995) pp.218-219.
®^ For the details of the power struggle and the process of Pakradouni’s 
election to the party president, see DS, September 1, 3, 18, 20, 21, and 25, 
and October 4, 5, and 22, 2001 and Gambhl (2001-10).
®® January 25, 2002. /Though there are some explanations for his 
assassination such as Israeh or Syrian plots [Gambhl and Endrawos (2002-
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Though Syria succeeded in installing the pro-Syrian Maronite figures, Efias 
Hrawi and Emile Lahoud, to a presidency whose power had decreased but 
was still important as one of the three pillars in the government, Damascus 
failed to construct broad and lasting Maronite support of its rule. This is 
largely attributed to its perceived discrimination toward the community as a 
whole. Among other things, the alleged “forced” and “unjust” electoral 
process in the Maronite districts and the treatment of Ja’ja, who alone stood 
accused of the crime of assassination while it was widely supposed to have 
been committed by many other militia leaders, arguably contributed to the 
negative image surrounding the Syrian presence and its aUies in the 
government and thus to the strong Maronite support for the latest pohtical 
current calling into question the Syrian presence in Lebanon. Even though 
the constitutional reforms Syria had engineered had built disproportionate
representation of the Christians into the system (e.g.50% of seats in the
parhament), Syria worked assiduously to ensure these were its own chents 
and exclude those who were hostile but arguably more representative of 
Maronite (though not Orthodox) opinion. Damascus was always able to find 
many Maronite chents ready to bandwagon (despite their tradition of 
“Lebanese” identity) with the superior power it wielded.
(3) The Sunnis and Syria
As regards the Sunnis, the post-Ta’if regime, which enhanced the power of 
the Sunni prime minister and disbanded the militias (which the Sunnis 
largely lacked), “reversed the deterioration of their position in the civil war 
and gave them a greater access to government than their cohesion or 
numbers warranted.”®^ However, Syria’s supremacy and its aUocation of pro-
1)] , there remains no confirmation about this incident. 
Hinnebusch (1998) p. 152.
160
Syrian figures to the presidency and speakership of parhament have checked 
the power of the prime minister.
Between 1992 and 1998, Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri tried to reconstruct 
Lebanon by using his ties with Saudi Arabia and the West, but the Lebanese 
government was no longer the master of Lebanon. As he tried to act 
“independently” and to balance against Syrian power, especiahy in the 
pohtical and security fields, by generahy counting on the above external ties 
and his popularity among the Lebanese, his moves were largely blocked by 
Syria and its aUies in the government. One example of this was his attempt 
in 1994 to broaden Christian support for his government by including more 
“independent” Christians in the cabinet. The move was contained mainly by 
two pro-Syrian figures in the government, Speaker Nabih Berri and 
President Ehas Hrawi, the latter lacking strong support among the 
Christians owing to his close relations with Syria.®® In contrast, Hariri 
exercised fi*eedom in the economic sphere, even though such affairs were 
connected with Syria. Syrian Vice President Khaddam and Hariri had 
business connections and these ties were not readily manipulated to the sole 
advantage of Syria. For example, the failure of Syria to hberahse its banks 
forced Syrian business to revive its rehance on Lebanese banks.®®
Hariri also pursued power struggles against his communal rivals. As a 
social outsider and nouveau riches of lower-middle-class background, he 
stood apart fi*om Sunni leading families in Beirut and Tripoh. Hariri used his 
wealth and position to extend his patronage network in West Beirut so as to 
compete with Hoss and Sa’eh Salem, where these figures had their own 
constituency. Omar Karami in Tripofi was also his political opponent owing 
to Karami’s close relations with Syria.®’ In effect, these rivals served the
®® Najem (2000) p.224.
®® Hinnebusch (1998) p. 154.
®’ Harris (1996) pp.305-306.
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interests of Syria which generally wished to check Hariri’s power.
Syria also needed a more stable partner in the Sunni religious community 
both to check radical Islamic movements which might spill over to Syria 
itself, and to enhance its legitimacy in Lebanon. As regards the former, 
Syria’s patronage of the moderate Islamic movement, Ahbash, allowed it to 
check opposition from more radical Islamic movements.®® As regards the 
latter, its dependence on the Ahbash had side-efrects. In 1995, the killing of 
its leader, Nizar Halabi, took place, which could be interpreted as part of a 
conspiracy to assassinate Lebanese officials, politicians, and communal 
leaders allied to Damascus.®®
Syrian patronage of the Sunnis, except for Hariri, seemed to be successful. 
During the recent debate about the Syrian presence in Lebanon, Grand 
Mufti Qabaani and Karami made statements which justified its role in 
Lebanon.®® Hoss also supported the Syrian role as a defence against Israeli 
aggression, especially after the eruption of the second intifada, and 
maintained the importance of coordination between Lebanon and Syria as 
neighbouring countries.®^
(4) The Shi’ites and Syria
The Damascus Agreement in January 1989 gave Syria the position as the 
only ultimate arbiter between Amal and HizboUah, two pillars of the Shi’ite 
community, and this role manifested itself particularly in the Lebanese 
parliamentary elections, which wiU be discussed below in Section 4. This 
part focuses mainly on the relations each group has maintained with Syria 
during the post-Ta’if period.
®® Hinnebusch (1998) p. 153.
®® Harris (1996) pp.306-307. September 6, 1995.
®® November 15, 2000 and May 17, 2001.
®^ D SJvly  27,2001. /Conversation with Hoss July 10, 2001.
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Syria, for its part, has needed the support of Amal to smooth its policy in 
Lebanon and to stabilise the Lebanese situation, since Amal, which has 
advocated a pluraHstic and undivided Lebanon (compatible with Syrian 
aims), has incorporated the secular Shi’ite middle class.®^  Amal, on the other 
hand, has had its own reasons to support the Syrian-dominated post-Ta’if 
regime. Firstly, Amal’s pragmatic leader Nabih Berri managed to adapt the 
movement to post-Ta’if politics, and has kept control of the office of speaker 
of parhament, whose power was increased in the Ta’if Agreement. In effect, 
senior party officers, such as Berri and Beydoun, became more interested in 
maintaining their official positions. Secondly, newly estabhshed private 
Shi’ite banks took over from Amal the abihty to capture the capital flows 
from the Shi’ite diaspora, which increased Amal’s dependence on Syria.®® 
Thirdly, HizboUah has been generally more popular than Amal among the 
Shi’ites. This came about because of Amal’s role during the “Camps War”, 
when it sided with Syria against the Palestinians and also because of 
HizboUah’s effective social services, especiaUy toward poor Shi’ites, and its 
vanguard role in the resisteince to Israel in the South.®'* OveraU, the Amal 
leadership’s increased political stakes in the post-Ta’if process and Amal’s 
vulnerable position within the Shi’ite community have contributed to its 
consistent alignment with Syria.
In contrast, Syrian relations with HizboUah have fluctuated. Though their 
damaged relations of the late 1980s were mended by the Damascus 
Agreement, HizboUah was not initLaUy wUling to approve the Syrian- 
supporting Ta’if Agreement. Firstly, HizboUah was concerned the agreement 
would benefit Maronites and Sunnis and create a threat to the status it had
®^ Hinnebusch (1998) p. 152.
®® Picard (2000) p.315.
®^ As for the detaUs of HizboUah’s social activities, see Harik (1994) pp.23-31 
and Picard (2000) pp.315-317.
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gained during the civil war. Since the process of reconstructing the Lebanese 
state required a return to the political power game within governmental 
institutions, the generally low educational level of the Shi’ites had the 
potential to make it difficult to fill the pohtical offices and positions allocated 
to the community with competent members. Secondly, the agreement also 
carried the seeds of a real threat to HizboUah, by caUing for the disarmament 
of the mihtias as its base of power.®®
With Syrian hegemony in Lebanon consohdating, especiaUy after Syria’s 
ahgnment with the USA-led anti-Iraqi coahtion in 1990, HizboUah leaders 
might have calculated that to estabhsh a close aUiance with Syria would 
guarantee to preserve or increase their power. WhUe HizboUah agreed to 
disarmament in Beirut and Beqqa, two main strongholds of the group, its 
armed presence in the South was permitted, since the Israeh-backed South 
Lebanese Army stiU remained armed there. HizboUah, on the other hand, 
was required to coordinate its mihtary operations with Syria to serve Syrian 
regional pohcy, especiaUy toward Israel, in return for gaining Syrian support 
for its role at the head of the Islamic resistance in southern Lebanon.®® Syria 
has also needed HizboUah’s support to stabihse the Lebanese pohtical 
situation, since the movement has incorporated the radicahsed Shi’ite lower 
class, as opposed to Amal.®’
Consequently, HizboUah’s cooperation with the Syrians manifested itself 
clearly in its participation in the Lebanese pohtical system and in its 
concerted mihtary activities in the South. As regards the former dimension, 
HizboUah participated in the 1992 parhamentary elections. The victory 
enlarged its stake in the pohtical system, and started to ahgn HizboUah with 
the Syrian-backed system, though its pohtical power was occasionaUy
Zisser (2001) pp. 139-140. 
Hinnebusch (1998) p. 148. 
Hinnebusch (1998) p. 152.
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contained by the Syrians, especially when quarrels with Amal took place. As 
regards the latter dimension, the progress and stalemate of peace talks 
between Syria and Israel clearly influenced the value of and scope of 
HizboUah’s military activities on which much of its prestige was based. 
When the Israeh government under the Labour Party considered Syria as a 
serious negotiating partner between 1992 and 1996, Syria generally kept its 
mihtary operations in check. However, when the Netanyahu government 
continued to neglect Syria by advocating the “Lebanon First” plan between 
1996 and 1999, Syria encouraged HizboUahs military activities as a means 
of putting pressure on Israel.®®
After the Israeli forces pulled out from Lebanon in May 2000, the movement 
faced the problem of its own raison d’être. Since its legitimacy was partly 
dependent on its armed struggle against the IDF forces in the “security zone”, 
the evacuation might have damaged its power and status. However, even 
after the Israeli withdrawal, Syria has needed a surrogate force to pressure 
Israel to withdraw from the Golan Heights, and thus HizboUah has acted as 
before, under the Syrian pretext that the Shebaa Farms, which Israel has 
considered Syrian territory, is Israeh-occupied Lebanese territory. As this 
pretext has also been favourable for HizboUah, its leadership actuaUy stated 
that it would keep fighting for the Shabaa Farms against Israel.®  ^In addition, 
HizboUahs mihtary activities in Shabaa from late 2000 to the first half of 
2001 were connected with the Palestinian second intifada. After “September 
11”, HizboUah initiaUy continued mUitary operations, but the possibiUty of 
American economic sanctions against Syria soon forced Damascus to limit 
HizboUahs activities.
®® Zisser (2001) pp. 146-147. 
®® DSUsiy 21, 2001.
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(5) The Druzes and Syria
When the civil war ended, the most prominent leader in the Druze 
community, Walid Jumblatt, did not appear to put full confidence in Syria, no 
doubt because of his bitter experiences during the conflict, especially after 
the assassination of his father by Syria and/or its chents and because of the 
confrontation between his forces and Syrian troops during the “Camps War”. 
He has nevertheless managed to cope pragmatically with the Syrians. It was 
necessary for him to do so to secure his pohtical status and thus to survive in 
the community. With Syria consolidating its position in Lebanon after the 
Ta’if Agreement, he sided with Syria against Awn during the “War of 
Liberation”, and later participated in the post-Ta’if pohtical process. In 
addition, the rivalry between Jumblatt and Druze za’im Talal Arslan might 
have forced the former to keep ties to Damascus, which could have thrown its 
support to the latter. At the same time, Syria needed support from Jumblatt 
in order to stabilise the “Pax-Syriana”, since Arslan had close relations with 
the Maronites, who were generally unfavourable to the Syrian presence in 
Lebanon.^®
The close relations between Jumblatt and the Syrians manifested 
themselves in the following ways. In the parHamentary elections of 1992, 
1996, and 2000, the electoral districts in Mount Lebanon were 
gerrymandered to secure the elections of Jumblatt and his ahies.^^ In the 
first Hariri government between 1992 and 1998, he served as the Minister of 
the Displaced and, by keeping this position and offering many houses for the
displaced—among whom there were huge numbers among the Druzes as a 
result of the “Shuf War” — he appeared to present himself as the only reliable
™ For the details of the Druze situation during the first half of 1990s, see 
Harris (1996) pp.307-309.
Gambill and Aoun (2000-8).
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patron of the Druze community.
After Bashar Asad assumed control of Lebanese pohcy from Khaddam in 
1998, Jumblatt was ousted from the cabinet portfoho because of his close 
relations with Khaddam. As a result, he began to criticise the Syrian-backed 
regime and the Syrian presence in Lebanon.^^ Although he temporarily toned 
down his criticism toward President Lahoud, a Syrian chent, during the 
2000 parliamentary elections, he again started to attack Lahoud’s policies, 
labelling them “militarisation” of the Lebanese s t a te .H e  also became one of 
the leading figures to question the Syrian presence in Lebanon by 
responding positively to the Patriarch Sfeir’s statement in September 2000 
and to the public mood in Lebanon, However, he later mended fences with 
Lahoud in the autumn of 2001, with Lahoud gradually recovering his power 
as a result of his attacks against the anti-Syrian movements in the summer.
(6) Brief Summary
In sum, the MusHm groups have generally maintained good relations with 
Syria more than the Maronites. In this point, it seems possible to say that 
the self-identity of each group has guided their actions. However, as clearly 
manifested in the cases of the Phalange Party under pragmatic leadership, 
Hariri, and Jumblatt, their power calculations and own interests have 
sometimes overridden their communal identity.
4. PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS IN 1992, 1996, AND 2000
(1) Introduction
After Syria firmly legitimised its presence in Lebanon on the basis of the 
Treaty of Brotherhood, Cooperation, and Coordination, it has attempted to
Gambill and Nassif (2001-4). 
MEIAugust 31, 2001.
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stabilise the Lebanese political situation under its hegemony. To reahse 
these ends, Syria and its allies in Lebanon, in every parliamentary elections, 
gerrymandered the electoral laws and took an interest in the formation of 
electoral lists. Within these parameters, the Lebanese candidates tried to 
manipulate the Syrians to their benefit. This section will focus on Lebanese- 
Syrian dynamics over electoral issues. '^*
(2) The Issue of the Electoral Laws
In July 1992, the Lebanese parliament passed new electoral laws aiming to 
replace the old ones, which had been in effect since 1960. Though Syrian 
interests were reflected in the issues of deputy numbers and size of electoral 
district, the change in the electoral laws was profitable not only for the 
Syrians but also for some Lebanese candidates, especially pro-Syrian 
political figures. It is thus possible to say that the change in electoral laws 
was an outcome of their shared interests and that it was not solely “imposed” 
by Syria.
The new laws increased the number of deputies from 99 to 128, though the 
Ta’if Agreement had stipulated that the number would be 108, and, on the 
basis of the agreement, divided the number equally between Christians and 
Muslims. One of the main reasons for adopting the higher figures may well 
have been Lebanese and Syrian calculations that stability would result from 
allowing a larger number of politicians into the parliament by including 
older leaders who had assumed power since the pre-civil war period as well 
as younger leaders who had risen to prominence during and after the conflict. 
Nevertheless, the regional distribution of additional seats largely reflected 
Syrian interests. In fact, a number of new deputies were to come from Beqqa
As for the details of results of each election, see the following materials: 
Khazen (1998) for the 1992 elections; Majed and Young (1996) for the 1996
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and North Lebanon, where Syria’s influence was then quite strong because 
of proximity to Syria, and where the Syrian army would remain even in the 
event of a partial withdrawal, as stipulated in the Ta’if Agreement/®
More importantly, the new electoral laws contradicted the Ta’if Agreement 
over the size of constituencies. The agreement stipulated that future 
parliamentary elections would be based on Muhafazat, larger electoral 
districts, of which in Lebanon there were six: North Lebanon, Beirut, Mount 
Lebanon, Beqqa, Nabatiyya, and Sidon. The purpose of adopting Muhafazat 
as electoral constituencies was that since a candidate in one sectarian group 
would have to appeal to another sectarian group in order to win, the system 
would encourage intercommunal alliances, would favour pohticians 
acceptable not only to their own sect but also to members of other sects, and 
would thus become a vital mechanism in preserving national integrity by 
undermining sectarian tendencies.^®
Prior to the 1992 elections, Syrian officials had grown concerned that some 
of their most important allies in Lebanon might lose the elections if they 
were to take place as stipulated in the Ta’if Agreement. Syria’s continued 
intent to influence Lebanon through its allies there, even after the supposed 
redeployment in September, was revealed by the fact that the new electoral 
laws gerrymandered districts in order to secure the election of pro-Syrian 
candidates. In effect, the new laws laid down a mixed system which 
stipulated that Beirut, North Lebanon, and South Lebanon, which was 
created by combining Nabatiyya with Sidon, would vote on the basis of 
Muhafazat, while Mount Lebanon and Beqqa would do so on the basis of 
Qada (plural: Aqda), which were smaller electoral districts. In Mount
elections; and ÆETSeptember 1 and 15, 2000 for the 2000 elections.
Baaklini, Denoeux, and Springborg (1999) pp.97-98. /Hanf (1993) p.625. 
/ilÆÉ7 July 24, 1992.
®^ Baaklini, Denoeux, and Springborg (1999) p.98. /Norton and Schwedler
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Lebanon, the important Syrian ally, Walid Jumblatt, acknowledged that 
given the overwhelming Christian majority who favoured candidates 
ahgning with the family of his Druze rival Arslan, he and his political allies 
would probably be defeated if the region was treated as one single Muhafazat. 
The application of Qada to Mount Lebanon, by narrowing their constituency 
to the predominantly Druze region of Shuf and Aley, actually resulted in not 
only the elections of Jumblatt and his allies but also the victory of EHe 
Hubayka, a Maronite militia leader ahgned with Syria and unpopular among 
the Maronites. Beqqa was also divided into Aqda, to secure the elections of 
powerful pro-Syrian figures such as the President EHas Hrawi and the 
Speaker Hussein Husseini.^^
For North Lebanon, the creation of two constituencies was initially 
proposed: one with a Maronite majority that would make the election of 
Suleiman Franjieh possible and the other with a Sunni majority that would 
give reliable support to Omar Karami. However, this scenario was abolished 
to prevent the possibility of Samir Ja’ja’ being elected and of Franjieh being 
defeated, and thus gave way to the single electoral constituency on the basis 
of Muhafazat. If a two-constituency plan had materialised, Ja’ja could have 
formed a powerful base to challenge Franjieh and other Maronite pohticians, 
notably George Saade.^® The adoption of one constituency seemed to be 
influenced by the calculations of both Franjieh and Syria. Farnjieh secured 
his seat by ahgning with Karami to maintain his pohtical power in northern 
Lebanon. To do this he had to sideline deep-rooted family rivalry with 
Karami. At same time, Syria desperately needed the election of pro-Syrian 
Maronite figures to counteract the strong Maronite opposition to the
(1994) p.50.
Baaklini, Denoeux, and Springborg (1999) p.98. /Hanf (1993) p.628. 
/Norton and Schwedler (1994) pp.50-51.
™ Khazen (1998) pp. 19-20.
170
electoral process.
For South Lebanon, the expanded constituency was adopted for the 
following reasons. Firstly, as the boarder region was a tense and unstable 
Israeh-occupied zone, it might have been considered that elections on the 
basis of a larger constituency would prevent this region from being interfered 
with by Israel and/or its surrogate, the South Lebanese Army. Secondly, 
there was Berri’s insistence that, considering the Shi’ite majority in the 
South, the single constituency would give him more manoeuvrabihty and 
more influence and control and also favour his massive hst of 22 
candidates.^®
As the 1996 parhamentary elections approached, various drafts of the new 
electoral laws were debated in the parhament, as the 1992 laws had been 
issued with the reservation of “for one time only”.®® However, the new 
electoral laws, which won parliamentary approval on July 10, clearly 
reflected the interests of Syria and its allies in the Lebanese government. 
Like the previous laws, the new ones violated the key provisions of the Ta’if 
Agreement and stipulated that the elections in Mount Lebanon would be 
again organised exceptionally on the basis of Qada. The primary objectives of 
gerrymandering in Mount Lebanon was likewise that it became easier for 
the pillars of the government, such as the Minister of the Displaced, Walid 
Jumblatt, the Interior Minister, Michael Murr, the Minister of Hydraulic 
Resources, EUi Hubayka, to retain their seats. The measures to secure 
Jumblatt’s election also may have reflected Prime Minister Hariri’s concern 
that Jumblatt’s defeat would hamper the return of war-displaced Christians 
to Shuf and thus his reconstruction efforts. Another objective was to tame 
the Foreign Minister, Faris Buayz, by securing his seat, since he had openly
Khazen (1998) p.20. /Norton and Schwedler (1994) p.51. 
®® As for the details of drafts, see Salem (1997) p.28.
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opposed the creation of two different types of electoral constituency.®  ^Since 
the Maronites had already expressed their intention to boycott the elections 
before parliamentary approval was given, Syria concerned that his refusal to 
stand would further damage the legitimacy of the elections.®  ^ It seems 
possible that his “opposition” was intended to pressure Syria into 
maintaining his seat by exploiting its concern, considering his close relations 
with Damascus.
The unification of two Muhafazats into one constituency, South Lebanon, 
was also an outside the original plans in the Ta’if Agreement. Although the 
government’s justification for the unification was the same as for previous 
elections, the main reason was that the Speaker Berri demanded the 
combination of two southern districts into one constituency as a means to 
strengthen his power, as in 1992. The main reason why Beirut held one 
constituency was to favour Hariri over Hoss, since the latter stated that the 
adoption of two different criteria in delineating electoral constituencies 
violated legal norms.®®
Since Syria and its allies in the Lebanese government were surprised that 
40 percent of the government-backed candidates lost in the municipal 
elections of 1998, it seems probable, as Gambfil pointed out, that they firmly 
decided to eliminate the possibility of such a defeat in the next 
parhamentary elections.®  ^The new electoral laws, which won parhamentary 
approval in late December 1999, completely reorganised electoral districts 
for the coming 2000 elections so as to secure the victory of pro-governmental 
figures. 14 reorganised constituencies were arrived at by dividing some
®' Harik (1999) p. 145. /METJuly 19, 1996. /Norton (1999) p.44.
®^ MEMJufy 4, 1996.
®® Khazen (2001) p. 47. /MF7 July 19, 1996.
®‘‘ Gambill (1999-12). /For the process and details of municipal elections in
1998, see MEIMsy 22, June 5, and June 19, 1998.
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Muhafazats and combining others.®®
The new laws divided North Lebanon into two districts, particularly in 
order to remove the possibility of candidates of the Lebanese Forces (LF) 
being elected and to ensure the elections of the Agriculture Minister, 
Suleiman Franjieh, and other Syrian alHes. Bcharre, a Lebanese Forces 
stronghold, was combined with the predominant Sunni areas, Akkar and 
Dinniya. Sunni Tripoh was combined with Christian Minyeh, Zghorta, 
Batroun, and Koura, so as to neutralise votes in Tripoli, a stronghold of the 
Sunni Islamist Jama’a Islamiya. Mount Lebanon was divided into four 
different electoral districts, and two of these were based on Qada: the Shuf 
was set to ensure the elections of Walid Jumblatt and his allies, after he had 
tactically reconciled with President Lahoud in order to secure his seat, and 
the Metn district was designed to consolidate support for the Interior 
Minister Michael Murr. In order to reduce the number of seats won by Rafiq 
Hariri, who criticised the Hoss government, Beirut was divided into three 
districts: one for Hariri and the others for Tammam Salam and Hoss, both of 
whom were his political rivals in the Sunni community of Beirut. South 
Lebanon still remained a single constituency, to preserve the electoral power 
of Berri and his allies over rival candidates supported by HizboUah.®®
Against the new laws, Beirut MP, Najah Wakim, tried to submit a petition 
claiming the iUegaUty of the new laws in January 2000, but he failed. 
Though ten signatures by members of parliament were needed, only two of 
them, Nassib Lahoud and Nadim Salem, were wUHng to sign his petition, in 
spite of the fact that 17 deputies had voted against the introduction of new 
laws in December 1999.®^  The decrease of the number who later supported
®® Conversation with Hassan Krayem in the AUB, July 4, 2001. /Quilty
(2000) p.21.
®® GambiU and Aoun (2000-8) /Quilty (2000) pp.21-23.
®" GambiU (2000-2).
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his attempt was partially influenced by his own resentment against the new 
laws, which forced him to run either in Hariri’s district or in Tammam 
Salem’s district, neither of whom had good relations with Wakim.®® More 
importantly however, 15 deputies might have withdrawn their support for 
him to secure their seats. In effect, as one activist in the Lebanese 
Association for Democratic Elections (LADE) pointed out, electoral laws were 
changed before every parhamentary election and gerrymandering occurred 
to ensure the elections of pro-Syrian candidates.®®
(3) The Issue of the Formation of Electoral Lists
The change in electoral laws made the election of pro-Syrian candidates 
theoretically and “legally” possible. However, the electoral process in 
Lebanon, a “hst system” m which each voter casts his or her ballot for 
multiple candidates, required further careful management by Syria. For 
example, of the five seats in the Aley district, two were allocated to the 
Maronites, two to the Druzes, and one to the Greek Orthodox. Voters were 
thus able to choose two Maronite candidates, two Druze candidates, and one 
Greek Orthodox candidate. To secure victory this system encouraged each 
candidate to form a joint hst with other candidate, because, though voters 
were not obhged to cast their votes for a pre-designed slate of candidates, 
they generaUy tended to do so. As a result, Syria was interested in 
influencing the formation of candidate hsts in order to secure the election of 
its pohtical ahies in Lebanon. It thus encouraged them to form a joint hst if 
they ran for election in the same electoral district.®® As GambiU and Aoun 
(2000-8) reported, though Syria intervened in the formation of electoral hsts
®® M gf August 18, 2000.
®® Conversation with Nissrin Mansour (an activist in the Lebanese 
Democratic Association for Democratic Elections), June 26, 2001.
®® GambiU and Aoun (2000-8). /Norton and Schwedler (1994) p.53.
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in many districts, it seemed to pay more attention to southern Lebanon, 
where the rivalry between Amal and HizboUah manifested itself and the 
volatUe situation might be exploited by Israel, For these reasons, the 
foUowing discussion wiU mainly focus on the South.
In the 1992 parhamentary elections, a coahtion hst, which was mainly 
composed of candidates from Amal and HizboUah, as weU as Bahiyya Hariri, 
the sister of Hariri, would not have been drawn up without Syrian influence. 
HizboUah was actuaUy opposed to both Amal and Bahiyya Hariri.®  ^However, 
that they were able to set aside their differences and form a single electoral 
hst was not only because of Syrian influence but also because of their 
wiUingness to join in a tactical and popular aUiance.®^  Amais leader, Berri, 
and Bahiyya Hariri might have calculated that their aUiance with HizboUah 
would become advantageous considering popular support toward the latter 
for its resistance to Israel. At the same time, HizboUah might have 
acknowledged that its aUiance with “moderates” would decrease the aUergy 
to its “radical” image among some voters.
In the elections of 1996, the electoral process in the South was 
characterised by a last-minute aUiance between Berri and HizboUah 
Secretary-General, Hassan NasraUah. InitiaUy, NasraUah had declared to a 
mass raUy of supporters that HizboUah had made a decision to run 
independent Usts of candidates. His action was connected with the increased 
tensions between Amal and HizboUah, with each other accusing the other of 
working against the resurgence of state authority and national institutions. 
This confrontation was further exacerbated by Hariri who stated that the 
battle was between “moderation” and “extremism”. In return, HizboUlah 
accused Hariri of betraying the Arab cause since he aUegedly had contacts 
with the IsraeU Prime Minister Netanyahu; HizboUah also stated its refusal
91 Khazen (1998) p.35. Septem ber 11,1992.
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to join any list that included Bahiyya Hariri, Since the conflict between the 
two groups in a region close to Israel made Syria nervous, NasraUah and 
Berri were summoned by Hafez Asad to Damascus and, after their return, 
they announced their commitment to make a joint hst. However, reflecting 
the Syrian preference toward Amal, HizboUah was on balance a loser in 
South Lebanon. Among the 23 seats aUocated to the district, the party won 
only four seats.®®
What other factors, besides Syrian pressure, influenced HizboUahs initial 
“independent” attitude and its final agreement with Amal? As regards the 
former, the victory in the 1992 elections, where it won 12 seats, and its quick 
and effective care given to the populace in the South after the IsraeU 
reprisals, might have given the leadership ongoing confidence in its 
popularity. As regards the latter, though it seems impossible to neglect 
Syrian influence, HizboUahs experience in Mount Lebanon, where the 
elections had taken place earUer, had more of an effect on its decision to 
cooperate with Amal. From the start of elections in Mount Lebanon, Syria 
had stated that HizboUah should coUaborate indirectly with Hubayka. This 
meant that Hubayka would leave one of the Shi’ite seats in his fist open for 
HizboUahs deputy Ah Ammar, while HizboUah supporters would vote for 
Hubayka’s Ust. HizboUah rejected the arrangement by arguing that it could 
not cooperate with Hubayka, whom it considered to have assumed a major 
role in the massacres of the Palestinians in the Sabra and ShatUa camps 
during the summer of 1982. EventuaUy Ammar joined in a Ust headed by a 
Christian opposition figure, Pierre Daccash, but Ammar was unexpectedly 
defeated. Given the unpopularity of Hubayka among the Christians, his 
defeat raised the question of the vaUdity of electoral process there. However,
Norton and Schwedler (1994) p. 57.
®® Majed and Young (1996) pp.38-41. /MÉ’Af August 21, 22, 28, 29, 30 and 
September 5, 1996. /ÆB7September 20, 1996.
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it also seemed to lead HizboUah to rethink its relation with Syrian-backed 
figures and thus its aUiance with Amal in the next voting session for South 
Lebanon.®^
During the 2000 elections, the joint Ust put up by Amal and HizboUah took 
aU 23 seats in the combined South-Nabatieh district. Syrian pressure in 
forming the joint Ust was clear, since two of its members who had stood as 
independents in the previous 1996 elections, Bahiyya Hariri backed by Amal 
and Mustafa Saad supported by HizboUah, refused to shake hands in 
pubUc.®® However, it seems that HizboUah’s aUiance with Amal from the 
initial phase in the 2000 elections was also influenced by its having learnt 
from previous experience in elections, as weU as by its desire to consoUdate 
power in legal institutions. The IsraeU withdrawal from the South in May 
2000 reinforced this desire.®® In fact, when a violent clash between the 
supporters of Amal and those of HizboUah took place just before the elections, 
the leaderships of both parties quickly acted to mend their fences by issuing 
a joint statement.®^
Even though Syrian influence in the formation of electoral Ust was clear, 
each candidate in southern Lebanon also seemed to have the reason for 
bandwagoning with it. Amal and Bahiyya Hariri, on the one hand, exploited 
HizboUah’s popularity and HizboUah, on the other hand, softened its 
“radical” image. This kind of bandwagoning by Lebanese candidate was also 
seen in other regions. Maronite sources such as GambiU and Aoun (2000-8) 
tended to exaggerate Syria’s role in forming electoral Usts as predominant 
and authoritative, when it resulted from astute poUticking.
In the 1992 and 1996 elections, the two electoral poles in North Lebanon
®^ Majed and Young (1996) pp.28-29. /ME&f August 21, 1996.
®® Gary C. GambiU and Daniel Nassif (2000-9). /MÉ7September 15, 2000. 
®® For the detaU of transformation of HizboUah, see Hamzeh (1993) and 
Usher (1997).
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were Suleiman Franjieh and Omar Karami. Considering their rivalry, it 
would have been usual for each of them to make his own electoral hst. 
However, despite the claim by Karami’s supporters that he was not given the 
right to choose the members of his electoral hst, he cooperated with Franjieh 
to form a single Hst whose aim was to defeat Ja’ja.®® Since Karami had 
resigned as prime minister after his failure to reconstruct the Lebanese 
economy, he might have calculated that cooperation with the Syrians would 
guarantee his seat, even though his status in northern Lebanon was 
downgraded.
In Beirut, after Syrian attempts to persuade Hoss to join with Hariri on the 
electoral hst for the 1996 elections ended in failure as this meant that Hoss 
would be subjected to Hariri in selecting fellow candidates, Hariri still 
managed to persuade one of Hoss’s electoral ahies, Bishara Merhej, to join 
his hst. It was beheved that Merhej was persuaded by Syria to collaborate 
with Hariri so as to punish Hoss.®® However, it seems impossible to deny 
Merhej’s intention to bandwagon, given the unfavourable condition for Hoss. 
In the Shuf, Zaher Khatib, who had not been on good terms with Jumblatt, 
joined the Jumblatt-led hst by using Syrian influence on the Druze chieftain. 
Jumblatt might have been forced to include Khatib on his hst in exchange for 
Syria’s aUowance that the elections would be again held on the basis of a 
Qada.
During the 2000 elections, a bizarre electoral ahiance between HizboUah 
and the Phalange Party was seen in Baabda-Aley district and Baalbeck- 
Hermel district. Though the Syrian strong position in Lebanon might have 
played a role in persuading these opposing groups to form the aUiance, the 
Lebanese groups’ understanding of the circumstances also influenced the
®" SWB3\ùy 18 and July 19, 2000.
®® Khazen (1998) pp.34-35.
®® Majed and Young (1996) p.36.
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outcome. As regards the former district, since ffizboUah seemed to be 
determined not to repeat the defeat of the 1996 elections, a compromise was 
reached whereby a slot on the hst, led by Aley MP Talal Arslan, was left open 
so that Hubayka’s supporters could write in his name.^ ®® As regards the 
latter district, a Phalange candidate Nadir Sukkar joined the hst with 
HizboUah in order to benefit from the Shi’ite majority there.^ ®^
(4) Brief Summary
OveraU, Lebanese candidates tended to bandwagon with Syria so as to 
secure their seats, and over time the number of figures who cooperated with 
Syria increased, reflecting especiaUy the change in Maronite attitudes 
toward the elections. In 1992, many Christian leaders, represented by Sfeir, 
caUed for a boycott of elections untU the Syrian forces redeployed to the 
Beqqa VaUey, since they considered that the Syrian presence would obstruct 
“fair elections”.^ ®^ However, a large number of influential Christian figures 
participated in the 1996 elections, and this trend was further reinforced in 
the 2000 elections. The main reason behind this change of attitude was the 
reaUsation by Christian leaders that the boycott of 1992 had had disastrous 
effects on their community’s pohtical power and had led to the pohtical 
marginahsation of Christians and the weakening of the opposition as a 
whole, while aUowing pro-Ta’if figures to dominate the pohtical field. ^®®
In this respect, a former State Minister, Pierre Helou, pointed out that since 
even one seat in the parhament made the chance of participation in the 
pohtical process possible, it would be better to fight within the institutional
®^® GambiU and Aoun (2000-8). 
®^^ GambiU and Nassif (2000-9).
®^^ Baakhni, Denoeuz, and Springborg (1999) pp.98-99. /Harik (1998) p. 141. 
/Norton and Schwedler (1994) pp.53-54.
®^® Baakhni, Denoeux, and Springborg (1999) pp. 104-105. /Salem (1997) p.28.
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framework/®^ By contrast, Dory Chamoun still opposed participation, on the 
basis that the elections were part of a conspiracy by Syria to take over 
Lebanon/®® In the 2000 elections, the number of people who supported 
Chamoun was very small, and many traditional Christian pohticians who 
had boycotted the previous elections participated in the electoral process. 
Bashar Asad’s promise to the Christian leaders that Damascus would 
restrict the interference of Syrian intelhgence forces also facilitated 
Christian participation. In fact, since these forces stayed their hand during 
the voting process and the final tahying, the 2000 elections took place in a 
fairly hberal atmosphere.^®®
While the Syrian attempt to influence Lebanon by taming deputies and 
incorporating them into the parhament seemed to be successful, it was 
arguably the Lebanese pohticians’ tendency to bandwagon in order to secure 
their seats that had the most far-reaching consequences.
4. THE DYNAMICS OF THE RELATIONS AMONG THE “TROIKA”
(1) Introduction
The Ta’if Agreement did not change the sectarian system in the Lebanese 
pohtical field, but altered the “rules of the game”. In other words, post-Ta’if 
Lebanon stih remains a consociational democracy in its form, though 
adjustments were made to fit the reahty as weU as the lessons derived from 
the civil war. Firstly, the proportion of Mushm to Christian deputies and 
officials became even. Secondly the power of the Maronite president was 
decreased, in favour of the Sunni prime minister and the Shi’ite speaker of
®^^ Conversation with Pierre Helou (a former State Minister), July 11, 2001. 
®^® Conversation with Dory Chamoun (the National Liberal Party leader), 
July 9, 2001.
®^® Conversation with Salim Nasr (General Director of the Lebanese Center 
for Pohcy Studies), June 22, 2001.
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parliament. Thirdly, since compromise among the top three leaders was 
stipulated as essential to make the pohtical process function, the division of 
power among them remained ambiguous. Because of the interrelationship of 
these three figures’ spheres of influence, post-Ta’if pohtics has been given the 
name of “Troika”.
However, this system has not functioned as anticipated in the Ta’if 
Agreement. In reahty, the top leaders have tended to antagonise each other, 
as a result of the differences of interests, tendencies, and positions of the 
sects they represent. Using this mutual antipathy Syria has played one off 
against another to serve its interests. While Syria has been in the dominant 
position in Lebanon, it seems an exaggeration to argue that Syria has fully 
orchestrated Lebanese pohtics. Even though it is true that top leaders have 
usually taken Syria’s opinion into consideration and also made concession to 
Syria, they have more or less tried to use the Syrians for their own ends.
The main focus of this section wih be the periods of government headed by 
Rafiq Hariri, on the grounds that he has been prime minister twice, he has 
occupied the position for a total of about 8 years, and, more importantly he 
has tried to act “independently” of Syria while his counterparts. President 
Ehas Hrawi and his successor Emile Lahoud, and the Speaker of Parhament, 
Nabih Berri, have been fairly dependent on Syria. Before mentioning the 
dynamics of the “Troika” in the two Hariri governments, the pohtical 
situation under pre-Hariri period will be briefly discussed, in order to 
understand the background to his assumption of the premiership.
(2) The Karami and Solh Governments (1990—1992)
On December 24, 1990, the government led by Prime Minister Omar 
Karami was formed to replace the government of Sahm Hoss, who
Hudson (1999) p.27. /Najem (2000) p .213.
181
considered that his government had completed its agenda by passing the 
constitutional reform proposals in August, by ousting General Awn with help 
of the Syrian army in October, and by reunifying Greater Beirut under state 
control in early December. Hoss tendered his resignation on December 19. 
The Karami cabinet, which was the biggest in Lebanese history consisted of 
30 ministers who were pro-Syrians and/or wartime militia leaders, and was 
equally divided between Christians and Mushms. The choice of Omar 
Karami as prime minister could be explained by it being Syria’s preference, 
since his family had maintained close relations with Damascus for a long 
time and his hometown, Tripoh, was weh within the sphere of Syrian 
influence.^ ®® Even though it was apparent that Syria played a key role in 
determining the composition of the government, the inclusion of militia 
leaders such as the LF leader Samir Ja’ja in the government was also a 
necessary step for the Lebanese state, which gave high priority on the 
stabihty of the social order as the basis for the process of economic 
reconstruction.
Concerned about the level of economic devastation and the repercussions 
which had resulted from the long armed struggle, in January 1991, the 
Karami government reactivated the Council for Development and 
Construction (CDR), which had been originally estabhshed in 1977. Though 
the Karami government tried to initiate the reconstruction project, little 
progress was realised. The government’s failure to articulate a consistent 
and clear economic pohcy alongside an over-staffed and inefficient pubhc 
sector, decreased confidence regarding Lebanon’s economic future and thus 
discouraged both domestic and international investors and aid donors. 
Though Karami attained relative stabihty of the social order as a result of 
dissolving mihtias and gathering heavy weapons, which might have had the
®^® A7Ë7 January  11, 1991. /Salem  (1994b) p.49.
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potential to attract foreign funds for economic recovery the economic 
situation continued to be poor/®®
In February 1992, the Central Bank stated that it could no longer draw on 
reserves to protect the value of the Lebanese pound on foreign exchange 
markets. The currency soon experienced a serious fall from 880 to 1200, and 
later 2000, pounds to the dollar. These economic conditions provoked nation­
wide labour strikes led by the Confederation of Trade Unions during the 
spring, and culminated in a violent mass riot on May 6. Worried about public 
grievances, Syria, which had initially asked Karami to stay and had urged 
him to make a serious effort to cope with the economic crisis, now 
endeavoured to replace him. Syria’s decision was also influenced by relations 
among the “Troika”. The government was often beset with internal feuding 
over pohcy and appointments of its members’ chents to pubhc posts. Though 
it indeed offered the Syrians great manoeuvrabihty, the May riot, in part, 
assumed the character of a cross-sectarian opposition against the Karami 
government, which was widely viewed as a surrogate of Damascus, and, by 
extension, against the Syrian presence in Lebanon."® In other words, if 
Karami had remained as a prime minister, the pubhc unrest would have led 
to further criticism of Syrian pohcy and injured Syria’s status in Lebanon.
On May 13, fohowing Karami’s resignation and after discussions in 
Damascus between Asad and Hrawi as weh as Khaddam and Husseini, 
Rashid Solh was named as his successor. The Solh government was 
composed of 24 ministers, although 16 of those continued on from the 
previous government. Considering the composition, Ja’ja stated that the Solh 
government would be doomed to inevitable failure, and indeed it failed to
'®® Najem (2000) pp.30-32.
"® For the details of Lebanese economic crisis and consequent social unrest, 
and the change of Syrian perception, see MÉTMarch 20 and May 15, 1992 
and also SWEMBy 8, 1992.
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stabilise the economy/" Since Syria was adamant that parhamentary 
elections should be held in the summer of 1992 as scheduled, while some 
Lebanese, especiahy Christians, opposed it, the new government was 
incapable of winning enough confidence from foreign investors to improve 
the economy. After the elections were over, Syria had to remedy the economic 
problems which the Karami and Solh governments had failed to resolve in 
order to further consohdate its presence in Lebanon. These circumstances 
limited Syria’s range of choice for the next prime minister and resulted in the 
formation of a government under Rafiq Hariri."^
(3) The First Hariri Government (1992—1998)
Before discussing the relations among the “Troika” under the first Hariri 
government, a brief explanation about the background to his nomination wiU 
be useful in order to understand his actions."®
In addition to the statements by the Western powers that the 
parhamentary elections were not fairly representative and that Syria should 
redeploy its troops to the Beqqa VaUey as stipulated in the Ta’if Agreement, 
the Lebanese domestic situation was not favourable for Damascus. Firstly, 
since the most popular Maronite pohticians boycotted the elections, Syria 
needed to form a popular government which could decrease the power of 
those leaders and increase the legitimacy of post-election politics. Secondly, 
Syria was concerned about the Lebanese economy, whose condition had 
continued to deteriorate during the elections because of uncertainties about 
the future. In mid-September, the Confederation of Trade Unions submitted 
to the government a two-week ultimatum which demanded an improvement 
of the worsening economy or the probabihty of an open-ended strike, and
MEIUsiy 29, 1992. ISWBMsy 13, May 18, and May 19, 1992. 
"" Najem (2000) pp.37-41.
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indeed a general strike took place in mid-October. Thirdly, the business
community in Lebanon, whose cooperation would be essential for Syria to 
improve Lebanon’s miserable economic condition, demanded that Rafiq 
Hariri play an important role in the coming government. Both international 
and domestic conditions unfavourable to Damascus finally led Hrawi to ask 
Hariri to form a new government on October 22, after consultation with the 
Syrian leadership."^
Hariri, a billionaire who enjoyed the support of international society and of 
the majority of Lebanese communities, had enormous potential power to 
make and carry out government poHcies at will. However, security and 
mihtary issues, including the redeployment of Syrian troops and the 
disarming of HizboUah, were to be decided by Damascus and its Lebanese 
aUies, who retained the key non-economic ministries, such as defence, 
foreign affairs, and interior. Also, Hariri’s sphere of influence surrounding 
economic issues, which was to be given free rein, was sometimes curtaUed, 
even though his cabinet included 12 experienced technocrats, mostly his 
close aUies, who were appointed to the economic portfoUos itself and other 
key portfoUos such as industry telecommunications, and agriculture."®
The constraints surrounding Hariri could also be explained by the power 
which each member of the “Troika” assumed. The Ta’if Agreement increased 
the power of the speaker of parhament. Firstly, his term of office was 
extended fi*om one to four years. Secondly, the speaker had the right to 
determine the timetable for the examination of draft laws."® In connection 
with his increased power, the power of parhament iself was also enhanced.
"® For the detaUs of Hariri’s career, see Najem (2000) pp.44-46.
ÆŒ7November 6, 1992. /Najem (2000) pp.43-44, pp. 46-47. /SWBOctober 
15 and October 24, 1992.
"® AffiTNovember 6, 1992. /Najem (1998) pp.26-27. /Najem (2000) pp.48-49. 
//S'lFS November 2, 1992.
185
Firstly, only parliament now had the authority to oust the prime minister, 
while only the president had the right to dismiss him before 1990. Secondly, 
the method under which the cabinet presented urgent laws was changed. 
Though the cabinet was still permitted to declare a particular bill as urgent, 
the parhament now had 40 days from the time it took up the biU, rather than 
40 days from when the cabinet submitted it, to act on the bhl. As a result, the 
parhament assumed the right to determine whether a particular bih was 
urgent or not."^ In addition to these institutional arrangements, the newly- 
elected Speaker, Berri, with strong Syrian backing, had enormous potential 
leverage over Hariri.
In contrast to the status of speaker, the President, Hrawi, was in the 
weakest position among the “Troika”. Arguably, this was influenced by the 
institutionahy decreased power of the president as stipulated in the Ta’if 
Agreement and by Hrawi’s isolation within the Maronite community, most of 
which refused to admit the legitimacy of post-Ta’if pohtics; nevertheless he 
had good relations with Damascus and stih possessed the right to delay 
legislation owing to the fact that ah legislation required the signature of the 
president."® In carrying out his pohcies, Hariri consequently had to bargain 
mainly with the powerful Berri so as to ensure that draft laws would be 
placed on the agenda of relevant parhamentary committees within a 
reasonable amount of time."® Detahed focus wih be made on Hariri’s 
relationship with Berri since the pohtical process during the first Hariri 
term was largely determined by the dynamics of that relationship
Immediately after Hariri completed the composition of his cabinet, Berri 
expressed resentment that he had not been properly consulted over it, and
"® Najem (2000) p.214.
Baakhni, Denoeux, and Springborg (1999) pp.95-96. 
"® Najem (2000) p.215.
"® Bahout (1996) p.28.
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was upset in particular over Harm’s decision to take over the finance 
portfolio for himself, since the ministry was a traditional Shi’ite preserve/^® 
In January 1993, tensions among the “Troika” arose over many high-level 
administrative appointments. Berri and the pro-Syrian Deputy Prime 
Minister, Michael Murr, stopped over in Damascus on the way to Tehran to 
meet President Asad.^^  ^It seems that their intention was to use Asad’s power 
to pressure Hariri into paying more attention to their interests. Though 
Hariri rejected the idea of a cabinet reshuffle, they succeeded in securing the 
position of Director-General at the Ministry of Emigrant Affairs for Haytham 
Jomma, who headed Amal’s executive committee, thus causing concern 
among the predominantly Christian emigrant community. Since Hrawi’s 
power was weakest within the “Troika”, he could not secure the appointment 
of his Christian ally as the post. In the following months, the parliament 
refused to grant the government special powers, specifically rule by decree, 
which Hariri demanded. Though Hariri later tried several times, he faced 
repeated refusal by the parhament.
Though Hariri had to make some concessions in the face of the reinforced 
power of Berri and other pro-Syrian figures, he used the tactic of either 
threatening to resign or actual resignation in order to get his pohd.es 
through. His actions were based on the calculation that he was an 
indispensable figure for Syria, which needed to stabfiise Lebanon to 
legitimise its presence there and also to give a good impression to Saudi 
Arabia and the West in order to attract foreign investment into Syria itself. 
Hariri threatened to resign in August 1993 for the first time, but when he did
^^® Af^/November 6, 1992. /Najem (2000) p.217.
January 16 and January 18, 1993.
^  Najem (2000) p.218. /^IFB January 20, 1993.
123 poy the analysis of both strength and weakness of the parhament, see 
Baakhni, Denoeux, and Springborg (1994) pp. 100-104.
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it again in May 1994, the situation was more serious 
On May 8, Hariri stated that he intended to make changes to his cabinet 
with a view to widening the range of Christian representation in the 
government, and accused certain ministers of being obstructive and of failing 
to perform their tasks adequately. When his wish to reshuffle his cabinet, 
aiming to facilitate his economic recovery process, was blocked by Hrawi and 
Berri (the latter clearly supported by Syria), he suspended his activities as 
PM. As he withdrew his services, the functions of government came to halt 
for a week. While Hrawi wanted his own Christian allies in the government, 
Berri, using this crisis, again demanded a greater Shi’ite role in financial 
affairs. Syria, meanwhile, warned against bringing in Christians who 
opposed its role in Lebanon. However, Hariri’s action caused a serious 
economic crisis, including a drastic fall in the value of the Lebanese pound 
and a rush to buy dollars, a situation that Syria could not ignore. Hariri, 
having succeeded in making Syria reafise how much Lebanese stability 
depended on his existence in the government, went to Damascus and secured 
from his critics the assurance that they would support him and not obstruct 
him as before. While he might have calculated that the wider Christian 
representation in his cabinet would remedy the firustration of their 
maginahsation in the political field, enhance the credibility of his 
government in the eyes of foreign countries, and thus contribute toward 
attracting more foreign investment which was desperately needed for his 
grand vision of economic reconstruction (Horizon 2000), his attempt aimed, 
more importantly, to force Syria to pressure its allies to stop their 
obstructions of his policy by threatening to include Christian opposition
Najem (2000) p.218. /Indeed, it was analysed that the May 1994 case 
“threatened to trigger the most serious political crisis in the country since he 
was appointed prime minister in October 1992.” (AfJSlf May 9, 1994)
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leaders in his cabinet/^® In other words, Hariri emphasised the idea of 
broadening cabinet representation as a means to advance the “Horizon 2000” 
plan.
However, Hariri’s eagerness for the reconstruction plan was not fully 
accommodated by his political opponents, especially Berri. Hariri again 
announced his resignation in December 1994, when the parliament had 
become an obstacle to “Horizon 2000”. In fact, the parhament’s refusal to 
attach the reconstruction plan to the 1995 budget plan in October deeply 
frustrated him. In addition, his eagerness to cut through institutional red 
tape and to get reconstruction bills speedily ratified in the parliament had 
stalled with Berri, who was determined not to have his own role as speaker 
and that of parhament bypassed. At this point, Hariri attempted to reshuffle 
his cabinet by removing his critics. Facing his threat to resign over this issue, 
Syria became more anxious than before to prevent turmoil in Lebanon, 
especially as this coincided with its own focus on the USA-mediated peace 
talks with Israel. Damascus was thus prompt to intervene to defuse the 
crisis as well as to prevent economic recession. A compromise deal was 
hammered out by Syria. The result was that although the fink between 
“Horizon 2000” and the 1995 budget was to be broken, the draft legislation of 
some of the most important projects was to be passed by the parhament, and 
other parts of the plan were to be dealt with in the first half of 1995. Syria 
also promised Hariri again that it would order his critics (its supporters) in 
the cabinet to cooperate with him.^ ^®
It seems that by repeating his threat to resign (August 1993, May 1994, and
125 m EIMslj 27, 1994. May 9, May 10, May 13, and May 16, 1994.
/Najem (2000) p.218. ISWBMsiy 10, May 11, May 12, May 14, May 17, May 
18, and May 19, 1994.
^^^MEI December 16, 1994. /ilTÊAf Decemjber 2, December 5, December 6, 
and December 7, 1994. /Najem (2000) p.219. /^IFB December 3, December 5, 
December 7, and December 10, 1994.
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December 1994) Hariri made Syria recognise his power as well as his 
determination to make economic progress and Damascus indeed pressured 
its Lebanese alhes to support him. However, Hariri's attempt to reshuffle his 
government and to create a more cooperative one was blocked three times by 
Syria and its allies in Lebanon, in particular, Berri. This situation brought 
about his change of tactics, and in May 1995 Hariri actually resigned. In this 
case he had two main aims: to reshuffle the cabinet in his favour and 
advance Hrawi’s attempt to amend the constitution to give himself a second 
presidential term, which Hariri supported, since he preferred a weaker 
president. After Hariri and Berri paid a visit to Damascus, a compromise 
deal was reached.
Hariri managed to compose a more homogeneous second cabinet of 24 
members under him, and to expel his leading critics: the Minister of State for 
Municipal and Rural Affairs, Suleiman Franjieh, the Information Minister, 
Michael Samaha, and the Labour Minister, AbdaUah Amin, who was a senior 
figure of the Lebanese branch of the Syrian Ba’th Party. He succeeded in 
nominating his close associates: Fadl Chalak (Post and Telecommunications) 
and Farid Mecari (Information), and also succeeded in preventing Berri’s 
demand that the financial post should be given to one of his allies.
At the same time, Hrawi and Hariri agreed that any possible amendment of 
the constitution would be postponed for six months. This seemed to be a 
concession to Syria, which feared that disputes over amending the 
constitution could bring about instability in Lebanon, and also to Berri, who 
hoped to become a king-maker in the election of the president. On the whole, 
it appears as if the result was a stalem ate.H ow ever, since Hariri’s top 
pohcy agenda was to carry out his economic recovery plan effectively and
MÊTMay 26, 1995. ISWEM^ay 20, May 22, and May 23, 1995.
128 MEMM-sy 22, May 23, and May 25, 1995. /Najem (2000) pp.219-220. 
MFIMay 26, 1995.
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smoothly, it would be fair to say that he gained more than Berri and his 
opponents did.
The dispute between Hariri and Berri over the Hrawi’s second term 
continued until the autumn and assumed a deeper crisis. Since President 
Asad was intently focused on the peace process between Syria and Israel, he 
could not tolerate being disturbed by any uncertainties, including possible 
instabihty in Lebanon. He also acknowledged Hrawi’s loyalty and obedience 
to Damascus. Under Syrian pressure, the vast majority of parliament 
permitted the extension of Hrawi’s term, although this was against the 
Lebanese will.^ ^^  Berri’s dependence on Damascus and his preference for a 
weaker president on the basis of the same reason with Hariri led to his 
temporary accord with the premier.
The tensions among the "Troika” further deteriorated after the 
parliamentary elections in 1996. It took two weeks for the “Troika” and Syria 
to agree on the formation of a new cabinet, largely because of the dispute 
between Hariri and Berri over the distribution of portfolios. Berri was 
angered that Hariri took for himself the ministers of finance and post and 
telecommunications, that Bassam Sabaa, a Shi’ites with close ties to Hariri, 
was nominated as the minister of information instead of one of Berri’s cHents, 
and that at least 10 ministers among 30 members of the newly-formed third 
cabinet were Hariri’s close allies or supporters of Hariri. Although Hariri 
might have been forced to include the vocal critics in his cabinet, Suleiman 
Franjieh (Health) and Talal Arslan (Expatriates), his strong determination 
to rebuild Lebanon into a regional business centre, clearly apparent in his
130 For the details of this process, see M EM ^vly 14, August 30, September 5, 
September 26, September 28, and September 29, 1995.
October 2, October 11, October 16, October 17, October 19, and 
October 20, 1995. /AfjETNovember 3, 1995. /In fact, one poll of Lebanese 
pubhc opinion showed that most Lebanese (over 70 percent) opposed Hrawi’s 
extension. {MEMM.ay 11, 1995 )
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holding of the above two posts, was further reflected in the overall formation 
of the cabinet/^^
Though Hariri made much progress in reconstruction, the Lebanese public 
was increasingly concerned over such problems as the massive budget deficit 
and the failure to attract long-term private sector investment, which Hariri’s 
economic policy, intentionally or unintentionally, had brought about. He 
tired to reduce the level of pubfic criticism by monopoHsing the Lebanese 
media and by preventing labour unions from striking and demonstrating. 
However, popular frustration began to reach such serious levels in 1998 that 
it began to threaten the post-Ta’if political order itself. Damascus may have 
calculated that its strategy of keeping Hariri in as prime minister would hurt 
its legitimacy in Lebanon. Since Hrawi’s extended presidential term was to 
expire in 1998, Syria took advantage of this opportunity to introduce a new 
element into the “Troika”. Considering Syria’s interest in breaking the 
continuous and long-term discord between Hariri and Berri, in cleaning up 
the corruption which was widely criticised by the Lebanese public, and, 
needless to say, in shifting the pohtical discourse to one more friendly for 
Damascus, the only figure capable of fulfilling these conditions was the 
commander of the Lebanese army. General Emile Lahoud.^^  ^ In October, 
Syria forced the members of parliament to vote on changing Article 49 of the 
Lebanese constitution, which required the senior members of army and 
administration seeking presidency to have retired from their posts at least 
two years before the participation in a presidential election. However, at that 
time Lahoud was popular with the Maronite community and also enjoyed
132 METNovember 22, 1996. /For the details of composition of the Hariri’s 
third cabinet, see E'PFB November 9, 1996.
133 Pqj. details of these both positive and negative aspects, see Najem 
(2000) pp.226-228. Also see October 1, 1997,
Najem (2000) pp.228-231. /For the details of Lahoud’s career in the 
military service, see Venter (1998).
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considerable support from the cross-sectarian community because he was 
perceived as honest and incorruptible. In fact, one prominent exiled leader, 
former President Amin Jumayiel, even stated his support for Lahoud. 
Even though it is true that Lahoud s election was largely determined by 
Syria, it also reflected the desires of the majority of Lebanese. Consequently 
Berri, as speaker, cooperated to pass a constitutional amendment in the 
parhament, though this action injured the authority of the legislature.
“Hariri’s fundamental concern was almost certainly that Lahoud would 
significantly undermine his already eroded power base, and make it much 
more difficult for him to carry out his poHcies.”^^  ^When Hariri expressed his 
hesitation to head a new government under Lahoud, it was interpreted as it 
had been in previous cases, where the threat of resignation had been seen as 
his strategy to strengthen his bargaining position with Syria and its aUies in 
Lebanon over the distributions of ministerial positions. However, taking 
into consideration the following circumstances, Hariri seems to have 
miscalculated. The stalled Lebanese economy and pubhc discontent with 
Hariri’s perceived corruption, as well as deadlock within the “Troika”, ended 
the Syrian leadership’s perception of his indispensabihty to the recovery of 
the Lebanese economy. Furthermore, in 1998, Bashar Asad began to take 
over control of the “Lebanon File” from Abdul Hahm Khaddam, who was a 
key ally of Hariri, and developed ties with Lahoud. In short, his already 
soured relations with both Damascus and Berri, the perception in Syria that 
his premiership was no longer indispensable, and the internal pohtical
AfE/October 16, 1998. / Najem (2000) pp.231-232. /Zisser (2001) p. 142. 
136 MEZif October 28, 1998.
Najem (2000) p.232.
AfEAf November 30, 1998. IMEIno. 589, December 11, 1998, p. 4. 
Najem (2000) p.232.
Blanford (1999) p. 19. /ACEAf February 1, 1999. /Zisser (2000) p. 142 and 
p. 145.
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changes in  Syria, all led H ariri to resign.
(4) The Hoss Government (1998—2000)
Sahm Hoss appointed a cabinet of 16 ministers on December 4. The new 
cabinet was mainly composed of technocrats. No former mihtia leaders were 
given portfoHos and only two pro-Syrian ministers in the outgoing cabinet, 
Michael Murr and Suleiman Franjieh, were r e t a i n e d . I n  other words, it 
seems that while Hoss targeted economic recovery on the basis of his 
experience as an experienced technocrat and acknowledged no need to 
include former militia leaders, he also clearly paid attention to Syria’s 
influence in Lebanon,
Though Hoss was highly respected in Lebanon as capable, honest, and 
principled, the circumstances surrounding his assumption of the 
premiership were unfavourable. Lahoud had replaced Hariri as the 
predominant figure in the “Troika” and Berri still enjoyed strong Syrian 
support. Though Lahoud’s pohtical priority was to clear up the heavy 
corruption in Lebanon, one of the legacies of Hariri’s era, and though Hoss 
was also eager to carry out this task, the anti-corruption campaign, which 
targeted Hariri, was perceived as pohtically partisan. Indeed, the 
campaign particularly targeted officials from the former Hariri government, 
although the judiciary was given a free hand to investigate numerous 
scandals and to bring former high-ranking officials to court and despite 
Hoss’s insistence that there would be no compromise in investigating the 
theft of pubhc funds. One dramatic example was the case of the former Oü 
Minister, Shahi Barsumian, who was arrested in March 1999 on charges of 
misappropriating state funds and of pocketing mühons of doUars through the
ME/December 11, 1998. /For the details of composition, see SWB  
December 7, 1998.
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illegal sale of crude oil owned by the s t a t e T h i s  “selective” approach also 
appHed to the reform of bureaucratic system and state enterprise. A number 
of Hariri’s appointees were purged from the civil service, and it was decided 
that the telephone maintenance enterprise, Orego, which was one of the key 
pillars of Hariri’s patron-chent system, should be hquidated. '^^^
In spite of Hoss’s attempt to bring about economic recovery, Lebanon’s 
reconstruction process received heavy blows. Major companies suffered 
substantial losses and smaller enterprises were reportedly going bankrupt. 
Sohdere, the biggest real estate company in charge of rebuilding central 
Beirut, announced a 30 percent fall in its profits during the previous year.^ "*® 
Hoss was of the opinion that though the Hariri’s economic recovery program 
itself had some positive aspects, his practices had too many drawbacks, 
especially the huge financial deficits and pubfic debts, and thus he himself 
made a five-year reconstruction plan in 1999 which aimed at the reduction of 
pubfic investment. '^*® However, Lebanese business circles had already began 
to criticise his economic policy in general and his anti-corruptive drive 
against Hariri’s allies in particular.*'*  ^ As a result, in August, President 
Lahoud, on the instigation of Damascus, met Hariri, who still carried too 
much personal weight to be excluded.*^ ® Lahoud’s demand for Hariri to 
cooperate in domestic economic affairs reflected the Syrian concern that the 
continued split between the government and the business group led by 
Hariri would further worsen the Lebanese economy and thus spill over to the 
question of its presence in Lebanon. Lahoud’s attempt to win Hariri’s
Najem (2000) pp.233-234.
ATE/Aprfi 9, 1999.144 jt/Ef January 29, 1999.
AfE/May 7, 1999.
Conversation with Salim Hoss (a former Prime Minister), September 10, 
2001.
AfE/May 7, 1999.
AfEfAugust 20, 1999.
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cooperation failed, however. Hariri stiU continued to be a very active figure 
on both the domestic and international scenes, and this became the 
foundation of his second government.*'*®
(5) The Second Hariri Government (2000—)
After the enormous success of candidates afigned with Hariri in the 
parhamentary elections of 2000, Syria made the decision to reinstate him as 
prime minister. This seems to have been influenced by the following factors. 
First of all, the election results showed decreased Lebanese support for the 
Hoss government because of his inability to deal effectively with the stalled 
economic situation and the administrative reform to which he had given 
priority,*®® Secondly, despite Hariri’s enormous spending pohcies that had left 
Lebanon heavily in debt, Damascus may have calculated that Hariri could 
stül attract international confidence and thus draw international aid and 
investment necessary for the Lebanese economy. Thirdly, the risk of bringing 
Hariri back into the government had been considerably reduced, because of 
the change in the power balance among the “Troika”. Because President 
Lahoud consohdated his power more strongly than his predecessor, Syria 
calculated that if Hariri returned to the premiership, he would not be able to 
exercise the same degree of influence as he had done during his previous 
government.*®*
After Damascus stated that it preferred a prime minister who would 
cooperate with Lahoud, Lahoud told Speaker Berri that he would not veto
*^® After the Hoss government was established, Hariri indeed waited for the 
time ripe for his coming back to prime minister, with criticising Hoss’s 
economic policy. (MEfl/March 29 and April 8, 1999. )
*™ Conversation with Fawaz Traboulsi (a professor in the Lebanese 
American University), June 27, 2000.
*®* Conversation with Farid Khazen (a lecturer in the American University of 
Beirut), July 9, 2001.
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any candidate chosen by the deputies for the premiership.*®  ^ Lahoud, 
supported by his close relations with Syria, continued to consult with Hariri 
and finally asked him to form a new cabinet. Hariri, in turn, had to allay 
Lebanese, especially Lahouds, concern that his relations with Lahoud would 
become problematic inside the cabinet, since his wish to be a strong prime 
minister had the potential to cause clashes with Lahoud who wished to be 
the most powerful of the “Troika”. Thus Hariri stressed repeatedly his 
intention to work closely with the president.*®® Before the consultations took 
place between Lahoud and Hariri, Berri had tried to obstruct Hariri’s 
potential premiership by stating that “Lahoud had no favourites”.*®'* 
However, Syria’s urgent need to improve the Lebanese economic situation 
and its confidence in Lahoud’s ability to contain Hariri took precedence over 
Berri’s opposition to Hariri.
Hariri formed his cabinet on October 26. Eight ministers among the 30 
members were his allies, and they also held key portfolios such as finance, 
trade and economy education, information, and justice, while only three 
ministers were obviously staunch allies of Syria: Suleiman Franjieh (Health), 
Najib Miqati (Transport and Public Works), and Karam Karam (Tourism). 
However, Hariri’s demand to have full control over the economic portfolios in 
order to have a free hand in implementing his economic pohcy was not 
realised, and he had to make some compromises with Lahoud and Berri. As 
regards the former, the telecommunications ministry which had been set 
aside for one of Hariri’s firiend, Ghinwa JaUul, was handed over to the 
Maronite mayor of Byblos and Lahoud’s ally, Jean-Louis Qurdahi. As for 
Berri, his clients controlled social affairs, energy and water, and agriculture.
*®^ EE September 11 and September 14, 2000.
*®® EE October 5, October 9, October 16, October 18, October 21, and October 
24, 2000.
*®'* EE September 28, 2000.
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which could be vital for improving Amal’s abüity to dispense patronage in 
the Beqqa and the South.*®®
Hariri’s coordination with Lahoud did not last long. At first, he shared with 
Lahoud the opinion that the time was not ripe for the withdrawal of Syrian 
troops, which had been called for by Maronite Patriarch Sfeir.*®® However, 
Hariri became increasingly opposed to Lahoud and the Syrians. This was 
mainly because the resumption of Hizbollah’s attacks against Israel, which 
began in the autumn of 2000, hurt his economic reform program. Irritated by 
the action, he announced in January 2001 that the exiled Lebanese army 
commander Awn could return to Lebanon at any time.*®^  Despite these 
volatile conditions, he succeeded in securing the renewal of a financial 
deposit from Kuwait.*®® However, his effort in Paris to give a group of foreign 
investors the impression that Lebanon would be safe for investment resulted 
in failure, because of Hizbollah’s military attacks in February 2001.*®® 
Anticipating Syrian containment of Hizbollah’s military activities, he 
temporarily cooled down his criticism of Syria in March by referring to its 
presence in Lebanon as necessary at present.*®® However, he again angered 
the Syrians after HizboUah launched another deadly attack in April.
Hariri’s relations with Berri temporarily improved during the 
parliamentary debate over the 2001 budget in late May, on the basis of their 
mutual antagonism toward the Lahoud-HizboUah coafition brokered by 
Syria. Syria, on the one hand, needed to secure the support of the Lebanese 
president for Hizbollah’s attacks against the Israefi forces in the Shebaa
*®® ME/November 10, 2000. /For the details of composition, see EE October 
27 and EWEOctober 30, 2000.
*®® EPFE November 13, 2000.
157 January 8, 2001.
*®® EIFE January 23, 2001.
*®® Gambill and Abdelnour (2001-7/8).
160 EIFE M arch 30, 2001.
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Farms because of increased Lebanese criticism over the party’s bellicose 
stand after Israel’s withdrawal in May 2000. On the other hand, Lahoud 
needed to counterbalance the popularity of Patriarch Sfeir in the Maronite 
community, which pushed him to rely on Syria and also gave Damascus an 
opportunity to broker an alHance between Lahoud and HizboUah. The 
Lahoud-HizboUah aUiance was seen by Hariri as an embarrassment which 
prevented foreign investors from coming into Lebanon, and by Berri as a 
threat both to strengthen HizboUah’s power and to erode his leadership 
within the Shi’ite community, especiaUy when his patronage system was 
about to coUapse because of layoffs in the civU service and state-run 
enterprises and a shortage of investment capital for the CouncU of the 
South.*®*
Hariri and Berri were also in agreement over security issues. On the third 
day of parhamentary session, Baabda MP and Hariri’s close aUy, Bassan 
Sabaa, accused the security forces of tapping telephone conversations among 
pohticians and between poHticians and journahsts, and provided the detaUs 
of their activities. Berri asked Hariri why legislation regulating wire-taps 
had not been implemented. Hariri responded that aU wire-tapping activity 
was supposed to be authorised by the prime minister and that he had given 
no such authorisation, suggesting Ulegal activities by the security forces. 
Considering that neither Hariri nor Berri was actuaUy threatened by JamU 
Sayyid, Lahoud’s number one aUy and the head of General Security 
Directorate, they seemed to be targeting Lahoud and, by extension, Syria. *®^
However, the aUiance between Hariri and Berri soon deteriorated in mid- 
June over the timing of the budget debate,*®® Furthermore, Berri began to 
distance himself from Hariri, starting after the partial withdrawal of Syrian
*®* AfE/June 15, 2001, 
*®^AfE/Junel5, 2001.
163 E E Ju n e  12, 2001.
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forces in June and becoming clearer after August 7 when the security forces 
started a campaign of arrest that mainly targeted the supporters of Awn and 
the Lebanese Forces, who called for fuU Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon. 
Hariri was upset over the arrests, particularly as they took place while he 
was out of Lebanon. Following the arrests, Lahoud demanded certain 
amendments to the criminal procedures law, which hmited the detention 
period pending investigation to 24 hours and redistributed some of the state 
prosecutor’s prerogatives to the Civil Appeals Court. Though the original law 
had already passed two weeks earlier, despite Lahoud’s objections, the 
parhamentary session on August 13 approved the amendments. The 
amended law extended the period of legal detention before investigation to 
48 hours, and also stipulated that the power to decide whether or not to push 
ahead with a case in the event of a judicial disagreement would be restored 
to the state prosecution, headed by Adnan Addoum who was closely 
connected with General Ghazi Kannaan, the head of Syrian intelhgence in 
Lebanon.*®  ^ The reason why Berri pushed the parhament to pass the 
amendments seems to be that while Berri did not want the power of Lahoud 
and the security apparatus to increase further, he also acknowledged the 
importance of Syria’s presence in Lebanon for himself. This was because his 
influence was fairly damaged by Syria’s partial withdrawal in June and by 
the opposition activities mounted against the Syrian presence during the 
summer. The Syrian withdrawal had the effect of getting back Berri in line 
with Damascus.
While Hariri was forced to sign the amended draft, he received some 
recompense on August 14 for his earher comphance, having several of his 
bills pushed quickly through the parhament, when the speaker accepted 
neither protest nor amendment unless Hariri agreed. The draft on
*®" AfE/August 31, 2001.
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administrative appointments was also retained unamended, as was another 
bill aimed to encourage investment.*®® As Michael Young pointed out, Hariri 
initiated a tactical retreat on political and security matters in order to carry 
out his economic policy.*®®
However, it seems clear that Hariri’s silence over the security issues did not 
mean his complete obedience to Damascus in the pohtical field. Firstly, a 
statement fohowing the weekly cabinet session, chaired not by Lahoud but 
by Hariri (since Lahoud apparently chose to distance himself from 
anticipated cabinet criticism of the security forces), criticised the excesses of 
the security forces in deahng with anti-Syrian demonstrators. Secondly, the 
statement by Bassan Sabaa that democratic systems had became targeted in 
the name of "security” could be interpreted as his speaking for Hariri against 
Lahoud, considering Sabaa’s close relations with the prime minister.*®  ^
Though Hariri initially kept some bargaining power, the balance of power 
among the "Troika” shifted further against Hariri, in favour of Lahoud. In 
late August, Lahoud proposed the use of economic experts to monitor the 
process of privatising state-owned enterprises. Hariri criticised this further 
expansion of presidential prerogative into the economic sphere and asked for 
mediation fi'om Damascus. However, Hariri was being pressed to allow more 
presidential input in the country’s economic reform process, and this brought 
about Lahoud’s return to cabinet meetings for the first time in weeks.*®® 
Understanding Hariri’s weak position in Damascus, Berri continued to keep 
a distance from the prime minister after August, and even became opposed 
to him. In December, the contest between the two was intensified over civil 
service appointments, in particular a chairman to the National Social
*®® ATE/August 31, 2001. 
*®® EE August 18, 2001.
*®'* EE August 17, 2001.
*®® EE August 29, August 30, and August 31, 2001. /ATE/September 14, 2001.
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Security Fund (NSSF), and the 2002 budget,*®® With Syrian blessing, Berri 
continued his confrontation with Hariri.*™ The Syrian decision to support 
Berri was, firstly, based on his having readily made concessions to Hariri in 
the appointment process. In fact, Berri’s brother was forced to resign as 
vice-president of the Council for Development and Reconstruction (CDR). 
Secondly, both Berri and Syria took a common stand to postpone the Arab 
summit of Beirut in March. Berri, on the one hand, did not want Libyan 
leader Muammar Qadhafi, whom he considered responsible for the 
disappearance of Amal’s founder Musa Sadr, to come to Lebanon. On the 
other hand, Syria feared that this summit would be subjected to US pressure, 
which might force Arab leaders to agree to the containment of Hizbollah’s 
military activities.*^*
In reference to the struggle between himself and Berri, Hariri showed no 
inclination to make concessions, on the basis that his position as prime 
minister should accord him a free hand in economic pohcies and 
consequently that the NSSF should be integral to his pohcy agenda. 
However, Syrian pressure worked to Hariri’s disadvantage. *™ In February, 
Hariri gave supportive words to the role of the Council for the South, which 
seemingly ended his efforts to reduce its ahocations in the 2002 budget. In 
addition, Hariri’s parhamentary bloc stated that the Council for the South 
and the Central Fund for the Displaced, both dominated by Berri’s aUies, 
sthl played key roles in reconstruction and would not be denied funding. By 
supporting Berri, Hariri may have hoped to secure the weakening of Bferri’s 
opposition to the forthcoming Arab summit in Beirut. Securing his patronage 
interests from Hariri, Berri announced the implementation of the 1997
*®® EE December 15, 2001. /December 21, 2001.
*™ EE December 27 and December 31, 2001, and January 3, 2002. 
*"* ME /January 11, 2002.
*™ EE January 4, 2002. /ME/January 11, 2002.
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revival plan, which had been ratified in October 1997 by Hrawi, Hariri, and 
himself, and which required a reduction in the country’s considerable 
expenditures in the security fields, in spite of the fact that raising this plan 
was seen as "taboo” under Lahoud’s mandate.*™ In March, under the growing 
economic crisis but in opposition to Lahoud, both Hariri and Berri demanded 
a cutback on security spending.*™
(6) Brief Summary
Overall, each member of the “Troika” has, more or less, exploited the 
Syrians to his advantage, either to reafise his pohtical preference or to 
strengthen his pohtical power in Lebanon by aiming to contain his rivals and 
to extend his patronage network. However, for each of them, sometimes 
Syrian interest was given priority over Lebanese interests, especiahy when 
Syria’s security affairs were involved.
6. THE DYNAMICS OF HIZBOLLAH’S ACTIVITIES IN SOUTHERN
LEBANON AND THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS
(1) Introduction
Under Syrian indirect rule, the Lebanese government has been torn 
between its desire for reconstruction and the mihtary activities of the 
Syrian-backed Hizbohah in southern Lebanon. Though both Lebanon and 
Syria have had common interests, such as the fuh Israeh withdrawal from 
the “security zone”, they have also had clear differences. The reconstruction- 
oriented Lebanese government under Hariri, on the one hand, has wished to 
calm the region and go ahead with the Middle East peace process with the 
aim of facilitating international aid and investment, while the Asad regime
173
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of Syria, on the other hand, has kept the heat in the South for its own 
interests, specifically the recovery of the Golan Heights. Therefore, they have 
tended to take different views toward the issues of HizboUah and the peace 
process, though some pro-Syrian figures in Lebanon, especiaUy Lahoud, have 
consistently supported the Syrian stance. The dynamics between Hariri and 
Asad over the above issues wUl be focused on in this section.
(2) The “Operation AccountabiUty” and its Result
After two years of relative peace in the South because of the fierce battle 
between Amal and HizboUah, the latter began in 1991 to engage in the 
conflict over the “security zone”. Beginning in November, after the Arab- 
IsraeU peace conference in Madrid, a series of roadside bombs kUled 
sometimes as many as five Israeh soldiers at once.*™ The effectiveness of the 
“security zone” for Israel was soon diminished by HizboUah’s activities since 
its chent South Lebanese Army, recruited by a combination of material 
incentives and conscription, had no high motivation to fight against 
HizboUah. The Israeh response was periodic sweeps, air raids, and artUlery 
bombardment north of the zone, so as to break up concentrations of fighters 
and deter Lebanese vUlagers from harbouring the group. However, since the 
members of HizboUah were mainly from the local populace and since the 
organisation enjoyed local support, as a result of its care in providing rehef 
and rebuUding destroyed houses, Israel was unable to prevent HizboUah 
firom infiltrating viUages north of the zone.*™
Israel thus became increasingly firustrated, and the conflict escalated into a 
major crisis on February 16, 1992, when Israel assassinated HizboUah leader 
Abbas Musawi and his famUy in Jibshit in southern Lebanon. HizboUah
*™ Harris (1996) pp.315-316.
*™ Ehteshami and Hinnebusch (1997) p. 148. /Hinnebusch (1998) p. 156.
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reacted with rocket strikes into northern Israel. The exchange of fire 
between HizboUah and the Israefi forces continued, and the additional 
Israefi deployment in the “security zone” threatened to bring about a full- 
scale invasion into Lebanon. In reaction, Syrian President Asad contacted 
the leadership in Iran and the Lebanese President, Hrawi. A meeting was 
convened in Sidon with Syrian and Lebanese army officers and 
representatives of HizboUah and Amal attending. Syria was partly 
motivated by the fact that the Lebanese were beginning to question why 
Damascus was doing nothing, neither restraining HizboUah nor giving it 
military support, despite the critical situation.*™
On February 22, HizboUah, in agreement with Lebanon, Syria, and Israel, 
pledged not to attack targets inside Israel and to confine itself to those in the 
“security zone”. It kept the promise for several months. On May 26, after 
Israefi air raids had killed over 20 Lebanese civilians, the Lebanese 
parliament stated that it supported the liberation of southern Lebanon firom 
Israel by any means.*™ At the same time, the newly-formed SoUi government 
was discussing its draft of the policy statement, and a number of ministers 
stressed that the policy statement should not contain absolute support for 
the resistance and should confine the resistance to the South.*®® On May 28, 
the policy statement, which was also in fine with the stance adopted by the 
parliament, was finaUy announced.*®* It appears that the Lebanese 
government hoped to limit further damage to the staUed economy by 
restricting the resistance activities to the South, since Israel had twice 
bombed HizboUah’s position in the Beqqa. *®^
*™ Harris (1996) p.316. /Ehteshami and Hinnebusch (1997) pp. 148-149. 
*™ ME/March 6, 1992.
*™ ME/May 29, 1992.
*®® SWBM.ay 25, 1992.
*®* M E /June 12, 1992. !SWBM.ay 30, 1992.
*®2 M E /June 12, 1992.
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After the summer lull in 1992, the conflict between HizboUah and the 
Israeh army revived, and culminated in the summer of 1993.*®® Given the 
stalemate of Syrian-lsraeU peace negotiations, Israel initiated massive
artUlery and aerial bombardment—"Operation AccountabUity”—on July 25,
aiming to destabUise the Lebanese regime by targeting Shi’ite towns and 
viUages in southern Lebanon. Israel hoped that the complete disruption of 
civUian Ufe would generate pressure on the Hariri government and, by 
extension, the Syrian regime, and thus would force them to curb HizboUah’s 
activities. Indeed, 300, 000 people fled to Beirut, with 128 dead in 
Lebanon.*®^
Instead of bowing to IsraeU pressure, the Lebanese government pursued 
the foUowing tactical pohcies. Firstly, Hariri made diplomatic efforts, mainly 
in Europe, to end the conflict, since the United States had persuaded 
Lebanon not to bring the issues to the Security CouncU, on the basis that a 
bitter debate might prevent Secretary of State Warren Christopher’s 
forthcoming visit to the Middle East aimed at restarting the staUed peace 
negotiations. Secondly, the government launched its first organised 
compensation program to assist the displaced people who had escaped firom 
the South, though the program feU short of satisfying the populace. Thirdly, 
the government made no attempt to discourage HizboUah’s shelling into the 
GaUUe. In fact, no cabinet member openly demanded restrictions on 
HizboUah’s activities during the hostUities. Fourthly, however, there were 
neither spontaneous nor government-organised demonstrations of soUdarity. 
When HizboUah tried to mobUise a raUy in Beirut, the government refused it 
a hcense. Therefore, since the government tacitly showed its sympathy 
toward, albeit within Umits, HizboUah, "Operation AccountabUity” faded to
*®® For the detaUs of both Israel and HizboUah activities up to the summer, 
see Ehteshami and Hinnebusch (1997) p. 149.
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exploit state-resistance hostilities in Lebanon.*®®
Meanwhile, Asad hoped for American mediation in the stalled Israeh- 
Syrian negotiations, and because of this he maintained restraint in the face 
of Israeh attacks on Syrian positions. Furthermore, he pressured HizboUah 
into ending the rocket attacks on Israel, forced the organisation to withdraw 
its heavy weapons and rockets into the Beqqa, and cut off further suppUes of 
rockets from Iran. On July 31, Israel accepted the cease-fire brokered by the 
USA with Syrian cooperation. The arrangement was that Israel would 
refrain from attacking civUian targets in Lebanon whUe HizboUah would 
focus its activities on the "security zone”. In addition, it was agreed that a 
token Lebanese army presence was to be deployed in the South, which Israel 
anticipated would help stabilise the region.*®® Since the agreement gave the 
Hariri government some hope of being able to facUitate the reconstruction 
program by recovering, though nominaUy Lebanese sovereignty over 
southern Lebanon, Hariri himself was probably satisfied with it.
However, this hope soon disappeared, since the size and role of the army 
which were initiaUy agreed with the UNIFIL, were reduced after strong 
opposition from Syria. In fact, several weeks after the deployment, the token 
force was stiU keeping a low profile, some distance from the IsraeU Unes.*®^  
This enabled Syria both to heat up and cool down activities by HizboUah to 
suit its own strategy and to show Israel that security in Israel would depend 
on a peace accord with Syria. In November, HizboUah launched a series of 
coordinated attacks on IsraeU and South Lebanese Army bases in the 
"security zone”, which was the biggest bUtz since the signing of the Oslo 
Accord in September. The IsraeU charge that it was ordered by Syria to
*®'* Harris (1996) pp.316-317. /Rabinovich (1998) pp. 102-103. 
*®® Harik (1997) pp.255-256. /AfE/August 6, 1993.
*®® Ehteshami and Hinnebusch (1997) p. 150.
*®" AfE/August 28, 1993.
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express its grievance toward the accord seems vahd, considering that the 
HizboUah attacks were accompanied by escalated Syrian verbal attacks, 
especiaUy that of Vice President Khaddam, on Arafat and the Oslo Accord.™®
(3) The “Grapes of Wrath” and its Result
After “Operation AccountabUity”, HizboUah’s mUitary activities were 
generaUy confined to the “security zone” and this situation lasted with some 
exceptions for nearly three years, since the Labour government in Israel in
general paid attention to the main Syrian interest—the recovery of the
Golan—in the IsraeU-Syrian peace negotiations. However, as the hope for a
breakthrough dwindled, the tensions in the boarder areas, which had 
already increased since March 1996, finaUy led to “Operation Grapes of 
Wrath” on AprU 11.*®® Israel’s massive military operation against suspected 
HizboUah targets in southern Lebanon and Beirut had a clear message; to 
pressure the Lebanese and Syrian governments into curbing HizboUah. The 
intense bombardment from land, sea, and air, resulting in many civUian 
causaUties and a huge refugee problem, also appeared to have the intention 
of damaging the Lebanese economy. The fact that an IsraeU heUcopter 
rocketed a power station in a Christian area could be interpreted as a serious 
blow to investor confidence in Lebanon’s stabUity to the reconstruction 
process. In sum, the thorny issue of the South and disarming HizboUah 
again presented a dUemma for the Hariri government which had always 
given priority to economic revival.*®®
The Lebanese government kept up its support for HizboUah even before
*®® ATEAf November 16, 1993. November 17, 1993.
*®® Harik (1997) pp.256-257. /Jaber (1997) pp.173-176. /For the detaUs of 
escalation process, see chronology in AfE/AprU 26, 1996.
*®® Trendle (1996) pp.5-6. /Jaber (1997) pp. 177-192.
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Israel launched “Operation Grapes of Wrath”. Foreign Minister Faris 
Buwayz stated that the resistance would continue until Lebanon regained 
sovereignty over the “security zone”, and rejected the demands by Israel and 
the USA that the Lebanese government should order its army to take action 
against HizboUah.*®* As soon as the massive operation erupted, Hariri 
energeticaUy visited regional and European capitals, using his personal and 
professional contacts to push for an early end to the conflict. His diplomatic 
activities were initiaUy successful since he secured both a high-level French 
initiative which demanded that Israel adhere to UN Security CouncU 
Resolution 425 and withdraw from Lebanon as he insisted, and also 
international emergency aid. In addition, President Hrawi delivered a 
complaint to the UN Security CouncU about the IsraeU attacks.*®  ^ Their 
actions were probably undertaken with Syrian permission, because they had 
been in close contact with Asad since the outbreak of “Operation Grapes of 
Wrath”.*®® At the same time, there was considerable cross-sectarian 
soUdarity with HizboUah in Lebanon.*®'*
Though the Lebanese government was active on the international scene, it 
was the IsraeU attack on the UN base at Qana on AprU 18 that was a turning 
point for Lebanese diplomatic manoeuvrabUity. After the Qana massacre, 
Washington reaUsed that a cease-fire between HizboUah and Israel could not 
be worked out without Syrian intervention. Asad, who only a month earUer 
had been hopelessly isolated in the anti-terrorism summit at Sharm Sheikh 
in Egypt, got a chance to bring himself back into the centre of diplomatic
*®* ME/AprU 12, 1996.
*®^ Salem (1996) pp. 75-76. /For the detaUs of Harm’s contacts, especiaUy see 
SWBAprû 18, 1996.*93 Pqj, examples, Hariri met Asad in Damascus on AprU 13, and Hrawi 
received a telephone caU firom the Syrian president on AprU 11. (EPFHAprU 
13, and AprU 15, 1996.)
*®^* ME/AprU 26, 1996. /Salem (1996) pp.76-77.
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efforts to bring about a cease-fire.*®® As a result of the USAs refusal to 
negotiate directly with Lebanon, he became a proxy for Hariri in talks with 
US Secretary of State Warren Christopher. Though Asad conferred closely 
and continuously with Hariri and Berri (who shuttled between Damascus 
and Beirut not to be overshadowed by his rival, HizboUah), once negotiations 
got under way, this USA stance sidelined Lebanon.*®®
However, the outcome of negotiations seems to have been reasonable for the 
Lebanese government, though its caU for the implementation of UN 
Resolution 425 was not acceded to. The reaffirmation of the 1993 agreement 
had merit for the government since the armed conflict would be confined to 
the “security zone”. More importantly, the Lebanese state acquired equal 
membership status on a cease-fire committee which included representatives 
of France, the USA, Syria, and Israel. In fact, this arrangement was 
headUned by the Beirut mass media as a breakthrough for Lebanon, which 
gained it international credibUity.*®^  Lebanon’s position of equaUty on the 
committee could be interpreted as a result of Hariri’s close relations with 
France, contributing to the upgrading of Lebanon’s status which had been 
injured by the USA refusal to make contact with Lebanon.
(4) The “Lebanon First” Plan and the Lebanese Reaction
The “Lebanon First” plan, which was vigorously proposed by the Netanyahu 
government and which envisioned the possibUity of IsraeU unUateral 
withdrawal from southern Lebanon in exchange for security guarantees by 
Lebanon for northern Israel, seems to have, in some parts, been inspired by 
Hariri’s earUer behaviour. Early in his tenure as prime minister, Hariri had 
outhned conditions for negotiations with Israel. In February 1993, he stated
*®® Jaber (1997) pp. 193-194. 
*®® ME/AprU 26, 1996.
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his readiness for an agreement with Israel based on UN Security Council 
Resolution 425, which called for the Israeh withdrawal from the occupied 
Lebanese territories, although denying that he was ready for a peace treaty 
with Israel.*®® He might have calculated that his statement would have some 
appeal for Israel, since the negotiations between Syria and Israel were at a 
stalemate at that time.*®® Though he cautiously denied the possibihty of a 
peace agreement and only demanded the Israeli withdrawal, the move 
toward a possible agreement could have the potential of decreasing the 
legitimacy of the Syrian mihtary presence in Lebanon and its backing of 
HizboUah’s mihtary activities in the South, thus weakening the Syrian 
negotiation position toward Israel. In fact, Hariri’s “independent” action did 
not survive the spring and by October 1993 he announced a total 
coordination with Syria over his regional pohcy.^ ®®
This trend was manifested in the Geneva summit in January 1994, when 
Asad made Lebanon a focus of his agenda in his meeting with Chnton. 
Though this meant Syrian consohdation of its hold on Lebanon, Hariri 
expressed, along with other ministers such as those of foreign affairs, 
defence, and information, his government’s satisfaction with and 
appreciation of the Syrian stance.™* Later, he stated in London that Lebanon 
and Syria agreed on rejecting the idea of separate peace deals with Israel.™^
In July 1996, the newly-elected IsraeU Prime Minister, Netanyahu, 
launched the “Lebanon First” plan, largely pressured by the IsraeU army, 
which had already begun to question the utiUty of its position in the
*®" Harik (1997) p.261. /ME/May 10, 1996.
*®® ElFEFebruary 13, 1993.
*®® In fact, the Israeli Foreign Minister Simon Peres asked the US Secretary 
of State Warren Christopher to pressure Syria in order to reactivate the 
peace process. (EPIE February 18, 1993.)
™® Norton (1997) p. 10.
™* ME4f January 17, 1994. /EIFF January 18 and January 19, 1994.
MEM January 26, 1994. /EUE January 27, 1994.
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“security zone”, especially after “Grapes of Wrath”. He suggested the idea of 
an Israeh withdrawal from the zone in return for appropriate security 
arrangements, the most important of which was to dismantle HizboUah and 
to send the Lebanese army there. Israel saw a number of merits in this 
proposal. Firstly, it might reUeve the pressure on Israel from the USA to 
make concessions in other tracks of the Middle East peace process, especiaUy 
in the remaining territories of the West Bank. Secondly, by leaving southern 
Lebanon, Israel could eliminate the Syrian tramp card in the negotiations 
over the Golan Heights. Thirdly a Lebanese-IsraeU arrangement could serve 
as the basis for dialogue between Israel and Syria in the future.™®
Syria objected to Netanyahu’s proposal by stressing that Damascus should 
maintain its central role in the South and that Netanyahu was trying to 
separate the Syrian and Lebanese tracks.™'* Fearing loss of leverage over the 
return of the Golan Heights and anticipating pressures to withdraw its 
forces from Lebanon after Israel puUed out, Syria signaUed to the Lebanese 
government that it should reject the IsraeU proposal and instead repeat the 
insistence on unconditional IsraeU withdrawal as demanded by UN 
Resolution 425.™® FoUowing the assertion by the Foreign Minister, Faris 
Buwayz, that the IsraeU offer was vague, Hariri emphasised that Lebanon 
had not been notified of the “Lebanon First” proposal and noted that aU that 
had been heard was from the newspapers.^®® There were possible reasons 
why he did not make a more expUcit statement on the proposal. Under fiierce 
opposition to the proposal not only from HizboUah but also even from 
moderate Amal,™  ^he seems both to have hoped to avoid causing turmoU in
™® Norton (1997) p. 12. /Zisser (2001) p. 146.
™'* EUE July 29, 1996 and July 30, 1996.
™® MaUk (1997) pp.94-95.
™® EUE July 29, 1996 and August 3, 1996.
™^ Berri stated that the proposal was aimed at waging a cold war, and 
NasraUah not only rejected the proposal but also ruled out any
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Lebanon, where the parhamentary elections were supposed to take place in 
the summer, and also to have calculated that if he dismissed the Israeh offer 
exphcitly, Lebanon would not in the future attract enough foreign 
investment, which was essential for his economic recovery project.
However, Syria was not satisfied with his attitude, and when Hariri visited 
Washington in December 1996 in a bid to secure the aid that was promised 
as compensation for the “Grapes of Wrath” operation, Syria opposed his visit 
on the grounds that closer ties between Washington and Hariri would lessen 
Syrian power in Lebanon.™® This Syrian suspicion continued till the next 
year. When Hariri visited Paris in mid-February 1997, it was reported that 
France might play a key role in southern Lebanon by sending troops and also 
that Lebanon was contemplating a separate accord with Israel. Hariri, 
aware of Syrian sensitivities, denied these reports, and French President 
Chirac telephoned Asad to reassure him that both France and Lebanon 
would oppose the Israeh demand to separate the Lebanon-lsrael track from 
the Syria-lsrael track within the peace process.™®
In January 1998, Israel announced its readiness to comply with Resolution 
425, if Lebanon would take steps to guarantee security on the Lebanese- 
Israeh border. As the Israeh Defence Minister, Yitzhaq Mordehay, had said 
that Lebanon was interested in a security arrangement with Israel, the four 
Lebanese leaders, President Hrawi, Prime Minister Hariri, Speaker Berri, 
and Foreign Minister Buwayz, told French Foreign Minister Hubert Vedrine 
that if Israel withdrew its forces unilaterahy from Lebanon, the Lebanese 
army would deploy in the South.^™ While this episode shows that even
arrangements with Israel. (EUE July 30, 1996 and July 31, 1996.)
™® MEMDecember 16 and December 17, 1996. /Najem (2000) p.225.1SWB 
December 18, 1996.
™® Najem (2000) pp.225-226. /EU EFebruary 11, February 13, and February 
14, 1997.
^*®_.ME/January 16, 1998. /EUE January 16 January 17, 1998.
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Syria’s allies in the Lebanese government supported the idea of Israeh 
unilateral withdrawal based on Resolution 425 along with security 
requirements, Syria rejected this proposal as usual and stated that the 
Israeh withdrawal should be unconditional, as demanded by Resolution 425. 
However, its main concern was, as before, that the Israeli plan would 
diminish the legitimacy of Hizbohah, which was an important tool to 
pressure Israel.®** In other words, Syria needed Israel to stay in Lebanon 
until the final resolution of the Golan Heights issue, while Lebanese state 
officials might have calculated that the deployment of the army would 
diminish Hizbohah’s popularity in the South, where it largely overshadowed 
that of the government, and improve the investment chmate in Lebanon.
In conclusion, the above two Israeli attempts in July 1996 and January 
1998 to withdraw unilaterahy fi'om the “security zone” resulted in fahure 
because of consistent Syrian opposition, though the Lebanese officials had 
been, more or less, interested in the “Lebanon First” plan. Nonetheless, 
Israel’s fuh withdrawal from Lebanon was proposed in the Knesset elections 
in May 1999, when Ehud Barak stated, in view of the increasing casualties 
to its army in southern Lebanon, that the withdrawal could be reahsed 
within one year. He reiterated this commitment after taking office, and the 
fuh withdrawal indeed occurred on May 24, 2000.®*®
(5) The “Shabaa Farms” Claim and “September 11”
The Israeh withdrawal fi’om southern Lebanon placed Syria in a difficult 
position. The newly-elected President, Bashar Asad, on the one hand, hoped 
to keep the IsraeH-Lebanese border calm and to prevent Israel from being
®** Hajjar (1999) p. 124.
®*® Zisser (2001) p. 146. /For the detahs of the situations in southern Lebanon 
during the period just before the Israefi withdrawal, see Baktiari and Norton 
(2000).
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provoked by a deliberate or unauthorised HizboUah attack. Although he 
dispatched Syrian intelligence officers to the South under the guise of 
preventing HizboUah retaliation against the members and families of the 
former South Lebanese Army who had coUaborated with Israel, the main 
aim was to watch HizboUah’s activities in the border area. Since Israel 
showed its respect for international obligations to the world by saying that 
its withdrawal was performed on the basis of Security Council Resolution 
425, Syria also needed to present a peaceful stance to the international 
community.^^^
On the other hand, since the Israeli withdrawal stripped Syria of its 
justification for unprovoked attacks against Israeli forces, Syria had 
desperately to seek to preserve a pretext for sponsoring HizboUah’s miUtary 
attacks against Israel, and later stated that the Shabaa Farms represented a 
stUI-occupied Lebanese territory. ReaUsing that Syria stUl needed 
HizboUah’s guerrUIa war to pressure Israel over the Golan issues, Lebanese 
officials gave their backing to the Syrian claim.
In October 2000 foUowing the outbreak of the second intifada, HizboUah 
launched its attacks against the IsraeU forces in the Shabaa Farms, and its 
operations continued into the next year. With these operations progressing, 
Israel abandoned its moratorium on retaUation against Syrian forces in 
Lebanon on AprU 16, 2001, when it bombed a Syrian radar station at Dahr 
Baydar.^ "^^  On July 1, 2001, Israel launched a second air strUse against a 
Syrian radar station in Beqqa, wounding three Syrian troops as weU as one 
Lebanese soldier.^ ^®
The Lebanese government was continuously pressured by the US and the 
UN to stabUise the South. The US ambassador in Beirut, David Satterfield,
Ben-Meir (2000) p.30. /Gerges (2001) p. 109, 
MET AprU 20, 2001.
DS July 2, 2001.
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warned Hariri in February 2001 that further attacks on the Shabaa Farms 
would harm the Lebanese economy and discourage investors.^^® In AprU, 
America actually withheld USD 20 million in economic aid to Lebanon 
because of Beirut’s refusal to deploy its army in large numbers along the 
Lebanon-Israel border, and to prevent HizboUah from launching attacks 
there.^^  ^In addition, after the UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, presented 
the UN Security CouncU with his report on drawing down and reconstructing 
the UN Interim Forces in Lebanon (ÜNIFL), the UN decided in May to 
reduce the force and, by so doing, to exert pressure on Lebanon to deploy its 
army in fuU scale.^ ^® Furthermore, it decided in July to proceed with cuts in 
UNIFL numbers and instructed Annan to study the possibUity of converting 
it into an unarmed observation mission, despite strong Lebanese 
opposition.^^®
At the same time, the Hariri government seems to have been interested in 
reining HizboUah’s military activities in the Shabaa Farms and in sending 
enough troops from the Lebanese army there to demonstrate its fuU 
sovereignty over aU Lebanese land.^^° Since his priority was to revive the 
moribund Lebanese economy, he had Mttle sympathy for continued HizboUah 
operations. His fear that the IsraeU retaUation against Lebanon might 
undermine Lebanese economic confidence became justified. InitiaUy, the
international donor’s conference for the South, due to be held in October
216 AffiTFebruary 23, 2001. 
"'"Afi5’/AprU20, 2001. 
MEIM.UY 18, 2001. 
MEf August 10, 2Ù01.
220 According to GambUl, after the IsraeU withdrawal, “Damascus permitted 
the Lebanese government to deploy only a token force of 500 poUce and 500 
soldiers to areas of south Lebanon evacuated by the IsraeUs.” [GambUI 
(2001-5).]
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221 A/E/November 24, 2000. 
^  Blanford (2001) pp.9-10. 
^  EE July 30, 2001.
^  EENovember 7, 2001.
2000, was postponed.^^  ^To make matters worse, HizboUah’s February attack 
came a day after Hariri had reassured international investors in Paris that 
Lebanon was now safe for investment and would not provoke the 
destabUisation in the region. A Hariri-owned newspaper openly criticised the 
AprU attack, saying that it could reflect negatively on Lebanon’s debt-ridden 
economy.^^  ^ In July, facing UN pressure to decrease the UNIFIL role, the 
Foreign Minister, Mahmoud Hammoud, asked Syria to support a 
continuation of the UNIFIL mission at its present strength.^^ This could be 
interpreted as an alternative Lebanese proposal to facUitate the economic 
recovery process by stabUising the region with the help of UN, in view of ]
Syria’s continued refusal to the Lebanese authorities to extend its fuU j
sovereignty in the Shabaa Farms. I
In the aftermath of “September 11”, the United States escalated pressure on I
!the Lebanese government to act decisively to rein in HizboUah. However, the |
government rejected the US demand that it should seek out and freeze jIHizboUah’s assets in the country. On November 6, Finance Minister Fouad I
jSiniora announced that Lebanon would not fbUow the US demand, and |
stated that terrorism should be defined and that those who were trying to |Iliberate their own land were merely practising re s is tan ce .H is  statement IJwas reinforced by the four reasons which the Central Bank ofiered on j
November 8 for refusing to comply none of them poUtical. Firstly the |Idemand to freeze HizboUah’s assets had come from the US, not the UN. |
iSince the measures to battle terrorism in September were endorsed in UN J
iSecurity Resolution 1373, the Central Bank stated that Washington’s I
Jrequest was not binding on Lebanon. Secondly the demand did not originate 1
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from the International Court of Justice in Hague. Thirdly, it did not arise 
from an international criminal investigation, which would have required the 
Central Bank’s cooperation. Fourthly, there was no bilateral agreement 
between Lebanon and the US detailing a procedure for freezing assets. Later 
on the same day, the Lebanese cabinet made a statement backing HizboUah 
by saying that resistance to Israel was legitimate as long as Israel occupied 
Arab land.^ ^®
The cabinet seems to have been given some justification for its statement by 
the Central Bank. Though it is true that the cabinet made the statement 
after Hariri had returned from Damascus, where he and Asad had agreed 
that the distinction between resistance and terrorism should be made clear, 
and though it seems possible to say that the Central Bank sensed Syrian 
intentions clearly and helped Hariri by giving him a domestic justification, it 
seems unjustified to maintain that the Lebanese government merely bowed 
to Damascus completely in this case, considering that the Central Bank has 
been fairly autonomous of Syrian influence.^^®
In December, when Hariri was struggling to enter the Euro-Mediterranean 
Partnership Agreement, Britain, supported by the US, initiaUy demanded 
that the agreement include an explicit Lebanese commitment to combat 
terrorism. Sensing Lebanon’s deUcate situation, France, which refused to 
condemn HizboUah’s mUitary attacks against Israel, proposed a compromise 
whereby Lebanon could sign a separate letter to the EU secretariat pledging 
to combat terrorism. However, Syria did not want the Lebanese government 
to sign a letter to the EU committing it to fight terrorism untU the EU 
released its fist of designated individuals and groups linked to terrorism 
later in the month. Lebanon thus had to say that the signing would be
^  AfE/November 23, 2001.
^  EE November 8, 2001. /Conversation with Jim QuUty (a Canadian 
JournaUst in the DaUy Star) by e-maU, AprU 18, 2002.
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pos tponed.When the Hst was finally released, it excluded HizboUah. 
However, this episode showed both that Syria opposed any kind of 
impUcation, not to mention clear expression, that HizboUah might be a 
terrorist organisation, and also that Lebanon had no choice but to faU into 
fine behind Syria over the issue of “terrorism”.
(6) AbduUah’s Peace Plan and the 2002 Arab Summit in Beirut
Saudi Crown Prince AbduUah’s peace proposal was objected to by President 
Bashar Asad and President Lahoud in their joint declaration on March 3, on 
the occasion of Asad’s visit to Beirut. The Syrian objection was based on the 
fact that the proposal impUcitly put the Israel-Palestine track before the 
Israel-Syria-Lebanon track and also on the fact that it did not expUcitly 
mention the Golan Heights, though it did stipulate that the Arab states’ 
recognition of Israel was contingent on fuU IsraeU withdrawal firom aU Arab 
lands occupied since the 1967 War. In addition, AbduUah’s plan did not 
mention the right of Palestinian refugees to return home: one of Lebanon’s 
key demands in negotiating with Israel, since Lebanon had 350,000 
Palestinian refugees.^^® Thus, though Lebanon had a common stance with 
Syria, it also had its own reason for working in concert with it.
However, Lebanon’s stance ran the risk of worsening relations with Saudi 
Arabia and, by extension, the Western countries supporting the Saudi 
proposal, particularly when the Hariri government was struggUng to revive 
the ailing economy. Because of this, Syria offered Hariri some economic 
concessions, and agreed to remove import restrictions on 14 Lebanese 
commodities such as dairy products, oUve oU, plastic shoes, detergents and 
salt. Damascus also decided to halve Electricité du Liban’s USD 123 mUUon
GambUl (2001-12).
228 2?EMarch 2, March 3, and March 4, 2002. /ME/March 8, 2002.
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debt to Syria and to reduce the price of natural gas being sold to Lebanon, 
and proposed some joint agricultural and industrial projects, including oil 
refineries in Sidon and Tripoli.^ ^®
Despite Syrian concern that the forthcoming Arab summit in Lebanon 
would be preoccupied with the Saudi proposal, which could weaken its role in 
the Arab-Israeh peace process, the Lebanese, especially Hariri, appeared 
very wfiling to hold the conference in Beirut. Though he was worried that 
Lahoud’s support of the Syrian stance might predominate in the summit and 
that many states would not attend as a consequence of the fierce protest in 
the Arab world over the Israeli condition put on Arafat’s attendance, he may 
have considered that it was a good opportunity to show the progress made in 
Lebanese reconstruction to the world. He was also aware that Syria would 
not openly and vehemently boycott the summit, since Asad was intent on 
improving relations with Saudi Arabia, to which he even paid a visit. 
Furthermore, he was trying to improve Syria’s image in the Western world, 
for example by meeting with the British Prime Minister Tony Blair in 
November 2001. In fact, only 10 among 22 member states of the Arab League 
attended the summit.^^® However, since the summit finally gave unanimous 
support to the Saudi plan for a “land for peace” deal and reconciliation 
between Iraq and Kuwait, it seems fair to say that the summit was 
successful at a regional level, especially as Lahoud praised it. However, 
HizboUah stated its disappointment at the summit and later hit IsraeU 
outposts in the Shabaa Farms, because the “land for peace” deal frustrated 
the Palestinians in the Lebanese refugee camps who perceived it as a 
pressure to put an end to their second intifada, which HizboUah has
^  EEMarch 12 and March 18, 2002. /ME/March 8, 2002.
^  EE March 6, March 21, March 27, March 28, and March 29, 2002. IMEI 
AprU 5, 2002.1The Guardian March 27, March 28, and March 29, 2002. IThe 
IndependentM.^oh 27 and March 30, 2002.
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supported.^ ^^
As for Lebanon itself, holding the summit in Beirut seemed to be a success, 
both politically and economically. Firstly, the Lebanese delegation at the 
summit managed to add a clause to the Saudi proposal which rejected the 
permanent settlement of Palestinian refugees in their host countries. Since 
the presence of Palestinians was stUl a destabilising factor in Lebanon, the 
clause had merits for both the economic-oriented Hariri government and the 
Christian opposition leaders hostile to the Palestinians.^^^ Secondly, since the 
conference was held in the Phoenicia Hotel on the western outskirts of the 
redevelopment area, Lebanon managed to showcase its progress of 
reconstruction to Arab heads of state and foreign journalists. Thirdly, in the 
weekend just before the summit opened, Arab ministers who attended the 
Arab Economic and Social Council agreed on the creation of an Arab Free 
Trade Zone, put forward by the Lebanese Economy and Trade Minister, Basil 
Fulayhan. At the same time, the Saudi Fund for Development signed USD 
38 million loans with the Council for Development and Reconstruction (CDR), 
one for 4 road projects and another for a drinking water project. Later, on 
March 31, the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development signed a 23 
million loan with the CDR to finance an electrical project.^^  ^As a result, the 
Hariri government benefited financially, initially fi*om Syria and later from 
regional states such as Saudi Arabia in particular, at the same time carefully 
watching Syrian diplomacy in the regional/international arena under Asad, 
particularly his attempts to strengthen Syria’s ties with the West and with 
the Gulf states.
(7) Brief Summary
EEMarch 30, April 3, and April 5, 2002. /AfE/April 5, 2002. 
EEMarch 30, 2002.
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Overall, since the issues of both HizboUah’s military activities in the 
“security zone” and later the Shabaa Farms, and also the Middle East peace 
process have been firmly associated with Syria’s security interests, the 
Lebanese government has had to coordinate with Damascus over these 
issues. The “independence” of its behaviour from Syria has been generally 
restricted during the post-Ta’if period, despite its efforts to send its army to 
the South with the aim of receiving financial aid by showing the recovery of 
full Lebanese sovereignty. However, Lebanon’s coordination with Damascus 
was not solely “imposed” by Syria, especially when Israeli massive attacks 
brought about both international and local support and sympathy toward 
HizboUah. While Hariri has been prevented by Syria from negotiating border 
issues directly with Israel, his calculation, by hosting the 2002 Arab summit, 
that (though the Saudi peace proposal would became a dominant issue) Syria 
would not oppose the summit itself, enabled him to obtain financial support 
and assistance from the Gulf states.
7. FEATURES OF THE ECONOMIC RECONSTRUCTION PROCESS
(l) Introduction
As already noted, political, security, and diplomatic aspects of Lebanese- 
Syrian relations have to some extent been connected with and influenced by 
economic affairs. In this section, more “purely” economic aspects wiU be 
focused.
Lebanon and Syria have signed a variety of economicaUy-oriented 
agreements and protocols covering areas such as agriculture, industry, 
health, tourism, science and technology energy water, post, communications 
and telecommunications, and utilities. The aim of these has been to achieve
A/E/AprU 5, 2002.
222
and develop their alliance and strategic partnership between the two 
countries that would lead to increased integration.^^^ The following four 
agreements were signed in September 1993: the Social and Economic 
Cooperation Agreement, the Agreement Regulating the Movement of 
Individuals and Goods, the Health Agreement, and the Agricultural 
Cooperation and Coordination Agreement. Three other agreements signed in 
September and October 1994 were the Orontes River Agreement, the 
Tourism Agreement, and the Labour Agreement.^^^
At the same time, the Lebanese government struggled to put the “Horizon 
2000” plan for economic reconstruction into action.^ ^® On the positive side, 
the plan emphasised the construction and financial sectors, and the 
rehabilitation process both needed and attracted a cheap labour force, 
mainly composed of Syrians. On the negative side, scant attention was paid 
to agriculture and industry, and the neglect of agriculture revitalised 
narcotics cultivation in the Beqqa Valley. As both positive and negative 
dimensions were to some extent connected with Syrian interests, the 
following topics wiU be discussed: the priority of the construction and 
banking sectors, the presence of Syrian workers in Lebanon, the neglect of 
agriculture and revival of narcotics cultivation, and the failure to protect 
Lebanese industry.
(2) Prioritising the Construction and Banking Sectors
As the Syrian Law No. 10 in 1991 put Syrian, Arab, and foreign capital on 
an equal footing in order to facilitate investment in Syria, both Lebanese 
entrepreneurs and Syrian expatriate entrepreneurs operating from Lebanon 
were able to acquire economic assets and significant leverage in Syria,
^  Saidi (1999) p.365.235 'pinaoui (1994) p. 101.
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largely owing to their personal and family ties as well as their geographical 
proximity.^^  ^ However, the Syrian strategy to very gradually liberalise its 
economy, so as to adapt to the new economic order after the end of the Cold 
War and not cause the internal turmoil, made the economic liberalisation 
process relatively slow.^ ®^
Many Syrian companies and Lebanese companies of Syrian origin became 
involved in reconstruction projects in Lebanon. Some of the biggest 
contractors in Lebanon, such as Abdel Rahman Hourieh, which built most of 
the roads, are of Syrian origin. The village of Rabiyeh, a successful Lebanese 
real estate project, had Shukri Shammas as its main investor, who was 
originally from Homs. The Syrian Sharika Khumasiyya also heavily invested 
in real estate projects in Lebanon.^^®
More importantly, the reconstruction project itself was associated with 
transstate Syrian-Lebanese political clout. In fact, members of the 
parliament openly criticised both that the companies which had been 
contracted to build a coastal road from Beirut to southern Lebanon were 
charging for the project and also that the contracts had been awarded 
without competitive bidding. A local company Ittihad Contacting, owned by 
Nabih Berri’s wife Randa, and a Syrian company. Mount Qassioun, in which 
the Khaddam family had a stake, were to build one stretch of the road, while 
a local firm, Geneco, owned by Rafiq Hariri’s brother Shafiq, was to build 
another stretch.^^® Mount Qassioun was also awarded a USD 206 million 
contract to build a road between the southern towns of Zahrani and Qena.^ "^ ^
236 details of plan and its effect, see Najem (2000) pp.57-212.
Nasrafiah (1994) p. 137.
238 the details of Syrian calculated strategy see Hinnebusch (1994b) 
pp.97-113.
Nasrallah (1994) pp. 137-138.
^  EIUW^ quarter, 1996. /Najem (2000) p. 146.
Najem (2000) p. 147.
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The above cases suggest that though these companies were “partners” in 
these projects, Hariri sought to push through the “Horizon 2000” plan by co­
opting his pohtical rivals, especially those who were pro-Syrian, companies 
of Syrian-origin in Lebanon, and Syrian companies, while at the same time 
maintaining his own economic stakes.
Also, the reconstruction project sometimes required a lengthy bargaining 
process. Elysser, a public agency which was established in the summer of 
1995 for the redevelopment of Beirut’s southern suburbs, was the product of 
three years of negotiations between the Lebanese government and Shi’ite 
groups. The initial government plan to redevelop the area by private 
companies was rejected by both Hizbollah and Amal, which were backed by 
Syria, since the plan threatened to weaken their patronage networks in the 
region and thus to decrease the power of pro-Syrian allies in Lebanon. 
Finally, a compromise deal was reached to give the Shi’ite leadership a major 
say in Elysser, while Speaker Berri supported in the parliament the 
government’s revision of the Beirut Central District Plan.^^
However, both Shi’ite groups continued to take an uncooperative attitude to 
Elysser because they still feared that it would threaten their* patron-client 
networks. When Elysser stressed the importance of bidders’ experience in 
expanding the project close to Beirut International Airport, representatives 
of Hizbollah expressed hostility to the plan ia talks with Hariri.^^  ^Also, a 
close ally of Berri, MP Mohammed Beydoun, threatened to bring a no- 
confidence motion against Hariri and Siniora if they did not withdraw a 
grant of USD 9.4 million to Elysser by claiming that the grant contravened 
the budget law.^ "^* The tender process was delayed and the government 
became involved in lengthy negotiations with the inhabitants of the area
Najem (2000) pp. 173-175. 
^  MEED February 9, 1996.
244 M EED April 4, 1996.
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over their relocation and compensation. "^*® In fact, this project was stalled for 
more than five years because no agreement could be reached between the 
representatives of poor Shi’ites and the government over purchase prices for 
the land and levels of compensation. Earlier in 2001, the government 
announced a new compensation package, but with Amal and Hizbollah 
competing to receive as much compensation for their clients as possible from 
the state, the negotiation process was difficult and resulted in their rejection 
of the new government offer in July.^ ^®
As for the financial sector, Lebanon’s banking system has traditionally been 
highly regarded. Although Syrian Law 10 aimed at rapid economic growth by 
facilitating investment in Syria, one of the difficulties faced by potential 
investors was the absence of foreign banks there.^ "*^  This situation in Syria 
could have given opportunities to Lebanese banks, but the state-owned 
Commercial Bank of Syria was the only commercial bank licensed to operate 
in the country until April 2000, when the government finally passed a decree 
allowing international banks to set up branches in the fi*ee trade zones on 
condition that they invest at least USD 11 million in equity.^ "*®
In late 2000, five Lebanese banks, one of which is said to be closely 
connected with Hariri, were granted licenses to establish operations in the 
zone, and several indeed established offices there. The banks were confident 
that over time they would be allowed to operate in Syria itself, since the 
Ba’th  Party Regional Command in December stated that permission would 
be given for the establishment of private banks in Syria. The Syrian decision 
seems to have been motivated by the fact that, because of Lebanese expertise 
and knowledge of the local market, many Syrian businesses and wealthy
MEED December 5, 1997 and March 6, 1998. 
^  E/DOctober, 2001.
Tinaoui (1994) p.99.
^  MEED July 7 and July 21, 2000.
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individuals had long been using banks in Lebanon to meet their financial 
needs, and it made sense to open such facilities in Syria itself.^ "*** Since the 
strengths possessed by Lebanese banks could appeal to international banks 
preparing for investment in Syria, they could also have the merit of 
enhancing the value of Lebanon in the world financial community. Regarding 
this point, Hariri is struggling to return the Beirut’s former status as the 
financial centre of the Middle East.^ ®°
(3) The Presence of Syrian Workers ia Lebanon
October 1994 saw the signing of a Syrian-Lebanese agreement on labour 
which aimed to legalise the status of the large number of Syrian labourers 
working illegally in Lebanon. There has been controversy over the actual 
numbers of Syrian workers in Lebanon, since the rapid influx of these 
workers into Lebanon began immediately after the end of the Lebanese 
conflict. The Lebanese Minister of Labour, Abdllah Amin, a prominent ally of 
Syria and the former head of the pro-Syrian Ba’th Party, stated in October 
1994 that the number of permanent Syrian workers in Lebanon was 16,000, 
in addition to a maximum of 50,000 Syrian seasonal workers.^ ®* However, at 
the same time, a Lebanese newspaper, Nahar, reported that according to the 
Lebanese General Security Directorate, the number of Syrian workers 
exceeded 900,000.^ ®^  Furthermore, Marwan Iskander, a former adviser to
249 December 5, 2000. /E /E  January, 2001.
^  Najem (2000) p. 181. /As for the details of the banking sector in the post­
war period, see Najem (2000) pp. 181-188.
AfEED October 28, 1994. /Tinaoui (1994) p. 108. /According to another 
source (EIU1®* quarter, 1995.), he had put the figure at some 150,000 at first. 
Afterwards, he sought to play down the figure, estimating the number to 
total no more than 50,000. It seems that his behaviour intended to lessen 
Lebanese criticism against the presence of Syrian workers.
252 Tinaoui (1994) p. 108.
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Hariri, estimated the number at about 1,4 mülion.^ ®® A study by the Syrian- 
Lebanese Higher Council estimated that comparatively higher potential 
earnings in Lebanon had attracted about 253,000 Syrian nationals.^ ®"* In sum, 
there seems to have been a tendency for anti-Syrians to overestimate the 
number to emphasise the “occupation” of the Lebanese labour field by the 
Syrians, while pro-Syrians have played down the number to lessen Lebanese 
criticism over their presence.
For Damascus, the presence of Syrian workers in Lebanon has brought 
some advantages. Firstly, it has contributed somewhat to the decrease in the 
unemployment rate in Syria. Secondly, the billions of dollars in remittances 
transferred from Lebanon to Syria every year has constituted the largest or 
second largest single such source for the country. For Lebanon, there have 
been both advantages and disadvantages. On the one hand, the Lebanese 
commercial elite who own businesses that require unskilled labour have 
preferred to hire Syrian workers willing to work for wages that have been 
extremely low by Lebanese standards.^®® Lebanese employers have also been 
able to lessen the difficulties in finding workers for menial jobs by employing 
Syrians, as Lebanese have generally scorned these kinds of jobs.^ ®® In 
addition, the Lebanese government, especially Hariri, has not appeared to be 
determined to stop the influx, as it has both shared the interests of the 
business community and seen the presence of Syrian workers as necessary 
for the progress of the reconstruction project. Though the presence of Syrian
workers has both raised the unemployment rate in Lebanon to around 30%
for the Lebanese labour force as a whole and given Syrian officials in
^  GambUl (2001-2). 
"®" Saidi (1999) p.363.
®^® Syrian workers earn, on average, about USD 50 at home, compared to 
monthly wages of some USD 200 in Lebanon. [Tinaoui (1994) p. 109.]
^  GambUl (2001-2).
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Lebanon the opportunity for intervention to protect Syrian workers, the 
Lebanese government has not seriously regulated their presence on the basis 
of the above-mentioned economic interests.^®^
While the government seems to have considered the merits of allowing 
Syrian workers into Lebanon for both the business circle and itself, the 
presumed “sensitive” nature of this issue appears to have influenced its 
decisions. There appears to be evidence that Syrian residents in Lebanon, 
mainly workers, were before the parliamentary elections naturalised and 
registered in the electoral districts in order to be able to support pro-Syrian 
figures such as Michel Murr.^ ®®
(4) The Neglect of Agriculture and Revival of Narcotics Cultivation
Since the Lebanese government has emphasised constructiop and banking, 
agriculture has been generally neglected, although it carried out three major 
projects in the agricultural sector with external support from the World 
Bank and the United Nations.^ ®® Despite the fact that rural farmers have
represented 40 % of the total Lebanese population, only 3 % of the
government’s annual budget has generally been allocated to this sector.
Apart firom this predilection which arised fi*om internal factors, there have 
been two external factors reducing the Lebanese government’s control over 
agricultural development. Firstly, the smuggling of agricultural products 
into Lebanon from Syria has continuously flourished, and Lebanese farmers 
have bitterly complained of being undercut by smuggled Syrian fruits and 
vegetables.^ ®® In fact, this situation actually led to a rural protest in Sidon on 
May 2, 2000. Moreover, the pending formation of a customs union with Syria
"®" Gambül (2001-2).
®^® Khazen (2001) p.49. /Mahk (1997) pp.40-44.
259 Najem  (2000) p. 129.
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agreed in February 1998 was likely to lead to more Syrian agricultural 
products entering into Lebanon and cause more serious social unrest. 
Secondly the water resources, vital for agriculture and originally plentiful in 
Lebanon, have not been under full Lebanese control, especially the Orontes
River. The water accord in September 1994 allocated Lebanon 22% of the
Orontes flow to irrigate about 60 millions square meters of land in the dry 
and poor Baalbeck-Hermel region of northern Beqqa. By comparison, a
Lebanese proposal in the 1950s had suggested that Lebanon exploit 40% of
the river’s flow.^ ®*
In addition to these internal and external factors, the economic recession in 
Lebanon after 1998 has affected Lebanese farmers, especially in the Beqqa 
Valley, and they have pursued, as a result, narcotics cultivation, although 
the amount of production started decreasing after 1991 as a result of 
international pressure. In 1994, the Council for Development and 
Reconstruction (CDR) agreed with the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP) and UN Drug Control Program to seek alternatives to 
drugs.^ ®^  In 1996, Lebanon joined in the 1988 United Nations Convention 
against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, with 
reservations about the convention’s provisions for bank secrecy.^ ®® Lebanon’s 
actions were intended to boost the country’s image in the international field 
while retaining its traditional financial advantage of bank secrecy, which 
would facilitate foreign investment in Lebanon.
However, the recent revival of drug cultivation by Lebanese farmers seems 
to have received tacit approval firom the Lebanese government in order to 
appease their complaints, because of its inabfiity to stop agricultural
EIU 4^  ^quarter, 1998 and 1®‘ quarter, 2000. 
Tinaoui (1994) p. 109,
262 rr»rrrondE /E 2  quarter, 1994.
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smuggling from Syria. In fact, the Higher Coordination Authority for 
Agricultural Cooperatives complained, on June 20, 2001, that hundreds of 
tons of various fruits and vegetables entered into Lebanon and damaged its 
market and economy. Despite this, Damascus has been unwilling to halt the 
flow of smuggled p ro d u ceA lso  the Lebanese government appears to have 
been worried that such complaints would get out of control and become part 
of Lebanese criticism of the Syrian presence.
(5) The Failure to Protect Lebanese Industry
Article two of the Social and Economic Cooperation Agreement in 1993 
underlined the necessity for Syria and Lebanon to coordinate their iudustrial 
development policies.^ ®® In August 1997, the two side agreed on a gradual 
and free exchange of industrial commodities and agricultural produce.^ ®® In 
February 1998, Syria and Lebanon agreed to form a customs union by the 
start of 2002, reducing tariff rates on all products by one-quarter from 
January 1999. However, as a result of Lebanese objections to reducing rates 
on agricultural products, the rate was applied only to industrial goods.^ ®^  It is 
worth considering why this situation took place, in view of the possibilities 
that Lebanon would become flooded with cheap Syrian industrial products 
which received subsidies from the government and that the process of the 
rehabilitation of Lebanese industry would possibly be hurt.
It seems reasonable to say that Lebanon was forced to admit it in exchange 
for the exemption of agricultural products. However, the following internal 
factors appear to have influenced the Lebanese approval. First of all, the
"®® Joffe (2000).
"®" EE June 21, 2001. /Abdelnour (2001).
^  Tinaoui (1994) p. 107.
^  MEEE August 29, 1997. /EIFEAugust 21 and August 22, 1997.
®^^ MEEEFebruary 20, 1998. IEIU4t^ quarter, 1998 and 1®* quarter, 2000.
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Hariri government lacked a coherent policy toward the industrial sector 
which accounted for 20 per cent of GNP between 1993 and 1997.^ ®® The 
Minister of the Economy and Foreign Trade, Yassine Jaber, favoured 
lowering tariff rates to stimulate commercial activities and to attract 
shoppers from the Arab countries, while the Minister of Industry Nadim 
Salem, advocated increasing customs duties on imported products which had 
local substitutes. These policy difference also reflected the competing 
interests between the BTA (Beirut Traders Association) and ALI (Association 
of Lebanese Industrialists).^®® The ALI had connections with state officials, 
but this did not ensure that its demand would seriously be taken into 
consideration.^^® Since Hariri was supported more by the BTA than by the 
ALI and since he gave more priority to the former, he seems not to have 
intended to protect Lebanese industry as he initiated no increase in the 
customs rate.
After Hoss took power in December 1998, his government vowed to reverse 
many of Hariri’s policies and to give more attention to the development of 
Lebanese industry. In fact, both the Minister of Finance, George Corm, and 
the Minister of Industry Nasser Saidi, who was also the Minister of 
Economy and Trade, made statements in support of developing national 
industry.^^* However, as mentioned before, the reduction of tariff rates on 
industrial goods was actually started in January 1999. Syrian permission to 
exempt agricultural products seemed to be based on its calculation: if the 
reduced tariff rate was applied to them against a backdrop of flourishing 
smuggling and against Lebanese farmers’ strong protests, it would badly 
affect the status of Minister of Agriculture, Suliman Franjieh, one of key
^  Najem (2000) pp.194-195. 
®^® Baroudi (2001) p.89. 
Baroudi (2000) p.46. 
Baroudi (2001) p.91.
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allies in Lebanon. In addition, although Hoss clearly had interests in 
protecting the national industry, he did not have enough power to re­
negotiate with Syria over the customs duties. Fortunately for Lebanon, 
however, the importing into Lebanon from Syria of manufactured goods, 
such as cars, has been limited by economic declines in both countries.^^^
(6) Brief Summary
Overall, while taking into consideration the economic stakes held by Syria 
and its allies in Lebanon, the Harhri-led government has implemented its 
economic vision and also secured his own interests as well as those of the 
business circles supporting Hariri, especially construction, banking, and 
trade, while sacrificing agriculture and industry.
8. PROBLEMS OF SOCIAL FREEDOMS
(1) Introduction
Under the indirect rule of Syria, social freedoms in Lebanon have been 
curtailed so as not to upset stability in Lebanon, which has been a priority of 
both Lebanese and Syrian governments. Restrictions and occasional 
violations to social freedoms have been carried out by the Lebanese 
government under clear or tacit understandings with Syria. This section will 
consider labour movement, free expression, and the detention of Lebanese 
citizens.
(2) The Issue of the Labour Movement
The end of the militia economy in Lebanon after 1989 did not bring about 
economic revival for the majority of Lebanese, and the economic conditions
^  EIUV^ quarter, 2000.
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further worsened in 1992. In response to hyper-inflation and the sharp 
dechne of the Lebanese Bra, the General Confederation of Labour (GCL) 
called for a one day strike on May 6, 1992, which finally forced the Karami 
government to resign.^ ^® Although labour leaders later denied they had any 
intention to bring down the government, these protests were seen by many 
not just as a response to the poor economic management under Karami but 
more as popular rebellions against the government itself and, by extension, 
the Syrian-dominated political order in Lebanon.^ "^*
Since the next Solh government also failed to tackle the deterioration of 
economic conditions, Syria may have felt the legitimacy of its presence in 
Lebanon to be further threatened. Afterwards, since Solh’s successor, Hariri, 
continued to give priority to putting through his economic recovery plan, 
Lebanon and Syria agreed to prevent labour movements fi*om spreading and 
intensifying, and they adopted a number of means to do so.
For example, the post of Lebanese labour minister was occupied by a 
succession of pro-Syrian allies. Abdullah Amin was a head of the Lebanese 
branch of Ba’th  Party prior to his appointment. Assad Harden was a high 
level official in the Syrian Socialist Nationalist Party (SSNP), which has 
advocated the unity between Lebanon and Syria. Another former labour 
minister, Michael Moussa, has been a close ally of Speaker Berri. The 
current minister, ALL Qanso, is also a former head of the SSNP.^ ^® Even 
though the Lebanese government was pressured by Damascus to install 
these bro-Syrian figures as the head of the ministry of labour to prevent 
labour movements fi*om escalating into anti-Syrian demonstrations, it seems 
clear that their firm cooperative attitude in defence of social order served the 
economic-oriented Lebanese government, especially under Hariri.
Baroudi (1998) pp.534-535. /MB/May 15, 1992. /EPFFMay 8, 1992. 
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More directly, Syria interfered to directly restrict the labour movement 
itself. When the GCL planed to launch a general strike on December 1993, it 
finally called off the strike after a Syrian-backed deal with the Lebanese 
government. The compromise deal was the product of talks between the 
Lebanese government on the one hand and the Syrian Labour Union, Syrian 
Vice-President Khaddam, the Lebanese leadership of the Syrian Ba’th party 
in the presence of the Labour Minister Amin, and the GCL leaders on the 
other hand. This episode indicates that the Syrian leadership sponsored 
efforts to reach an agreement, in a bid both to avert the strike and to give a 
fair deal to the working class.^ ^® In July 1995, in an attempt to force the 
government to remove the gasoline surcharge, the GCL called a strike and 
mass demonstration. In an immediate response, the government banned all 
demonstrations and pubhc gatherings and ordered the internal security 
forces and army to implement this decision. These actions were supported by 
the Syrians. In fact, Hariri went to Damascus to seek Syrian support for the 
use of its security services against his own people. As a result, thousands of 
Lebanese soldiers and police, backed by Syrian troops, fanned out in Beirut 
and other cities to enforce the government ban on demonstrations.^^^
Faced with a continuing pattern of confrontation between the Lebanese 
army and security forces, supposedly backed by Damascus, and Lebanese 
demonstrators, Hariri, Berri, and the majority of other ministers came to the 
conclusion that the GCL leader should be replaced by a more cooperative 
figure.^ ^® The government, and in particular the pro-Syrian minister of 
labour, began a campaign to defeat the GCL leader, Abu Rizq, in the April 
1997 GCL elections. The government helped engineer a split in the
AfEMDecember 15, 1993.
Baroudi (1998) p.538. /AfEATJuly 18, July 20, and July 21, 1995. ISWB 
July 19, July 20, and July 21, 1995.
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organisation, and in the second election, which was held with the 
participation of the five recently licensed federations loyal to Berri, 35 
delegates out of 54 elected a list of 12 candidates headed by a pro-regime 
candidate, Ghanim Zughbi. The entire election process was marred by 
serious irregularities, and it was said that security officers were present in 
large numbers and were trying to prevent pro-Rizq delegates firom entering 
the GCL building.^^® Although Syria was not directly involved in this case, it 
seems that its primary goal of containing social unrest in Lebanon was 
secured through its active clients, such as the minister of labour and the 
speaker.
During the post-Ta’if period, Syria has generally sided with the Lebanese 
government on the basis of their common interest in the stability of the 
social order. However, Syria’s behaviour had the potential to hurt its image 
as a “socialist” state. To prevent this happening, one of its client sub-state 
groups in Lebanon, Hizbollah, made statements in 1995 about its support for 
the GCL’s strike call and for the people’s right to demonstrate.^®® Though 
Syria supported the effort by the Lebanese government to maintain social 
order by using its troops, the statements by Hizbollah seemed not only to 
represent the party’s political stance but also to indicate the delicate Syrian 
position. After Abu Rizq managed to regain the GCL presidency in July 1998, 
he did not revert to his pre-April 1997 confi'ontational stance.^ ®* As a result,
the Hariri government managed to contain the labour movement — with
Syrian help—in order to facilitate his economic revival efforts and also to 
secure the interests of the business circles supporting him.
Baroudi (1998) pp.540-543. .
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(3) The Issue of Free Expression
Since Lebanon has long prided itself on its respect for free expression, the 
mass media, on which it has depended, will be the main focus here. In the 
post-Ta’if period, there have been two main constraints on the mass media: 
“the self-censorship that curtails any criticism of the president or his 
counterparts in the Arab world; and traditional curbs on dissent and 
protest.” These restrictions seem to have been preferable not only for the 
Syrians but also for the Lebanese government.
In Lebanon, as the publisher of Nahar, Gebran Tueni, explained, the media 
law itself was formulated on the model of that of France, and thus 
theoretically there has been no problem for free expression. Rather, the main 
problem has been the pressure on mass media exerted by the Lebanese 
government.^®® There have been two ways by which this has occurred: by 
directly influencing the content of broadcasting, in the case of the official 
Tele-Liban, or by indirectly influencing it through pro-Syrian figures in the 
government. A “red line” has excluded topics such as sectarianism in Syria 
and the drug smuggling between Lebanon and Syria, although other “taboos”, 
such as the issue of the Syrian presence in Lebanon, were recently removed , 
as a result of increasing discussions across the Lebanese political spectrum 
caUing for a reconsideration of Lebanese-Syrian relations.^®  ^ In practice, 
self-censorship in order not to offend the Syrians has been commonplace, as 
Tueni stated, but recently less in evidence.^ ®®
The printed press has been relatively free compared to the broadcast media,
Young (1998) p. 6.
Mafiat (2000) p. 159.
®^® Conversation with Gebran Tueni (the Publisher of Nahar), June 28, 2001. 
®^"* Conversation with Michael Young (a British journalist residing in Beirut), 
June 21, 2001.
Conversation with Gebran Tueni (the Publisher of Nahar), June 28, 2001.
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because most Lebanese have got their news from television and radio.^ ®® In 
fact, political news on TV programs has been severely regulated, more so 
with regard to anti-Syrian demonstrations than to pro-Syrian 
demonstrations.^®^ Although it appears that Syria has not been directly 
involved in the issues surrounding free expression, it is Kkely that the 
Lebanese government has acted in collaboration with Syria, whose main 
interest has been to contain the criticism of its presence and of the Lebanese 
government on which its Lebanese policy has relied.
Instances of this collaboration appeared clearly in 1994 and 1996. In 1994, 
their target was the printed press, and the Lebanese government, backed by 
Syria, tried to introduce stiff penalties on journalists and newspapers. 
However, faced with a storm of protest from journalists and parliamentary 
deputies, the government backed down from this confrontation, and also 
toned down the tough proposed punishments.^®® In 1996, the Lebanese 
government, with Syria behind it, pronounced that only four television and 
eight radio stations, other than official Tele-Liban and Radio-Liban, could 
use Lebanon’s airwaves. It then licensed only those stations in which the 
leading political figures had stakes. Of the four TV stations to which licenses 
were granted, one was controlled by the Prime Minister, Hariri, one by the 
Speaker, Berri, one by a close associate of the President, Hrawi, and one by a 
close associate of the Interior Minister and Deputy Prime Minister, Murr. 
The most remarkable case was the TV station belonging to Berri, which was 
granted a license despite the fact that it was not yet operational. Hizbollah, 
which had initially been given a hcense for its own Manar Television, but 
which was later cancelled, accused the government of dividing the spoils.
^  Young (1998) p.6.
Conversation with Michael Young (a British journalist residing in Beirut), 
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though Manar Television continues to operate “illegally”.^®® The change of 
treatment toward Hizbollah by the government seemed to reflect its concern 
over mass rehgious radicalisation of the Lebanese, which was also an anxiety 
for Syria. In addition, even though it seems true that Hariri had to bargain 
with staunch pro-Syrian political rivals, he also managed to take a share of 
the cake by holding the license to his own Future Television.
Despite the hard times for the mass media, they have still played an 
important role in the political field. As Hassen Erayen in the AIIB pointed 
out, the 2000 parliamentary elections were called “media wars”. The 
authorities utilised public media such as Tele-Liban, while opposition 
candidates made use of private media, including Hariri’s Future 
Television.^ ®®
(4) The Issue of the Detention of Lebanese Citizens
An unknown number of Lebanese citizens have been imprisoned in Syria, 
some of them kidnapped in Lebanon during the civil war and others 
abducted there after the end of the conflict. In both cases, it is said that they 
were transferred to Syria by Syrian security forces which have maintained a 
powerful presence in Lebanon and have had the cooperation of the Lebanese 
security forces. These abductions have had no legal basis, and the Beirut Bar 
Association actually reported to the UN Human Eights Committee in April 
1997 that there was neither existing legislation nor a bilateral treaty to 
permit such conduct.^ ®*
Initially, the Lebanese government did not openly admit the presence of any
®^® Hudson (1999) pp.31-32. /EBESeptember 19, September 20, and 
September 21, 1996. /Young (1998) p. 6 .
®^® Conversation with Hassen Krayen (a lecturer in the American University 
of Beirut), July 4, 2001.
"®' Sherry (1997) p.31.
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Lebanese in Syria, though President Hrawi privately acknowledged in 
September 1992 that there was nothing he could do to help or release the 
detainees.^®  ^ In October 1996, Prime Minister Hariri, visiting Washington 
DC, publicly denied their presence. His denial seems to have been motivated 
by the following factors. Hariri went to Damascus before his departure to the 
USA, and it is possible that he was pressured by the Syrians not to make the 
Lebanese detainees in Syria an agenda item. However, there seemed to be 
another important factor: as Hariri’s relations with Syria were strained over 
Netanyahu’s “Lebanon First” plan, he seems to have hoped to prevent their 
relations from further worsening, as this had the potential to destabilise 
Lebanon and, as a result, to affect his struggle to attract foreign investment 
and support. In fact, he was eager during his visit to secure foreign 
contribution to the reconstruction of Lebanon, and succeeded in doing so.^^ 
As usual, he gave priority more to the economic recovery than to his people.
Initially most relatives of Lebanese detained in Syrian prisons remained 
silent. In 1997, however, a group of parents broke their pubHc silence on this 
issue by forming the Committee of Parents of Lebanese Detainees. Other 
Lebanese human rights groups, such as MISRAD and SOLIDE, also became 
active in this campaign. Finally pressured by the anti-Syrian mood in 
Lebanon, even pro-Syrian Berri declared on Radio Lebanon in November 
2000 that he would obtain a hst of Lebanese detainees held by Syria and 
would work to secure their release, though Syrian officials quickly denied 
their existence.^ ®® In December, when Syria released 46 Lebanese detainees, 
the Hariri cabinet denied that large number of prisoners were to be released 
by Syria, and dispersed a rally by the families of detainees, though the
^  Sherry (1997) p.31.
SWB  October 15 and October 22, 1996.
^  GambiU (2001-1).
GambiU (2000-12). November 27, 2000.
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Director of SOLIDE, Ghazi Ad, said that there were more prisoners still held 
in Syrian jails.^ '®®
(5) Brief Summary
Overall, the Lebanese government has generally taken, in collaboration 
with Syria, a tough stance toward labour movement and free expression. 
Also, it has not seriously taken up the issue of Lebanese detainees. Though 
these governmental measures have hurt Lebanese “democracy”, there have 
been obvious advantages not only for Damascus but also for the Lebanese 
government, which has been eager to stabilise the country and focus on rapid 
economic reconstruction.
9. LEBANESE DISCUSSION OF THE SYRIAN PRESENCE AND 
ITS EFFECTS
(1) Introduction
As mentioned in the previous sections, Syria has been deeply involved in 
Lebanon’s pohtical, diplomatic, economic, and social life. Though it is true 
that Lebanese state officials have exploited Syrian presence in their favour 
and have managed to secure their interests, the Lebanese state as a whole 
has been in an unequal position with regard to the Syrians. Increasingly, the 
Lebanese have come to express their grievances against the unequal Syrian- 
Lebanese relations, and this trend was accelerated in the aftermath of the 
statement on September 20, 2000 by the Maronite Patriarch, Nasrallah Sfeir. 
This section will be divided into two parts, following the different Syrian 
reactions to the sequence of events: jSrstly, Sfeir’s statement and the first 
Syrian army redeployment; and secondly, the “August 7” incident and the
GambiU (2001-1). //9IFS December 13, December 15, and December 18,
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second Syrian army redeployment.
(2) Sfeir’s S tatem ent and the F irst Syrian Army Redeployment
The statement made by Sfeir was in line with previous Lebanese anti- 
Syrian expressions, one of which was “An open letter to Dr. Bashar Assad” by
Gebran Tueni, published in the newspaper, Nahar —owned by him —on
March 23, 2000. In this article, Tueni stated to the then heir-apparent of the 
ailing Syrian President Asad that many Lebanese were not satisfied with 
Syrian poHcy in Lebanon and its military presence there, and demanded the 
estabhshment of equal Lebanese-Syrian relations.^®’ While Sfeir’s statement 
also generally expressed Lebanese dissatisfaction against Syrian rule by 
focusing on parHamentary elections, economic conditions, and political 
conditions, it explicitly called for the Syrian army to redeploy in Lebanon in 
preparation for its full withdrawal as stipulated in the Ta’if Agreement. It is 
probable that Sfeir’s action was instigated by the following two factors: the 
transition period in Syria firom the death of Asad to the election of his son 
during the summer, which was thought to weaken Syria’s ability to respond; 
and the decreased legitimacy of the Syrian military presence in Lebanon 
caused by the IsraeH withdrawal firom the “security zone” in May without a 
Syrian-Israeh peace agreement.^^®
Immediately after this statement. President Lahoud made a statement 
defending the Syrian p resenceH ow ever, pohtical leaders were soon 
divided over this issue into pro-Syrian figures and anti-Syrian figures.
2000.297 description is owed to the Enghsh transcription of the letter which 
Tueni himself gave to me, when I met him on June, 28, 2001.
^  agSeptember 21, 2000. /MMOctober 13, 2000. /Rabh (2001) pp.35-36. 
^  jDaS'September 22, 2000.
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mainly along sectarian lines/°° In other words, while most Muslims defended 
the Syrian presence as the pillar of a Lebanese sovereignty still threatened 
by IsraeH miHtary attacks, most Christians raUied around Sfeir and 
supported his statement.^®  ^ In reaction, the staunch pro-Syrian President, 
Lahoud, further maintained that only the Lebanese government should deal 
with the Syrian issue.^°  ^ At the same time, Syria for the first time 
acknowledged that it was holding 50 Lebanese prisoners.^®  ^Its aim, to calm 
the anti-Syrian trend, did not succeed, and Sfier continued to criticise Syria’s 
role throughout October 2000/^^
In November, Lebanese pubHc disaffection toward the Syrians assumed 
cross-sectarian proportions, though the former Shi’ite Speaker, Hussein 
Husseini, had already criticised Syria’s arbitrary appHcation of the Ta’if 
A g reem en t.T o counter this trend, then newly-appointed Prime Minister
Hariri carefully defended the Syrian role as temporary and necessary—his
nomination to the premiership arguably being owed to Lahoud. However, 
Druze leader WaHd Jumblatt, who temporarily had reconciled with Lahoud 
during the 2000 parHamentary elections in order to secure his seat, began to 
caU for a reexamination of the Syrian security role in Lebanon. Though Syria 
initiaUy responded to the Sfeir’s statement by saying that it would only 
Hsten to the Lebanese government, it was upset with Jumblatt’s demand and 
finaHy barred Jumblatt and his PSP members fi*om entering Syria.^^  ^
Despite Syria’s harsh stance toward Jumblatt and the pro-Syrian stance
Ü/S September 22, September 23, September 25, 2000.
RabH (2001) p.37.
^  September 26, 2000.
D5 October 2, 2000. /MATOctober 13, 2000.
^  For example, see DiS'October 2, October 5, and October 25, 2000. 
^  October 21, 2000.
AffiTNovember 10, 2000. / November 4, 2000.
RabH (2001) pp.37-38. /^IFBNovember 9, 2000.
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taken by government figures such as Lahoud and Hariri, Sfeir stepped up 
the debate over Syria’s presence in mid-November, and this finally led to a 
violent clash between the Lebanese security forces and anti-Syrian 
demonstrators on November 22, Lebanon’s Independence Day.^ °^  After the 
clash, Speaker Berri tried to reconcile the differences between Damascus and 
the patriarch, but this failed because of Sfeir’s firm demand for the 
redeployment of Syrian forces.^ *^ ®
At the beginning of 2001, Hariri began to disassociate himself firom the 
other two figures in the “Troika” over the Syrian presence, though he had 
defended it after the incident on Lebanon’s Independence Day.^ ^^  As 
mentioned in the “Troika” section, he made a statement in January 
permitting Awn to return to Lebanon without being fiable to any punishment. 
This was arguably both a result of his soured relations with Lahoud and of 
the resumption of HizboUah’s military operations in the Shabaa Farms, 
which damaged his economic recovery efforts. At the same time, his cabinet 
itself was divided over the Syrian issues. The pro-Syrian but Maronite 
Health Minister, Sufiman Franjieh, met Sfeir and other prominent anti- 
Syrian figures such as Amin Jumayiel and Carlos Edde, the son of Raymond 
Edde who had died in exile. He encouraged a “national dialogue” between the 
government and the Maronites, but his real aim was to firm up the status 
quo in Lebanon that favoured the Syrians.^“
Despite Franjieh’s efforts, the debate over Syria gained further strength in 
the spring and thus deepened the political and communal divide among the 
Lebanese. On March 14, the Free National Current, composed of Awn’s 
followers, organised a pohtical rally to protest against Syria’s presence and
308 jV/STNovember 24, 2000. /aS’IFFNovember 9, November 10, November 11, 
November 13, November 14, November 20, and November 23, 2000. 
November 27 and November 28, 2000.
November 27, November 28, and November 29, 2000.
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commemorate Awn’s “War of Liberation” in 1989. In response, the Lebanese 
government permitted only a sit-in, and ordered its army to prevent 
demonstrations outside Syrian army centres in Beirut.^^  ^Later, on March 20, 
both a pro-Syrian rally and an anti-Awn rally composed of Amal, HizboUah, 
and the SSNP were organised.^^^ Hariri may have considered that the 
situation might escalate out of control and further destabilise Lebanon, and 
so reiterated, in fine with Berri, that the Syrian presence was temporary and 
necessary^^"*
The anti-Syrian current continued throughout A p r i l .O n  April 25, a leftist 
and former Marjayoun MP, Habib Sadiq, formed the Democratic Forum, an 
inter-sectarian group of politicians, including figures such as Walid Jumblatt 
and the former Ambassador to USA, Simon Karam, and called for dialogue 
among the Lebanese and also reassessment of Lebanese-Syrian relations.^^® 
A few days later, some 30 Christian figures such as Amin Jumayiel, Metn MP, 
Nassib Lahoud, Batroun MP, Butros Harb, Gebran Tueni, and members of 
the National Liberal Party and the Phalange Party formed the Qornet 
Shehwan Gathering, which was to be dedicated to the renegotiation of 
Lebanese-Syrian relations, and whose founding statement reiterated well- 
known nationalist themes: the necessity for national dialogue on the 
Lebanese-Syrian relationship; Lebanese army deployment to southern 
Lebanon; and Syrian army redeployment in accordance with the Ta’if 
A g reem en t.B y  May 16, the Democratic Forum prepared a new document
AfBTFebruary 23, 2001.
AfA7March 23, 2001. ISWBUscrch. 15 and March 16, 2001 
Rahil (2001) p.38.
SWBM&rch 16, March 22, and March 30, 2001.
For the details of Lebanese situation especially around the anniversary of 
outbreak of the civil war, see A/EZ"April 20, 2001.
Conversation with Simon Karam (a key figure in the Democratic Forum), 
on July 4, 2001. /AfE/June 15, 2001.
EEMay 1 and May 2, 2001. /ATE/June 15, 2001.
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complementing that of the Qornet Shehwan Gathering, and most of the 
latter’s membership and other figures across the political and confessional 
spectrum, whose total number was more than 1400, signed the document.^^®
Under mounting opposition to the Syrian presence in Lebanon, Damascus 
took the following steps in June. President Bashar Asad, who had already 
taken over the “Lebanon File” in 1998 fi*om ^ce-President Khaddam, made 
the decision to include him once again in Syria’s Lebanese policy especially 
anticipating that his close connection with Jumblatt improve relations with 
such key Lebanese political figures. Under Khaddam’s niediation, Jumblatt 
and then Sfeir met Lahoud.^^® In addition, on June 14 Syria pulled its troops 
stationed in Lebanon out of the area adjacent to the presidential palace in 
Baabda and the defence ministry in Yarze, and moved to the western Beqqa 
and the eastern region. Within 5 days, some 6,000 of the 25,000 Syrian 
troops evacuated a dozen major bases in and around Beirut, especially those 
located in largely Christian areas and near government buildings, though 
Syria continued to hold some strategic points. The Syrian redeployment was 
intended not only to appease the opposition movement against its presence, 
but also, by this partial withdrawal, to strip them of a powerful weapon to 
attack the Syrians and thus to shore up the power of its allies in the 
Lebanese government, especially Lahoud.®^ ®
(3) The “August 7” Incident and the Second Syrian Army Redeployment
The political response to the Syrian redeployment in mid-June was largely 
positive. Among the key members of the Qornet Shehwan Gathering,
For the contents of this document and the name of signatories, see DS  
May 17, 2001.
DE June 7 and June 8, 2001. /AfE/June 15, 2001.
320 June 15, June 16, June 18, June 19, June 20, and June 23, 2001. JMEI 
June 29, 2001.
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Nasrallah Sfeir, Nassib Lahoud, Butros Harb, and Walid Jumblatt 
cautiously regarded the Syrian move as a first step toward the full 
implementation of the Ta’if A g reem en t.C arlos Edde and Simon Karam 
also took the same stance.^^  ^ In contrast, Dory Chamoun condemned the 
redeployment as insufficient and stfil criticised the Syrian presence in 
Lebanon.®^^
By tapping the positive mood among the vocal critics of the Syrian presence, 
Lahoud and Berri tried to resume ties with Sfeir, Jumblatt, and Sadiq and to 
contain the power of more intransigent opposition figures.^ '^  ^ Franjieh also 
supported their efforts by meeting with Sfeir.^ ^® However, these attempts by 
pro-Syrian figures in the Lebanese government hardly seemed to be 
successful. In mid-July Nassib Lahoud launched a new grouping, the 
Movement for Democratic Renewal, which included 50 founding members 
and would presumably focus on such issues as the Shabba Farms, the Syrian 
role in Lebanon, and political reform. As for Lebanese-Syrian relations, he 
held that the Syrian military strategic role should be defined by the Ta’if 
Agreement, though he stressed the importance of harmony with Syria.^^  ^ In 
addition, Sfeir reiterated that the Syrian “hegemony” was stfii a reality 
Finally, Sfeir visited Shuf, Jumblatt’s hometown, to further strengthen their 
ties and reconciliation, since their relations had been severely damaged 
during the 1983-1984 “ShufWar”.»^
DE June 15, 2001.
322 25, 2001. /Conversation with Simon Karam (a key figure in the
Democratic Forum), July 4, 2001.
323 2?EJune 22 and June 27, 2001. /Conversation with Dory Chamoun (the 
National Liberal Party leader), July 9, 2001.
DE June 28, June 29, June 30, July 5, and July 21, 2001.
DE July 13, 2001.
DE July 16 and July 17, 2001. /MBIAugust 10, 2001.
DE July 20, 2001.
^  DE August 4, August 6, and August 7, 2001. /MEIAugust 10, 2001.
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The formation of a strong Maronite-Druze alliance calling for further 
Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon made the pro-Syrian figures in the 
Lebanese government increasingly nervous. Taking advantage of Hariri’s 
trip to Pakistan, Lahoud ordered the security forces to crack down on 
supporters of the Lebanese Forces and the Free National Current. Beginning 
on August 7, about 140 people were detained .Im m ediately  after the 
incident, Jumblatt, Sfeir, members of the Qornet Shehwan Gathering, and 
some Christian MP denounced the arrests while Lahoud praised the security 
forces.^ °^ Lahoud tried unsuccessfully to mend fences with S f e i r . I n  fact, 
Sfeir continued to demand the complete Syrian redeployment to the Beqqa in 
accordance with the Ta’if Agreement. The Qornet Shehwan Gathering was 
stiU active, but its power and unity were somewhat eroded by the following 
factors. Firstly with Lahoud recovering his power among the “Troika”, 
Jumblatt, acting pragmatically improved his relations with Lahoud in late 
October.Secondly, the internal dispute among the Maronites, the backbone 
of the movement, seemed to badly affect the situation; specifically there were 
verbal attacks between Awn and Sfeir over the tactics and power struggles in 
the Phalange P a r t y . I n  addition, Hariri, who originally condemned the 
arrests, was forced to cooperate with Lahoud to make progress on economic 
recovery which had been severely damaged by the “August 7” incident, and 
finally blamed Sfeir in mid-March 2002 for being an obstacle to his 
reconstruction efforts, since he came to see Sfeir’s actions as a destabilising
DE August 8, 2001. /AfE/August 31, 2001.
DE August 14, August 15, August 23, and August 24, 2001.
DE August 22 and August 23, 2001.
^  DE October 31, 2001. /AfE/September 14, 2001.
333 movement criticised HizboUah’s activities in the Shabaa Farms. [DE 
December 28, 2001.]
DE October 27, October 28, and October 29, 2001.
DE August 29, August 30, September 1, September 8, 2001.
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factor in Lebanon.^^® By keeping a distance from the leading opposition 
figure, Hariri may have expected cooperation from Syria on the forthcoming 
Arab summit in Beirut.
The weakened power of the opposition movement and Hariri’s reentry into 
the Syrian orbit brought about the second Syrian army redeployment in 
April, though some Christian university students and the Free National 
Current still protested against the Syrian presence around the time of 
Lebanon’s Independence Day and the Arab summit in B e iru t.U n lik e  the 
previous redeployment, this Syrian decision was probably influenced by the 
following calculation: since the opposition to its presence was largely 
curtailed both at government level and at a social level, the reduction of its 
military presence would not affect its status and thus would not damage its 
allies in Lebanon. In other words, the Syrian move seemed to result not fi*om 
its “weakness” but from its “strength”.
(4) Brief Summary
Overall, even when the Lebanese discussion over Syria’s presence reached 
its peak by assuming cross-sectarian dimensions, pro-Syrian state officials, 
especially Lahoud and Berri, continued to defend Syria’s role in Lebanon. 
Since Lahoud’s continuous alignment with Syria hurt his popularity among 
the Maronites, he had to rely on Syria to maintain his power. Also, since 
Berri has not had enough power of his own to compete against HizboUah, he 
has needed the Syrian presence. As regards Hariri, though he sometimes 
aligned with the anti-Syrian current, he generally contained the tide so as 
not to harm his economic reconstruction, which has been his main asset to 
secure his legitimacy as prime minister. FinaUy the societal current did not
DEMarch 16, 2002. /ME/March 22, 2002.
DEMarch 21, March 29, April 4, April 5, April 6, April 8. /ATE/December 7,
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succeed in pressuring the state officials among the “Troika” to change their 
attitudes. There appear to have been two main reasons for this: firstly, the 
strong tendency of the “Troika” members to protect their own power and 
status under Syrian indirect rule; and secondly, the disunity among the big 
figures in the anti-Syrian movement, particularly Jumblatt’s opportunistic 
behaviour toward Lahoud and the differences of strategy between Awn and 
Sfeir.
2001, April 5, and April 19, 2002.
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V. CONCLUSION
This chapter firstly aims to answer the three questions posed in the 
introductory chapter: (1) Why has Lebanon generally “bandwagoned” with 
Syria, a country which has managed to intervene in and subdue it? (2) How 
have Lebanese state officials, along with other pohtical actors, tried to 
manipulate Syria for their own interests, whether to defend Lebanese 
sovereignty, to maintain and increase their status, or to contain and appease 
their rivals and opponents? (3) Parallel to the discussions generated by these 
two questions, which kinds of theory are relevant to or best explain Lebanese 
relations with Syria? In doing so, the chapter will summarise the Lebanese 
state’s dealings with the Syrians during the civil war and post-war periods 
respectively in order to answer the first and second question and, based on 
the summary of each period, the third question can be answered. Secondly, 
by extending the Lebanese case study, more wide-ranging and 
philosophical/methodological issues will be addressed.
1. THE CIVIL WAR PERIOD : LEBANON UNDER SEMI-ANARCHY
(1) Summary
Although the civil war semi-anarchy stripped the presidency of much real 
power, the power of the president was still superior to that of his 
counterparts, the prime minister and the speaker of parliament, and it was 
primarily the president who directed the Lebanese state. Presidents, being 
Maronites and occupying the office which institutionalised Lebanese 
sovereignty, had, by virtue of their communal and state roles, an interest in 
resisting Syria’s encroachment on Lebanon; yet, lacking reliable coercive 
power, they had also to appease Syria while still trying to use Syrian power
on behalf of their own power positions. Given the pivotal role of the president, 
this section whL primarily summarise his actions by looking at each 
presidential term.
Franjieh: After the outbreak of the civil war in Lebanon, President Suliman 
Franjieh faced heavy attack from the LNM-PLO forces. While Syria forced 
Franjieh to accept Rashid Karami, who was supported by the Sunni 
establishment and the LNM-PLO coalition, as his counterpart, Franjieh 
probably considered that by supporting the Syrian-backed Karami he could 
both appease Syria and also Muslim and Palestinian groups with transstate 
ties to Syria, and thus maintain his status. Though Syria’s imposition of 
Karami somewhat worsened relations between Asad and Franjieh, they 
maintained their contacts, even in this tense period, on the basis of thefr 
shared political interests. Syria, for its part, did not want to antagonise the 
Lebanese president and also needed to construct broad support in the 
Lebanese government in order to get acceptance of its increasing 
involvement in Lebanese affairs. Later, in the spring of 1976, when Franjieh 
retracted his earlier resignation against Syrian wishes, Syria ultimately 
permitted him to stay in office until the expiration of his official term, 
calculating it would be able to exert more influence through such a well- 
known figure. Syria’s needs, in turn, made it possible for Franjieh, by using 
his external patron, to defend his power against his rivals in the community, 
Camille Chamoun and Pierre Jumayiel, who were increasing their power by 
forming the Lebanese Front. Also, Franjieh’s long-term reliance on Syria, 
and especially the Asad family, made his sensitivity tosvsxd Syria higher, and 
seemed to encourage his continuous alignment with Damascus.
Broad Maronite support for aligning with Syria in order to prevent further 
losses to the LNM-PLO coafition, resulting from the severe battlefield 
fighting during late 1975 and early 1976, enabled Franjieh, along with
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Karami, to associate himself with the Syrian-initiated “Constitutional 
Documents” which aimed to preserve the status quo in Lebanon, the 
confessional system, with some modifications. Since Syria secured Sunni 
communal interests in the document by preserving the post of prime 
minister for the Sunni community against Kamal Jumblatt’s demands, 
relations between Karami and the Syrians were further consoHdated. After 
Jumblatt criticised the “Constitutional Documents” and escalated military 
attacks against the government and the Maronites, both of which were now 
backed by Syria, Franjieh asked for the Syrian army to protect them from 
the LNM-PLO coalition supported by the LAA. His request matched with the 
interests of Karami and Syria, both fearful of the increasing power and 
popularity of the Jumblatt-led “radical” forces among the Muslims. Asad 
decided to send Syria’s regular army to Lebanon in June 1976 in order to 
contain the LNM-PLO forces, in part so as not to give Israel a pretext for 
intervention in Lebanon. Once its troops settled down in Lebanon, Syria 
inevitably became a pivotal player in Lebanese pohtics.
Sarkis: Indeed, Syria succeeded in having Elias Sarkis elected as the next 
president. Although the election of Sarkis to the presidency was owed largely 
to Syrian influence and although his inauguration was performed under 
Syrian guidance, he tried, as a Shihabist, to keep his poficy as “neutral” as 
possible during his term. Firstly, Sarkis nominated Safim Hoss as prime 
minister, and formed a cabinet without representatives fi*om warlord 
factions, at the same time deferring to the Syria’s opposition to LNM 
participation in the cabinet.
However, Sarkis gradually distanced himself from Syria and by 1978 had 
become closer to the Lebanese Front, mainly as a result of the worsened 
relations between Syria and the Maronites, especially the Lebanese Front, 
and also because of Syria’s passive attitude toward the implementation of
the Shtura Agreement concluded in July 1977. While he had anticipated 
Syrian help in containment of Palestinian activities in southern Lebanon 
and a deployment of the Lebanese army there, changes in regional 
circumstances gave Syria an interest in keeping a Palestinian military 
presence there. To counter this shift in Syrian pohcy, Sarkis tried to build 
inter-Arab support in order to deal with the PLO’s military presence in 
southern Lebanon and enable the Lebanese army to be dispatched there. 
These efforts were ultimately disrupted by both the polarisation between 
Arab states, resulting from the Islamic Revolution in Iran and the Iran-lraq 
War, and also by Syria which needed a Palestinian armed presence in 
southern Lebanon to counter Israel’s provocative attitude under the Begin- 
led Likud government.
At the same time, Sarkis stül tried carefully not to alienate the Muslims 
and the Syrians. He continued to support his Sunni counterparts, Hoss and 
Wazzan. When Hoss threatened to resign in May 1979, he actually asked 
Hoss to form a new cabinet. Also Hoss, who gave priority to economic 
reconstruction, continuously backed Sarkis’s regional policy of seeking inter- 
Arab support to stabilise the South. Later, after the “Missile Crisis” in mid- 
1981, Sarkis and Wazzan cooperated to propose a joint peace program. 
Ultimately Sarkis deferred to Syrian interests in Lebanon, in that he 
continued to extend the ADF mandate at its periodic expirations, and even 
after he finally decided to let the ADF mandate expire in July 1982, he later 
agreed at the September Arab League summit in Fez that the 
implementation of the Syrian withdrawal would be contingent on Lebanese- 
Syrian negotiations and on Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon.
It seems probable that some occasional Syrian appeasement, notably 
Syria’s partial redeployment of its troops from Christian-dominated areas of 
northern Lebanon and East Beirut to Beqqa in January 1980, and also
m
Sarkis’s recognition of growing Shi’ite power and of Shi’ite close relations 
with Syria, encouraged his deference to Syria. However, Lebanese-Syrian 
economic interdependence, which his Sunni technocrat counterparts may 
have more clearly recognised, seemed to be another important factor behind 
his alignment with Syria, especially considering the priority he gave to 
cooperation with them. In the fall of 1976, the Syrian-led ADF created 
conditions in Beirut for the banking sector to be able to re-operate, which 
made it possible for Syrian investors to once again use banks in Lebanon. At 
the same time, Lebanon exported a variety of goods to Syria itself and the 
Gulf states through Syria. In addition, under the flourishing müitia economy 
and the illegal economic activities that occurred as a result, even one of the 
most important lifelines in Lebanon, electricity, was being imported from 
Syria.
Jumayiel: Sarkis’s successor, Amin Jumayiel, elected at a juncture when 
both Israeli and Western forces had intervened in Lebanon, countering 
Syrian power, was initially aUgned with the USA and Israel against Syrian 
and Muslim forces, and indeed concluded the May 17 Agreement with Israel 
in 1983. He could do this because of weakened Syrian and Muslim-PLO 
power, the newly established Israeli hegemony in Lebanon, and the revival of 
the Cold War context in the Middle East that brought the US in on his side. 
However, his actions provoked heavy opposition from the Syrian-led 
National Salvation Front (NSF) forces, and led to the fierce “Shuf War”, a 
disintegration in the Lebanese army, and also a succession of heavy Shi’ite 
attacks on the Multi National Forces (MNF). While he tried to rely on the 
USA and Israel to contain the NSF, their large numbers of casualties led 
both governments to cut down their presence in Lebanon.
Under these circumstances, Jumayiel recognised the danger of neglecting 
Lebanon’s Arab identity, and resumed ties with Syria to protect himself from
fierce Druze and Shi’ite attacks. In exchange for his abrogation of the May 17 
Agreement, Syria pressured Jumblatt and Berri to soften their attitude 
toward Jumayiel. However in the Lausanne conference in mid-March of 1984, 
Syria’s allies, Jumblatt and Berri, still thrust (what he saw as) unreasonable 
demands on him, and because the Syrian leadership was racked by internal 
conflict between pro-Asad and pro-Rifat factions, Syria could not persuade 
them to moderate their demands. Later in April, as fragmentation within 
Lebanon mounted, Jumayiel asked Syria to persuade its allies to cooperate 
with him. However, Syria did not want to strengthen the position of the 
president at the expense of its traditional allies.
Although these Syrian attitudes would have fi'ustrated Jumayiel, he still 
paid attention to Berri’s economic interests, anticipating that this would lead 
to the latter’s cooperation with his government. In fact, the Ministry of the 
South was created, and an aid program and the revival of the highway 
project for southern Lebanon were agreed. Though the “Tripartite 
Agreement” in December 1985 and its resulting military conflict between the 
factions of the Lebanese Forces led by Efie Hubayka and the Lebanese army 
caused Jumayiel to be further disappointed with the Syrians, he reopened 
dialogue with Asad in the fall of 1986. Syria’s efforts to contain HizboUah 
and the PLO by using Amal in order to prevent the radicalisation of Lebanon 
could weU have appeased him. However, the Syrian condition that dialogue 
should be based on the spirit of the “Tripartite Agreement” was not 
acceptable to Jumayiel, and he became increasingly reUant on the Lebanese 
Forces and the Lebanese army. In fact, he rejected the Syrian demand in 
March 1987 that the Jumayiel administration and the Lebanese army 
should clear the Lebanese Forces mihtias fi*om the streets of East Beirut. 
Syria refused to pressure Amal and the PSP in September 1986 to cooperate 
with the government over the closure of iUegal ports, although the Syrian
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army sided with Jumayiel in late August 1987 when poor Shi’ites 
demonstrated against the government decision to cut subsidies to basic 
goods. Although Syria occasionally cooperated with Jumayiel, his Maronite- 
oriented behaviour continued until the end of his presidential term.
(2) Theoretical Applications
Lebanese presidents’ alliances with Syria could be partially explained by a 
theory of complex realism. As Harknett and Vandenberg explained, 
interrelated threats require state officials to cope with internal and external 
challenges that reinforce one another. During the civil war, Maronite 
presidents in Lebanon were challenged by interrelated threats from Syria: 
its violation of Lebanese sovereignty by interfering in Lebanese political 
affairs and by sending and stationing its troops and its support of the 
powerful opposition forces in Lebanon, the Muslims and Palestinians, 
though it occasionally opposed them. Simple realism would expect Lebanon 
to balance against Syria. However, except in a brief period after the Israeli 
invasion in 1982, the Maronite presidents nevertheless ahgned with Syria, 
on the basis of the following factors.
Franjieh managed to contain the greater internal threat, powerful LNM- 
PLO coalition, by ahgning with the lesser threat, Syria. Franjieh was not 
balancing against Syria as simple realism would expect, but took the 
strategy of “omni-ahgnments” with the lesser threat to deal with the greater 
internal threat, as the theory of complex realism predicts. Sarkis initially 
tried to contain Palestinian activities by using Syrian power as explained by 
complex realism, though this resulted in failure because of the 
fragmentation in the Arab world. Jumayiel initially tried, by using the 
weakness of the sub-state groups, specifically Arab-oriented Muslim forces, 
in Lebanon in the context of the Cold War intensification in the Middle East,
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to be a rational actor and to defend Lebanese sovereignty by aligning with 
the USA and Israel against Syria, as the theory of simple realism would 
expect. However, as the Syrian-led NSF forces soon became powerful, the 
prerequisites on which simple realism is based disappeared and the 
disastrous results for Lebanon led him to improve relations with Syria in 
order to win support from Syria’s allies in Lebanon, particularly the Druze 
and Shi’ite forces, as the theory of complex realism suggests.
It is probable that Maronite presidents were prepared to cooperate with 
Syria as a result of Syria’s support for Lebanon’s domestic status quo. For 
example, the “Constitutional Documents” in February 1976 which gave the 
Christians disproportionate number of seats in the parliament and the 
Syrian army siding with the Lebanese government in late August 1987 
during the uprising of poor Shi’ites, may have appealed to Franjieh and 
Jumayiel. Also, Syria occasionally appeased Lebanese presidents; thus for 
example, its partial redeployment of its troops in January 1980 may have 
softened Sarkis’s perception of Syria despite strained Maronite-Syrian 
relations.
However, as the theory of constructivism suggests, the identity factor also 
played a key role in determining the presidents’ policies towards Syria. The 
presidents’ Maronite identity theoretically perceived Syria as a threat to 
Lebanese sovereignty. However, the fact that the majority of Lebanese held 
Arab identity and that the Arab-oriented forces were generally powerful 
during the civil war, along with each president’s peculiar circumstances, 
constrained their possible strategies. Presidents were thus caught between 
the identity of their own community and that of the Muslims who, as 
president, they also had to satisfy. This in turn forced them to take greater 
account of Syria.
In the case of Franjieh, he seemed to balance between representing a
Maronite identity and appeasing the Arabism championed by Syria and the 
LNM-PLO forces. In fact, he both preserved the Maronite prerogatives by 
signing the Syrian-initiated “Constitutional Documents” and nominated 
Syrian-backed Karami as prime minister. Even after Sarkis distanced 
himself from Syria, Sarkis did his best not to antagonise the Mushms and 
worked through the Arab League in his attempts to pacify Lebanon. In other 
words, as a Shihabist he avoided exclusive identification with non-Arab 
notion of Maronite identity and instead accommodated the Arab identities of 
many Lebanese, and by using Arab support, attempted to appease both Syria 
and Muslim-PLO coalition, though this was not successful. His continuous 
extension of the ADF mandate also had the same aim. In the case of 
Jumayiel, his initial alignments with the USA and Israel were also 
influenced by a Maronite identity which saw the West and Israel as their 
protectors. Even after his policies brought about strong opposition from the 
Syrian-backed NSF forces, he tried to rely on the USA and Israel to contain 
Syria’s aUies in Lebanon, but this failed. As Syrian hegemony in Lebanon 
was restored by the NSF’s military offensive, he finally learned the 
importance of Arab identity among the Muslim Lebanese and began to 
improve relations with Syria. This shows that balancing in complex realism 
is not just a response to internal threats, but takes account of identity. 
Indeed, as constructivism argues, “threats” are not self-evident but shaped 
by one’s identity.
In addition to complex realism and constructivism, pluralism is an 
important theoretical construct that can be used to make sense of Lebanese- 
Syrian relations. There were not only shared economic interests but also 
shared political interests between the two countries. As regards the former, 
their interdependence through financial affairs, trade, and smuggling, along 
with the Shihabist Sarkis’s high priority to keep on good terms with the
economic-oriented Sunni prime minister, could explain why he never tried to 
sever relations with Syria. As regards the latter, there was an 
interdependence of political interests between Franjieh and Syria in 
maintaining his presidency. By using Syria’s need for his support to 
legitimise its Lebanese role, Franjieh not only maintained his status and 
contained his rivals within the Maronite community but also managed to 
defend Lebanese sovereignty. Also, Franjieh’s long-term personal relations 
with Asad were another factor in influencing his perceptions of Syria. In 
other words, his interests in aligning with Syria carried more weight than 
his identity as a Maronite. As pluralism holds, the variety of actors, state 
and sub-state, shaping Lebanese-Syrian relations and the resulting complex 
interdependence contributed to the cooperation between Lebanon and Syria. 
As we have seen, presidents’ actions could be explained on the basis of three 
theories: complex realism, constructivism, and plurahsm. Which theories are 
applicable to other political actors? In terms of their Arab-oriented identity, 
Sunni prime ministers were a natural ally of Syria. In addition, Karami and 
Syria had a common political interest: to contain the LNM-PLO forces. 
Karami needed Syrian help in order to maintain his status among the 
Muslims, and Syria needed his support among the community. Hoss and 
Wazzan seemed to recognise the importance of economic interdependence 
between Lebanon and Syria. In effect, identity (constructivism) and shared 
interests (pluralism) could explain the cases of prime ministers.
In the case of Jumblatt, it is possible to say, considering his continuous 
alliances with the Palestinians, that he actually had an Arab-oriented 
identity. However, another reason why he opposed the “Constitutional 
Documents” and finally confronted the Syrian forces was that the Syrian- 
initiated plan neglected his communal-based desire to assume the 
premiership or speakership, which decreased his interest in aligning with
Syria. As a result, constructivism and pluralism could explain the cases of 
prime ministers and Jumblatt.
2 . THE POST-WAR PERIOD : LEBANON UNDER INDIRECT RULE
(1) Summary
This section will primarily summarise the actions of Rafiq Hariri, since, in 
addition to the increased power of the prime minister stipulated in the Ta’if 
Agreement, he has occupied the post during most of this period and also has 
tried to behave “independently” despite the strong influence of indirect 
Syrian rule.
Karami and Solh: The first post-Ta’if government led by Omar Karami was 
largely at the mercy of the Syrians. First of all, Syria played an important 
role in forming the cabinet. Secondly, though the Defence Minister, Michael 
Murr, ordered in March 1991 all Lebanese and Palestinian militias to disarm, 
Lebanon was forced to accept HizboUah’s military presence in the South in 
accordance with Syria’s strategy toward Israel. Furthermore, the May 1991 
Treaty of Brotherhood, Cooperation, and Coordination estabUshed Syrian 
hegemony in Lebanon. The treaty consequently came in for severe criticism 
in Lebanon, especiaUy from the Christians. Under these circumstances, 
though the Karami government tried to improve the economic conditions, 
they continued to be poor and finaUy brought about a mass riot in May 1992. 
Since the incident had the danger of escalating into opposition against the 
Syrians, Damascus decided to replace him. The succeeding government 
under Rashid Solh was also in a weak position toward Syria. In fact, Syria’s 
firm intention to hold parliamentary elections in the summer of 1992 
overrode strong Lebanese, especiaUy Maronite, opposition.
Hariri: In contrast to these figures, Hariri, supported both internationaUy 
and domesticaUy, was generaUy in a stronger position toward Syria,
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especially before 1996 when the Lebanese began to criticise his economic 
pohcy. Indeed, considering himself to be an indispensable figure for Syria 
which anticipated, through Lebanon’s economic improvement, the 
strengthening of its legitimacy there, Hariri used the strategies of either 
threatening to resign or actual resignation four times in total during his first 
term, August 1993, May 1994, December 1994, and May 1995. By doing so, 
he forced Damascus to pressure its chents in his cabinet and the pro-Syrian 
Speaker Nabih Berri (his opponents) to cooperate with him, in order to push 
through his “Horizon 2000” plan.
However, his pohtical power as prime minister has been considerably 
constrained not only by that of other two figures in the “Troika”, especially 
Berri, but also that of Syrian-backed HizboUah which has carried out 
mUitary operations in the border areas with Israel. In effect, Hariri’s 
eagerness to stabUise Lebanon and faciUtate investment and economic 
reconstruction has required him to take into consideration HizboUah’s stakes 
in Lebanon. Anticipating the need to win cooperation firom Amal and 
HizboUah for his economic efforts, he continued to pay attention to the 
economic interests held by these Shi’ite forces, while he himself secured his 
own interests. Representative of this was the project to buUd a coastal road 
firom Beirut to southern Lebanon, as was the case of Elysser.
Moreover, Hariri has generaUy cooperated with Syria over its security 
concerns, in order to benefit from Syrian control over HizboUah. When Israel 
launched massive operations against Lebanon (“Operation AccountabiUty” in 
1993 and “Grapes of Wrath” in 1996), Hariri pursued diplomatic efforts 
mainly in Europe to reach agreements on southern Lebanon, aiming to 
minimise the damage for economic reconstruction, whUe showing solidarity 
with HizboUah and organising a compensation program for the displaced. 
Though Hariri initiaUy showed interest in the possibiUty of IsraeU unUateral
withdrawal from the “security zone”, he later opposed the separation 
between the Lebanon-Israel and Syria-Israel tracks, as proposed in 
Netanyahu as “Lebanon First” proposal. After Hariri assumed his second
premiership following the Hoss government (1998 — 2000), Hariri has
generally defended the Syrian presence in Lebanon against demands for 
Syrian withdrawal led by Maronite Patriarch Sfeir. Also, he has never 
criticised HizboUah, amidst a succession of HizboUah mUitary attacks 
against IsraeU forces in the Shabaa Farms, in the context of the US war 
against terrorism after “September 11”. By continuously deferring to Syrian 
interests in Lebanon, he has especiaUy expected that in return Syria would 
contain HizboUah s mUitary operations in order to minimise the economic 
damage to Lebanon. In fact, Syria has occasionaUy pressured HizboUah to 
halt its mUitary activities and given economic concessions to Lebanon, for 
example by removing import restrictions on Lebanese commodities before 
the 2002 Arab summit in Beirut.
WhUe Hariri has aUgned with Syria in order to deal with the “threat” posed 
by these Shi’ite groups, there have also been shared economic and poUtical 
interests between Lebanon and Syria. As regards the former, he has accepted 
the presence of Syrian workers in Lebanon, which decreased the 
unemployment rate in Syria and brought about huge remittances for Syria 
and which also gave the Hariri-supported business community the cheap 
labour force necessary for reconstruction projects. Also a Syrian decree 
aUowing foreign banks to operate in the free trade zones attracted Lebanese 
banks in which Hariri had his own stakes. GeneraUy, both Hariri and Syria 
have given priority to stabUity in Lebanon. WhUe Hariri’s motivation has 
been to create the condition for facUitating foreign investment in Lebanon, 
Syria has feared the radicaUsation of Lebanese would develop into the 
opposition movement against its presence. Thus, Hariri, with Syrian backing.
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restricted the mass media: he tried to introduce stiff penalties on journalists 
and newspapers in 1994, and actually reduced the number of television and 
radio stations in 1996. Also, when the General Confederation of Labour 
(GCL) called a strike and mass demonstration in 1995, Hariri banned all 
demonstrations and public gatherings, and later in 1997 defeated Abu Rizq, 
a hostile chairman of the GCL. Syria, overtly or tacitly, supported Hariri’s 
actions against the GCL.
As we have seen, Hariri’s bandwagoning with Syria has occurred mainly 
because of his eagerness to make progress in economic reconstruction and 
also to defend his own economic interests. But what factors have affected 
other pohtical figures’ attitudes toward Syria?
The president and speaker: The other two figures in the “Troika” have 
generally been in a weak position. In contrast to the opposition figures who 
boycotted the parliamentary elections, Hrawi did not have strong support 
among the Maronites, which forced him to rely on Syria in order to maintain 
his status. Though his successor, Lahoud, initially obtained broad Lebanese 
support, his consistent support for the Syrian presence in Lebanon and for 
Hizbollah’s mUitary activities in Lebanon, as well as Patriarch Sfeir’s 
growing popularity among the Maronites, also increasingly led him, hke 
Hrawi, to count on Syria. Berri also has generaUy taken a pro-Syrian stance 
in order to maintain, with Syrian power, his status in the Shi’ite community, 
especiaUy since HizboUah has been more popular than Amal among the 
populous. Syria, for its part, has had its own interest in maintaining the 
power of these figures in order to construct broad support in the Lebanese 
government for its presence. Also it has counted on Berri to contain “radical” 
HizboUah.
The deputies: Lebanese deputies have tended to manipulate Syria to secure 
their seats, regardless of their sects. To this end, they have generaUy taken
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cooperative attitudes toward Syrian-supported gerrymandering and also 
joined Syrian-initiated electoral lists. In southern Lebanon, candidates from 
Amal and HizboUah and Bahiyya Hariri, in spite of their conflicts with each 
other, formed a single electoral list under Syrian urging. Also there were 
“strange” electoral aUiances between HizboUah and the Phalange Party. In 
addition, the number of Maronite poHticians participating in the elections 
increased, since they feared their marginaUsation and loss of power in the 
pohtical institution if they abstained. In the long run, Lebanese poHtical 
figures have continuously aligned with Syria under indirect rule.
This did not change after Bashar Asad began to take the “Lebanon Füe” 
from Syrian Vice-President Abdul HaUm Khaddam in 1998 and succeeded to 
his father’s office in 2000. Though Bashar Asad initiaUy tried to stahUise the 
IsraeU-Lebanese border by dispatching Syrian intelligence officers to the 
South, he later sought a pretext for keeping HizboUah’s mUitary attacks 
against Israeli forces in order to pressure Israel over its occupation of the 
Golan and stated the Shabaa Farms was stUl-occupied Lebanese territory. In 
addition to HizboUah’s continuous guerriUa activities, Bashar’s close ties 
with President Lahoud have further posed a “threat” from Syria to the Hariri 
government. Since Hariri’s close aUy in the Syrian regime, Khaddam, 
retreated from Lebanese affairs and his position among the “Troika” was 
weakened, Hariri has become more dependent on Syria in his second term
(2000—) in order to push through his economic plan and also to control
HizboUah.
(2) Theoretical AppUcations
TheoreticaUy, as simple reaUsm suggests, the initial broad support for 
Hariri not only from the international community hut also from the majority 
of Lebanese made it possible for him to behave as a rational actor to defend
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Lebanese sovereignty by balancing against Syria. In fact, he occasionally 
attempted to get Western support and negotiate with Israel in order to calm 
the border areas in southern Lebanon and to establish governmental 
authority there, and also pressured Syria, backed by international and 
domestic support for him, to make its aUies in Lebanon cooperate with him. 
However, his position as prime minister has been challenged not only 
occasionally by the dominant Syrians but also regularly by Berri and 
HizboUah, both supported by Syria. In other words, Hariri has been placed 
under interrelated threats from Syria as complex reaUsm suggests: despite 
its constrains on Lebanese sovereignty he has had to appease Syria in order 
to ward off chaUenges from Syrian-supported Shi’ite forces. SpecifrcaUy, in 
order to prevent turmoU in Lebanon and to faciUtate foreign investment, he 
has had to rely on Syrian support to control HizboUah’s military activities in 
the South, whose militancy seemed to somewhat increase after Bashar Asad 
took power in Syria. He has also taken into consideration the economic 
interests of Amal and HizboUah, aiming to soften their opposition to him. 
Thus, his aUgnment with Syria could be explained by the theory of complex 
reaUsm.
In addition to Syria’s occasional appeasement of Hariri (by restricting 
HizboUah’s military activities in southern Lebanon and by lifting economic 
restrictions), identity and shared interests also seem to have affected his 
attitude towards Syria. First of aU, although Hariri is a Sunni, he has viewed 
the Syrian presence in Lebanon and Syrian-backed HizboUah’s mUitary 
activities in the South as “threats”, since these factors have actuaUy 
obstructed his economic reconstruction efforts by Umiting Western aid and 
investment. In this respect, his economic interests appear to have 
overshadowed his Sunni identity. However, it seems that, as a Sunni 
poUtician elected from Sunni-dominated West Beirut, he has needed to take
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account of the Sunnis’ Arab-oriented identity, their sympathy toward Syria, 
and their support for resistance to Israel. In fact, he occasionally showed his 
solidarity with Hizbollah’s resistance, especially when Lebanese sympathy 
toward the group mounted after Israel’s massive attacks. As constructivism 
suggests, the Arab-oriented identity of his constituents has affected Hariri’s 
pohcies.
Secondly, while it seems possible to say that the identity factor surrounding 
Hariri has forced him to take appeasement policies towards Syria, there 
have been more “positive” factors Unking Hariri and the Syrians: their 
shared interests which have led to their mutual cooperation as the theory of 
pluraUsm suggests. The two issues of Syrian workers in Lebanon and Syria’s 
permission for Lebanese banks to operate in its free trade zone, being 
beneficial to both states, seem to have reinforced their economic 
interdependence. In addition, they have had common pohtical interests in 
preventing Lebanon from becoming radicaUsed. Syria has feared that 
radicaUsation would develop into Lebanese mass opposition to its presence, 
and Hariri has never wanted turmoil in Lebanon to obstruct his economic 
reconstruction efforts.
As we have seen, Hariri’s actions can be explained on the basis of three 
theories: complex reaUsm, constructivism, and pluraUsm. Which theories 
have relevance to other Lebanese poUtical actors? Both the president and 
speaker have generaUy been unpopular in their own community. Although 
both Hrawi and Lahoud, as a Maronite, may have seen Syria as a threat 
violating Lebanese sovereignty, their weak position forced them to rely on 
Syria in order to maintain their presidency and to contain their communal 
rivals, especially popular opposition leaders such as Patriarch Sfeir. In other 
words, thefr Maronite identity was overridden by their power interests, but 
this seems to have been considerably affected by the Syrian need to have
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Maronite allies in the government in order to construct broad support to its 
presence, since most Maronites have not welcomed the Syrians. Thus Syria 
has had an interest in protecting their presidencies, and the Maronite 
presidents, in turn, have received Syrian support. In effect, the 
interdependence between the presidents and Syria has led to their mutual 
cooperation as pluralism suggests.
In the case of Speaker Berri, not only his Shi’ite identity but also his 
eagerness, by counting on Syria, to maintain his power in the Shi’ite 
community against popular HizboUah seems to have affected his close ties 
with Syria. At the same time, the containment of HizboUah’s power has also 
benefited Syria, since it has feared the radicaUsation of Lebanon. The 
relation between Berri and Syria could be thus explained by both 
constructivism and pluraUsm: his Shi’ite identity and their shared poUtical 
interest to contain HizboUah.
In addition, Lebanese deputies and the Syrians also have had common 
poUtical interests. The deputies have given priority to securing their seats, 
and by guaranteeing it through gerrymandering and the formation of 
electoral aUiances Syria has acquired influence in Lebanon through these 
deputies. Since shared poUtical interests have generated their 
interdependence, pluraUsm could explain the above cases of Lebanese 
poUtical actors: the presidents, speaker, and deputies, though constructivism 
might partiaUy apply to the case of Berri.
3 . FROM THE LEBANESE CASE STUDY TO THE MORE
WIDE-RANGING AND PHILOSOPHICAL/METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES 
This case study demonstrates the behaviour of a penetrated weak state, Uke 
Lebanon, toward a regional middle power, like Syria, cannot usefuUy be 
explained by simple reaUsm’s state-to-state power balancing model but only
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by a combination of factors identified in a variety of theories, namely “omni- 
ahgnments” against interrelated threats (complex reaUsm), identity 
(constructivism), and interest interdependence (pluraUsm).
Simple reaUsm is useful in understanding Syrian behaviour. Since Syria 
managed to subordinate its domestic groups under Asad, its foreign poUcy 
has been relatively freed from domestic constraints and it can be treated as a 
unitary rational actor. In effect, external factors, that is the regional 
dynamics in the Middle East, have largely shaped its foreign poUcy 
including its Lebanese poUcy, and it has continuously given a top priority to 
securing its national defence against Israel. By contrast, the Lebanese state 
cannot be seen as a unified actor and thus it is necessary to differentiate the 
multitude of state (office-holders) and sub-state actors. In practice although 
the regional system has affected Lebanese attitudes towards the Syrians, 
they have been more strongly influenced by domestic factors. SpecfficaUy, as 
sub-state actors, especiaUy ones backed by Syria, have been generaUy 
powerful, these circumstances have required state officials to take account of 
domestic threats. SpecfficaUy, when they face both internal and external 
threats at the same time, they use the lesser threatening force to appease 
and contain the greater threat, as complex reaUsm would suggest, which is 
generaUy internal.
For Lebanese poUtical leaders, unlike the Syrians, “threat” does not 
automaticaUy mean a particular state, either Israel or Syria even though 
both are more powerful contiguous states and even though both, especiaUy 
Syria, have threatened Lebanese sovereignty. In spite of this, Syria has not 
necessarUy been seen as an unmitigated threat because Lebanon has not 
been a national state with a shared identity differentiated from Syria, but 
has incorporated communities sharing trans-state identities with Syria. On 
the one hand, the specific communal identity of sub-state actors has affected
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which country is perceived as the greater threat. On the other hand, 
Lebanese actors’ economic/pohtical interests have sometimes overshadowed 
their communal identity in shaping perceptions of threat. Concretely, since 
Muslims having Arab identities have constituted the majority of Lebanese, 
state officials have had to take account of their sympathy towards Syria, 
sometimes regardless of their own identity, in order to secure their power 
and status. At the same time, the various actors have developed economic 
and pohtical interdependence with Syria. From this Lebanese-Syrian case 
study, it seems possible to say that perceptions of “threat” are strongly 
connected with and/or influenced by identity and interests and are not given 
from power or location as neo-reahsm imagines.
Though each of these three theories (complex realism, constructivism, and 
plurahsm) speciahses in highlighting different aspects in international 
relations, they have a common assumption that state is not a unitary actor 
and they are also interconnected at the sub/trans-state level which largely 
influences state’s foreign relations. Thus, the combination of three theories is 
not only reasonable but also essential to allow a full comprehension of the 
various dimensions of Lebanese-Syrian relations. In other words, the 
employment of a single analytical approach is insufficient as a framework for 
this case study. In sum, it shows that while simple realism could explain the 
behaviour of a consolidated or coherent state, the combination of complex 
reahsm, constructivism, and plurahsm is more appHcable to a penetrated 
weak state like Lebanon. Since this conclusion results from a specific case, 
the wider vahdity of the argument for international relations theory would 
have to be tested by examining other penetrated weak states’ cases under 
similar circumstances. This might become a basis for a new more widely 
apphcable theory of international relations in Third World states.
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ABBREVIATIONS
The abbreviations below refer to newspapers, periodicals, information services, 
and documents cited in the text.
DS The Daily Star (Lebanese Newspaper)
EIU  Economic InteUigence Unit Country Report : Lebanon 
FBIS Foreign Broadcast Information Service
FCO Foreign Commonwealth Office documents in the British Public Record 
Office
MEED Middle East Economic Digest
MEI Middle East International
MEM Middle East Mirror
SWB BBC Summary of World Broadcasts
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